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Introduction 
Peter Larmour 
In 1987, Fiji had its first change of government since the country 
became independent in 1970. In a general election, a coalition of the 
National Federation Party (NFP) and the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) won 
four more seats than the ruling Alliance Party. Dr Tunoci Bavadra 
replaced Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister. Both were 
indigenous Fijians, but most of the Coalition's electoral support was 
non-indigenous. A month later the new government was deposed by 
a military coup. A second coup, later in the year, forestalled 
implementation of a political compromise between party leaders. The 
country was declared to be a Republic, and was refused re-admission 
to the Commonwealth. The former Governor-General became 
President, and established an Interim Government. 
A new Constitution was drawn up to replace the one adopted at 
Independence in 1970. Its preamble explained how the 'events in 
1987' 
were occasioned by a widespread belief that the 1970 Constitution 
was inadequate to give protection to the interests of indigenous 
Fijians, their values, traditions, customs, way of life and economic 
well being (Fiji 1990:498). 
The new 1990 Constitution contained provisions that its designers-. 
believed would protect and promote the interests of indigenous 
Fijians, including disproportionate parliamentary representation, 
more influence for the Great Council of Chiefs, affirmative action in 
the public service, and the reservation of the office of Prime Minister 
for indigenous Fijians. Its affirmation of indigenous rights attracted 
some sympathy from governments elsewhere in the region, but the 
Constitution was also criticised for its impact on non-indigenous 
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Fijians, particularly the Indo-Fijians whose forebears had come as 
indentured labourers to the country during colonial rule. Emigration 
increased and investment fell. Constitutional change became the test 
___for investor confidence and a return to the Commonwealth. 
The 1990 Constitution contained provisions for its own review 
within seven years (Section 161). The Review was eventually 
commissioned in March 1995, and reported in September 1996. 
Parliament approved the following terms of reference 
The commission shall review the Constitution promoting racial 
harmony and national unity and the economic and social 
advancement of all communities and bearing in mind internationally 
recognised principles and standards of individual and group rights. 
Towards these ends the Commission shall 
(1) Take into account that the Constitution shall guarantee full 
protection and promotion of the rights, interests and concerns of the 
indigenous Fijian and Rotuman people. 
(2) Scrutinise and consider the extent to which the Constitution of Fiji 
meets the present and future constitutional needs of the people of 
Fiji, having full regard for the rights, interests and concerns of all 
ethnic groups of people in Fiji. 
(3) Facilitate the widest possible debate throughout Fiji on the terms 
of the constitution of Fiji and inquire into and ascertain the views 
and opinions that may exist in Fiji as to how provisions of the Fiji 
constitution can be improved upon in the context of Fiji's needs as a 
multi-ethnic and multicultural society. 
(4) Report fully on the above matters and, in particular, to 
recommend constitutional arrangements likely to achieve the 
objectives of the Constitutional Review as set out above (Fiji 
1996:744-55). 
The chairman of the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) was 
Sir Paul Reeves, a former Archbishop and Governor-General of New 
Zealand with an indigenous Maori background. Its other members 
were Tomasi Vakatora, an indigenous Fijian businessman and former 
cabinet minister, and Dr Brij Lal, an Indo-Fijian academic historian at 
The Australian National University (ANU). 
The chapters in this book assess the CRC's recommendations 
about the system of electing members of Parliament. Although they 
are only one aspect of the CRC's report, they are a critical, and 
p,,,,,,. T nrmnur 
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controversial, aspect of its approach to achieving cooperation 
between ethnic groups. 
Ethnic divisions are typical of modem states (Smith 1995:86). 
Ethnic conflicts have become more salient since the end .of the Cold 
War, but have always been a feature of the politics of developing 
countries like Fiji. Relations between indigenous people, and the 
descendants of migrants, are also a matter of constitutional debate in 
Fiji's neighbours, including Australia, New Zealand and New 
Caledonia. 
Background to the chapters 
The following chapters are based on papers presented at a workshop 
held at ANU's Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies in 
Canberra in January 1997. The workshop brought together the 
former Commissioners (Reeves, Vakatora and Lal, and their Counsel, 
Alison Quentin-Baxter), Professor Donald Horowitz, whose argu-
ments about voting in ethnically divided societies had influenced the 
Commission, and other academics and students with interests in 
electoral systems and Fiji politics. Members of the Select Committee 
of the Fiji Parliament which was then reviewing the CRC report were 
invited to the workshop, and several were able to attend. It was 
organised by the editors of this book as part of a wider research 
project in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies on 'State, 
Society and Governance in Melanesia', funded from the ANU's own 
resources and the Australian Agency for Aid and Development 
(AusAID), and convened by Professor Ron Duncan of the National 
Centre for Development Studies. 
Tomasi Vakatora, and Professor Yash Ghai, who were academic 
visitors to ANU in late 1996, helped design the workshop and 
identify participants. Professor Cheryl Saunders, of the University of 
Melbourne, Michael Maley of the Australia Electoral Commission, 
and Dr Marian Simms, Dr William Sutherland and Anthony Regan of 
the ANU contributed as rapporteurs and discussants. Ghai was 
adviser to the NFP-FLP, and he, Saunders and Larmour had been 
advisers at various times to the Citizens Constitutional Forum, a non-
government organisation (NGO) that had held a number of 
workshops in Fiji on constitutional issues, and had made a 
submission to the CRC. Another NGO, the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), contributed to the 
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publication of this book, through Ben Reilly, Programme ?~ficer at 
IDEA and a PhD scholar in the ANU's Department of Political and 
Social Change. 
Electoral systems in Fiji, 1970-1997 
Under the 1970 Constitution, there were separate electoral rolls for 
Fijians, Indians and so-called General Voters (the rest). The country 
was divided into two kinds of constituency: 27 communal con-
stituencies, in which voters from one ethnic group chose among 
candidates from their group; and 25 national constituencies, in which 
candidature was limited to members of one or other ethnic group, 
but all three groups voted. Thus any particular elector had four 
votes: one for a candidate from his or her own ethnic group, compet- · 
ing only for the votes of that group; and one each for a candidate 
from each of the three ethnic groups, competing for three national 
seats. The candidate with the largest number of votes in each seat 
won. There were no seats without ethnic restrictions on candidature 
and/or voting. However 'cross voting' in the national seats was 
meant to encourage accommodative behaviour. For example, the 
candidate in a Fijian national seat had to be a Fijian, but could seek 
support more widely from other ethnic groups. In ethnic terms the 
outcome was fixed, and balanced, in advance: there would always be 
22 Fijian MPs; 22 Indian MPs; and 8 'General' MPs (who were thus 
over-represented compared to their numbers in the population). 
Fijian and Indian leaders had agreed that the 1970 arrang~ments 
were not final, and that a Royal Commission would look agam at the 
electoral system. The commission, chaired by Professor Harry Street, 
reported in 1975 and recommended retaining the 27 communal seats, 
but opening up the 25 national seats to any candidate, regardless of 
ethnicity. Elections to the open seats would be by Single Transferable 
Vote. The government did not act on the report (Lal 1986:78, Scarr 
1988:20). 
The Alliance Party held power under this electoral system for 17 
years. The Alliance was formally a coalition of different ethnic 
organisations. Though it was dominated by its Fijian wing, it always 
attracted a substantial Indian vote. It faltered briefly in 1977, when it 
narrowly lost a general election. However, the opposition was so 
divided that they could not form a government and the Alliance was 
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~estored with a large majority in a second general election held later 
m the year. It faltered fatally in 1987, when the opposition coalition 
briefly took office, before being removed in a military coup. 
The 1990 Constitution retained the separate electoral rolls of its 
predecessor, ~d created an additional roll for the indigenous people 
of ~e offshore ISland of Rotuma. It eliminated the cross voting 
national seats, and increased the total number of communal seats bu~ reweighed them to give the Fijian members an overall majori~. 
Thirty-seven of the 70 seats were reserved for Fijians, 27 for Indians, 
5 ~or ~~.neral Vo~ers and 1 for Rotumans (who had previously voted 
with FiJians). Thirty-two of the Fijian seats were filled from 
multimember, provincial constituencies. All elections were conducted 
via a First-Past-the-Post (FPP) electoral system. 
When parliamentary government was restored after the first 
general elec.tion in 1992, the Alliance had been replaced by the 
Soqosoqo ru Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) as the largest Fijian party. It 
was led by Sitiveni Rabuka, who had led the two coups in 1987. Ratu 
Mara, the former Prime Minister, became President. The SVT did not 
try, n~r did ~t have any electoral incentives, to appeal outside Fijian 
co~shtuencies, and claimed a special relationship with the country's 
chiefs. In the 1994 election it increased its number of seats. 
Meanwhile, emigration had affected the demographic balance 
between rethnic groups. In 1966, indigenous Fijians had formed 42 
per cent of the population. In 1986, just before the coups, they formed 
46 per cent. By 1996 they were 50 per cent (Norton 1990 Table l; Fiji 
CRC 1996: 7~91, Tables A and B). There had been a net outflow of 
about 40,000 Indo Fijians, compared to 5,000 people from other 
communities, since the coups (Fiji CRC 1996: 37, para 3.67). 
What the chapters say 
Horowitz: the arguments for the Alternative Vote system 
Donald ~o.r~wi~z's ~hapter argues from first principles, particularly 
that a politician s primary objective is to ensure election, and from 
the recent history of other, ethnically divided societies. He identifies 
several w~ys of re~uc~g inter-ethnic conflict: by dispersing it; by 
~ncou~agmg conflict w~thin rather than between groups; by creating 
mcenhves for cooperation; and by encouraging cleavages such as 
class or territory, that cut across ethnicity._ 
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Horowitz proposes that politicians will be more moderate on 
ethnic issues if they have to rely, to some extent, on the votes of 
people who are not members of their ethnic group. Their moderation 
is enforced by the votes, and the threat of withholding them, of 
voters from other ethnic groups. He contrasts this approach, which 
he calls 'vote pooling', with 'seat pooling', where candidates 
successful within their own ethnic group form a coalition with 
candidates from other ethnic groups after the election. These 
coalitions, he says, quickly break down without the backing of 
voters. He finds three conditions are required for pre-electoral 
coalitions in divided societies: party proliferation (so no party can 
govern alone); heterogeneous, or mixed constituencies (so that 
candidates cannot rely on the votes of their own group alone); and 
'strong electoral incentives to make vote pooling politically 
profitable', particularly the Alternative Vote (AV). 
Horowitz finds the CRC's arguments for the AV 'impeccable' but 
he disagrees with some of their detailed recommendations, 
particularly their way of adding preferences, and their proposal for 
multimember seats in which all candidates compete against all other 
candidates. He suggests other ways of counting preferences, and 
proposes that if large constituencies are necessary they need not be 
'multimember': three members would be chosen by the same 
electorate, but candidates competing for one of the seats would only 
compete with other candidates competing for that seat, and 
preferences would be transferred only within single seats. Horowitz 
thus deals with the major concerns raised in the workshop against 
multimember AV. 
Horowitz also includes 'discouraging words' about the 
relationship between the process of negotiation, and the outcome. 
Just because two sides can agree on something does not mean it will 
work. And things that are agreed to as transitional often later prove 
hard to dislodge (as the fate of the Street Commission shows). It is 
important to get things right at the start. 
Lal: the Commission's thinking 
Brij Lal introduces and summarises the Commission's thinking and 
recommendations about electoral systems. He sets out the logic of the 
Commission's approach: analysing the weaknesses of the 1970 and 
1990 constitutions, comparing Fiji with other countries, giving 
Peter umnour 
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priority to inter-ethnic cooperation, and then making recommenda-
tions to achieve it. Among these were the recommendation that all 
elections to both Houses of Parliament, and to the Presidency and 
Vice Presidency, should be by "the preferential system known as the 
'Alternative Vote'" (Fiji CRC 1996:304). 
The chapter treats the AV as a refinement of the FPP system, 
designed to ensure that the successful candidate receives a majority 
of the votes cast. The AV contrasts both with proportional systems, 
designed to ensure that the seats a party receives in Parliament are 
proportional to the number of votes it receives in the election. 
Importantly for the debate in the January workshop, the chapter 
argues that the Alternative Vote can be used in multimember as well 
as single-member constituencies. 
The Commission evaluated these electoral systems according to 
their impact on inter-ethnic cooperation and multi-ethnic 
government. They studied the impact of electoral systems in other 
ethnically divided societies, including Mauritius (discussed in 
Mathur's chapter). They saw politicians and political parties as the 
significant actors, responding to incentives and restraints imposed by 
the electoral system. Provided that there were a number of political 
parties, and constituencies contained a mixture of ethnic groups, the 
Alternative Vote could encourage some politicians and parties to 
seek the second or third preferences of people from another ethnic 
group. If they wished to get re-elected, they would continue to take 
into account the interests of the voters who had given them their 
preferences. 
The Commission went on to evaluate AV against their other 
criteria: representation of constituents; voter participation; minority 
representation; fairness between parties; effective government and 
effective opposition; provenness elsewhere; and legitimacy. The CRC 
recommended that 45 open seats in Fiji's Lower House should be 
filled by AV in 15 three-member heterogeneous constituencies. 
Boundaries would be determined by a standing, independent 
Constituency Boundaries Commission. Another 25 seats should be 
reserved for ethnic groups. 
Lal's chapter concludes with his own comments, particularly to 
counter criticisms of the use of AV in multimember constituencies. 
Fiji already used multimember constituencies for Fijian seats, and the 
purpose of the CRC' s recommendation was to achieve the ethnic 
Introduction 
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heterogeneity within the seats that was necessary for AV to encour-
age inter-ethnic cooperation . 
Reilly: the Alternative Vote in Australia and Papua New Guinea 
Ben Reilly's chapter follows Horowitz and Lal in granting a central 
place to electoral systems in shaping political competition, and the 
Alternative Vote in achieving accommodation. His contribution is to 
show in detail how AV works in Australia, and worked in its former 
colony, the ethnically divided state of Papua New Guinea. He 
disagrees with the CRC, however, over the use of AV in multimember 
constituencies. 
Reilly shows how AV can be seen as a refinement of the Single 
Transferable Vote system of proportional representation. The 
arguments for AV assume that politicians behave rationally, and 
strategically, taking into account the characteristics of the electorate, 
their bases of support, and their expectations of what other 
candidates will do. To 'pool' their own first preferences, and the 
second preferences of other candidates, politicians will, he says, tend 
to move to the centre. The Australian Labor Party's reliance on the 
second preferences of Green voters in the 1990 Federal election is a 
good example. 
Reilly identifies three strategies adopted by candidates under AV 
in Papua New Guinea: candidates with a small base of first 
preferences sought the second preferences of other groups; 
candidates with a larger base sought secondary support from outside 
it; while others campaigned together, urging supporters to give their 
second preferences to each other. Preference distribution became 
increasingly important in deciding the outcome of successive 
elections (and, by implication, the highly competitive, and sometimes 
violent, style of campaigning in some parts of Papua New Guinea 
may be related to its adoption of FPP in 1975). 
While the PNG evidence supports AV, Reilly faults the CRC's 
recommendation for AV in multimember constituencies, and their 
recommendations about the way second and third preferences 
should be counted. The Alternative Vote in multimember 
constituencies, he argues from Australian Senate examples, can 
produce highly disproportionate outcomes. He shows from a 
hypothetical example, that giving second and third preferences the 
same weight as a first preference may lead to the elimination of more 
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popular candidates, and disproportional outcomes. He concludes 
that AV utilising single-member constituencies is the best option, but 
if multimember constituencies are needed to achieve ethnic 
heterogeneity, then Fiji should use the Single Transferable Vote. 
Arms: arguments for Proportional Representation 
David Arms dissents from the consensus among previous chapters in 
favour of the Alternative Vote. He goes back a step further to dissent 
from the priority that the CRC gives to multi-ethnic government. 
Instead, he argues, the electoral system should try to represent the 
whole spectrum of opinion in the electorate, including minority 
views, even if these are racist, or extreme. Arms is suspicious of 
deals, accommodations and engineering outcomes. People in Fiji, he 
suspects, will continue to vote on ethnic lines, and a system that tries 
to marginalise these expressions of opinion will only drive them 
outside it. 
Arms is sympathetic to the use of AV when one official is being 
elected (for example, a President). However, when a number of 
representatives is being elected simultaneously (as in a parliament), 
he is concerned that a minority interest or viewpoint may be 
systematically unrepresented. (Supporters of AV might say they 
would nevertheless be able to influence the outcome through the use 
of their preferences.) 
The first part of Arms' chapter uses examples to show how 
different electoral systems can deliver different results from the same 
initial distribution of votes. He notes Block Voting is already 
operating in some elections in Fiji, and generally finds it, and AV, to 
be hostile to minorities. He points out that the CRC has been 
sufficiently concerned about under-representation to allow the 
President to make appointments to the Upper House to compensate 
for it, and that the CRC is content to continue the over-representation 
of General Voter and Rotuman minorities in the reserved seats. 
Arms favours the Single Transferable Vote (STV) as a means of 
ensuring that parties, interests and viewpoints (including expressions 
of ethnic sentiment) are represented in parliament in proportion to 
their distribution among the electorate. Coalitions might then follow 
by a process of what Horowitz called seat pooling rather than vote 
pooling, but the electoral system is not enlisted to encourage them. 
The second part of the chapter engages point-by-point with the 
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arguments of the CRC, using its own criteria. He notes the stress that 
requirement for ethnic heterogeneity puts on the boundaries to be 
drawn by the Constituency Boundaries Commission. The third part 
advances Arms' argument for ST\!, and admits some mainly technical 
drawbacks. 
Mathur: accommodation without the Alternative Vote in Mauritius 
First-Past-the-Post (FPP) voting received short shrift in the CRC 
report, and in all the chapters reviewed so far. Raj Mathur shows 
how FPP has allowed dramatic disproportionality between seats and 
votes in general elections in Mauritius. Twice, the opposition has 
been wiped out, with a winning coalition obtaining 100 per cent of 
the seats with 64 per cent of the vote in 1982, and a different coalition 
achieving a similar clean sweep with 65 per cent in 1995. 
Nevertheless, Mauritius has achieved ethnic accommodation, and 
national, rather than communal parties, in spite of FPP. 
Mauritius uses a system of three-member constituencies in which 
the top three candidates, regardless of the percentage obtained, are 
elected (rather like the Block Vote described in Arms chapter, and 
used in most Fijian constituencies under the 1990 Constitution). 
Disproportionality has been somewhat mitigated by the filling of 
eight additional 'Best Loser' seats. Four of these are awarded on 
ethnic grounds, by calculating which community is least represented, 
compared to its population. However, Mathur says that the system is 
associated with increasingly unwelcome entrenchment of ethnic 
differences. 
The Constitution of Mauritius recognises the existence of different 
ethnic communities, but does not enrol them separately, or require 
that they vote separately, as does Fiji. All are descendants of migrants 
(whereas the conflict in Fiji is increasingly expressed in terms of 
relationships between indigenous people and immigrants, rather 
than races, or ethnic groups). Mauritian parties have learned ethnic 
accommodation and power-sharing. They enter into coalitions before 
or after the election, pooling votes and seats, and none has tried to 
govern alone. Parties have striven to become 'national' and now no 
party is ethnically-based. In terms of Horowitz's criteria, there is a 
Peter Larmour 
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proliferation of parties, so none can govern alone. Not all cons~tue~­
cies, however, are heterogenous (Hindus, we are told, predominate m 
rural constituencies). Nor are electoral incentives particularly strong, 
as candidates require only a plurality to win. 
Ghai: what the parties wanted 
Yash Ghai compares the CRC report with the submissions to it from 
the opposition parties and the governing SVT. He criticises the CR~ 
for its commitment to a 'Westminster' system of government, and its 
reluctance to mandate power-sharing in the constitution. 
The SVT submission supported the continuing political 
predominance of indigenous Fijians, reinforced by majo~ty . 
representation in a parliament of seats reserved for particular ethnic 
groups. Coalitions or power-sharing might not be excluded, but the 
constitutional system did nothing to encourage them. 
The NFP-FLP submission favoured 'constitutionally mandated 
sharing of power' between parties and ethnic groups. Any party that 
received more than 20 per cent of the votes would be entitled to a 
similar proportion of seats in Cabinet. The Pr~e Minister wo~ld be 
required by the constitution to ensure that Cabinet membership was 
racially balanced. Electorally, the NFP-FLP recommende~ 40 ope~ 
seats elected by proportional representation from party lists, treating 
the whole country as a single constituency. It also recommended 
continuing, for the time being, with 30 communal seats, elected from 
single-member constituencies by the Alternative Vote. Parties would 
be required to open their membership to all ethnic groups. 
Ghai associates the CRC's preference for encouraging power-
sharing indirectly, through the electoral system, with their 
conservative endorsement of the Westminster system (in particular, 
he implies, the adversarial relationship between Government and 
Opposition). He questions whether the CRC's ass~p~ions abo~t. 
Westminster, and the continuing vitality and proliferation of political 
parties, are valid. Generally, he concludes that while the CRC's 
proposals may work, there are too many uncertainties to rely on an 
untried electoral system, rather than constitutional mandate, to 
ensure power-sharing. 
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The issues raised 
Achieving heterogeneity by multimember constituencies 
Horowitz was clear that AV would not encourage accommodative 
behaviour on its own. Constituern;:ies also needed to be 
heterogeneous for candidates to see the need to make appeals 
outside their own ethnic group. 
It was the difficulties in achieving heterogeneity that drove the 
CRC from the uncontroversial use of AV in single-member 
constituencies to its controversial use in multimember constituencies 
where, according to Reilly, 'the majoritarian features of the system 
become overwhelming'. 
Can sufficiently heterogeneous constituencies be drawn up in Fiji? 
The answer depends on demography and what counts as sufficient. 
The CRC made its own calculations, finding 
the choice between single-member and three-member constituencies 
did not affect the potential for heterogeneity in the more densely 
populated areas in the western Division, Macuata and the Greater 
Suva and Nausori area. Using three-member constituencies made it 
marginally easier to achieve a reasonable degree of heterogeneity by 
combining the less densely populated areas, such as the maritime 
provinces, with other areas having similar interests (Fiji CRC 
1996:314, para 10.50) 
The CRC was prepared to accept as heterogenous 'a mixed 
population ranging from more or less equal balance between Fijians 
and Indo-Fijians, to a proportion as high as 85-90 per cent of one 
community and 15-20 per cent of the other' (Fiji CRC 1996: 315, para 
10.51). In the latter situations there might be few pickings for ethnic 
moderates. 
Horowitz proposed a solution: that constituencies large enough to 
be heterogeneous need not be 'multimember'. Two or three members 
could be separately elected by the same large, heterogeneous, 
electorate. Candidates competing for one seat would compete only 
with each other, and preferences would not be transferred between 
the seats. However, some felt this might be confusing and was 
untried. 
In either case, several contributors pointed out the stress that the 
use of the electoral system to achieve ethnic accommodation put on 
the Constituency Boundaries Commission. Careful calculations, 
Peter Larmour 
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independent judgements, and unfamiliar combinations of population 
would be required to achieve and maintain the heterogeneity that 
was required for the CRC's scheme to work 
The priority of multi-ethnic government 
Arms' chapter questions the priority CRC gave to multi-ethnic 
government, and the subordination of other democratic values to it 
(though as Ghai points, the CRC was required to do so by the terms 
of reference Parliament gave it). Horowitz points out that the 
arguments for AV are quite different from the arguments that 
animate discussions about electoral systems in homogeneous 
countries (proportionality, party strength, relations with constituents, 
and seat bonus for FPP). 
Some participants questioned the assumption that lay behind the 
CRC's priorities: that Fiji was, in fact, 'deeply divided' by race. They 
cited the amiable day-to-day relationships between members of 
different ethnic groups, or the importance of other social divisions 
such as class or region (see Sutherland 1992). Different views of the 
salience of ethnicity were also expressed in different interpretations 
of 'the events of 1987'. Were these the last gasp of colonially-inspired 
racism, or a mild precursor of the violence that might come if ethnic 
tensions were not addressed? 
The relationship between recommendations 
The Commission and several participants emphasised the 
interconnectedness of its recommendations. These chapters and the 
workshop focused only on the electoral system. Other 
recommendations, such as the proposal for a 'Compact', and those 
dealing with human rights or indigenous institutions were meant to 
reassure communities, and encourage accommodation between 
them. Seamlessness is particularly important for the electoral system 
which is enlisted by CRC to encourage power-sharing. The CRC's 
approach is self-consciously indirect, but Ghai worries that it put too 
much reliance on the electoral system to achieve power-sharing that 
might have been achieved directly. The system lacks the 
'redundancy' of Horowitz's engineering metaphor. Inability to 
achieve heterogeneity in constituencies may weaken the electoral 
incentives on politicians which in tum may reduce cooperation in 
government. 
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The evidence from Mauritius, with accommodation in spite of an 
electoral system that all the other chapters condemn, shows how 
many other factors may be important. These are difficult to 
disentangle in ad hoc international comparisons that are made to 
support a point in a domestic argument. 
Consociation and/or integration 
The Commission contrasted two approaches to encouraging inter-
ethnic cooperation: its own integrationist approach, that used the 
electoral system to encourage parties to seek support from more than 
one ethnic group; and the 'consociational' approach, which assumed 
communal voting, and sought to achieve accommodation between 
leaders. The two approaches follow Horowitz's distinction between 
vote pooling (which creates continuing electoral pressure on leaders 
to accommodate) and seat pooling (which he found to be unstable). 
'Consociation' was defined classically by Lijphart (1977:25) in 
terms of four features: a grand coalition government; mutual vetoes 
to protect minority interests; proportional representation, employ-
ment and expenditure rules in the public sector; and community 
autonomy. There has been much written about the degree to which 
the 1970 constitution was consociational and the relevance of the 
model to Fiji (for example, Premdas 1986:118 and 1993). Horowitz 
argued that consociation had, in fact, failed to produce accommoda-
tion in countries that tried it. Leaders were easily tempted to abolish 
the restraints it imposed. Ghai suspected the CRC of a 'doctrinal 
objection' to post-election coalitions. 
Taken as a whole, the CRC's report has consociational elements, 
such as the idea of a 'Compact among the people of the Fiji islands', 
separate Fijian institutions, reserved seats, and the proposal that the 
composition of the state services, including the army 'broadly reflect 
the ethnic composition of the population' (Fiji CRC 1996:472, para 
14.26). The CRC argued that it did not favour its approach 'to the 
exclusion of relevant aspects of the consociational model' (Fiji CRC 
1996: 312, para 10.38). 
The NFL-FLP submission to the CRC had taken a consociational 
approach with its proposal for constitutionally mandated power-
sharing, though its proposals for thresholds to get into Parliament 
and Cabinet, and for ethnically inclusive parties, were more 
'integrationist'. 
Peter Larmour 
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The issue in the workshop was whether the outcomes expected by 
the application of electoral incentives might not be guaranteed 
directly by constitutionally mandated power-sharing-at least for a 
transitional period. Such guaranteed outcomes would also, 
politicians pointed out, be easier to explain to their constituents. 
Horowitz pointed out that elections were intrinsically unpredictable, 
while institutions could only hope to reduce ethnic conflict, not 
eliminate it altogether. 
The interests of politicians and parties 
The interests of politicians and parties, rather than voters, are 
referred to positively and negatively at different points in the 
chapters. They are crucial to the CRC's scheme of enlisting the self-
interest of politicians to an achievement of accommodative 
behaviour. Heterogeneous constituencies and Alternative Voting 
guide the vote-maximising politician to take the interests of other 
ethnic groups into account. 
Arms recognised that some politicians' behaviour might be 
expressive (for example of ethnic identity) rather than rational and 
instrumental. The CRC's scheme assumes that at least some 
politicians are rational, in the sense that they calculate the best way 
of maximising their votes and chances of re-election (even if this 
involves them appealing outside their ethnic group). Horowitz 
argues it would work if just some politicians are rational, hewing to 
the centre while leaving the fringes to the fundamentalists. 
The CRC is comfortable with parties: 'in our view the formation 
of a government must continue to depend on the party system' (Fiji 
CRC 1996:79, para 5.48). The CRC's scheme requires that there be 
proliferation, so that no one can govern alone. While they would be 
bound by the Compact, the CRC does not seek to regulate 
specifically the parties' internal mechanisms for selecting candidates 
or admitting members (matters addressed, Ghai notes, in the NFP-
FLP submission). Arms sees parties as potentially obstructive of 
voters' wishes (for example, in dealing with criticism that minority 
parties may exercise undue influence, he points out that the real 
villain is party discipline). Good or bad, Ghai wonders if parties will 
in fact continue to play the central role they have in Fiji politics. They 
are much.weaker elsewhere in Melanesia. 
Introduction 
. 
. I···~·,, 
_J
li., 
. 
. 
16 
State, society and governance in Melanesia 
Reilly's work on Papua New Guinea, however, suggests strongly 
that AV can encourage accommodative behaviour in heterogenous 
constituencies without parties. The calculations, deals, and swops 
involved in vote pooling are simply made by individual candidates 
relying on concentrations of support . 
The relative importance that the CRC and others give to the 
electoral system is partly because it seems to be the most manipula-
ble part of the political system, that most conducive to 'engineering', 
though the interests of the current generation of politicians may act 
as a dead weight on change. They may rationally resist choosing 
rules that would subject them to unwelcome incentives. 
The interests of politicians were also involved in Horowitz's 
cautionary words about the outcomes of constitutional bargains, 
which might not lead to the best outcomes, and the dangers of 
transitional measures. 
Several contributors also referred to the ability of politicians and 
parties using the system to learn. Reilly showed how vote pooling 
took hold over several elections in Papua New Guinea, while Mathur 
described politicians and parties learning from early conflict. Part of 
the historical thrust of the CRC's report is to learn from the failures of 
the past, both 1970 and 1990. Clearly an indirect system like the CRC 
recommended will need time, and several elections, to work. 
The possibility of democracy in Fiji 
Horowitz identifies limits on democracy in a deeply divided society. 
Democratic elections assume no permanent majority or minority, and 
that voters may switch between parties. In divided societies, people 
are assigned identities at birth, and parties tend to attach to them. 
Much depends on what is implied by 'democracy': the CRC took 
it to mean 'governed by the people through their elected 
representatives' (Fiji CRC 1996:66, para 5.13), though the CRC also 
put great emphasis on human rights. The scheme of heterogeneous 
constituencies, party proliferation and AV may be valuable in 
moderating inter-ethnic conflict, but does not of itself enhance 
democracy. Other parts of the CRC's report, for example those 
dealing with human rights, expand the conditions for democracy in 
Fiji, but that is a secondary criterion for evaluating the electoral 
system, which is aimed at inter-ethnic accommodation. That was the 
basis of Arms' critique. 
Peter Lannour 
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Several contributors to the workshop questioned whether it was 
appropriate to talk about a 'return' to democracy in Fiji. 
Commentators from quite different points of view have questioned 
the earlier existence, and continuing possibility of democracy in Fiji's 
circumstances of Chiefly power, Fijian traditions, ethnic divisions, 
and a politicised military: For Ravuvu, 'Democracy was an illusion, a 
facade, a parting whim of a colonial power that had itself only 
practised dictatorship' (1991:87). Scarr concludes 'the independence 
constitution itself was not democratic at all' (1988:23). Lawson points 
to the system's intolerance of an opposition becoming the 
government (1991:287-8). Comparative research on the social 
conditions for democracy finds that landowners are generally 
resistant to democratisation. A linkage between constitutional and 
land issues is often made in Fiji (Larmour 1994). 
Other issues of 'state, society and governance in Melanesia' 
The relationship between the electoral system and ethnic conflict is of 
significance more widely in Melanesia (the scope of the project that 
sponsored the workshop). A return to Alternative Voting has been 
canvassed for Papua New Guinea, particularly by Tony Siaguru 
(Reilly 1997:6). Vanuatu provides an example of the use of a simple 
form of Proportional Representation to reassure linguistic minorities 
(Van Trease 1995a:l45-50). The ethnic impact of voting systems and 
constituency boundaries is also an issue in New Caledonia, where a 
large indigenous minority coexists with the descendants of settlers, 
and recent migrants, in what is constitutionally part of France. 
Conceptually, the CRC's indirect approach to achieving multi-
ethnic government is consistent with new approaches to governance 
that rely less on restraints and more on incentives. Their approach 
assumes rationality-at least among sufficient voters and 
politicians-to elect an accommodative coalition. Such indirect 
approaches may be particularly relevant to so-called 'weak states' in 
other parts of Melanesia, but the analysis of the conditions for AV to 
achieve ethnic accommodation shows that it requires some strong 
institutions, particularly Boundaries Commissions. The political 
parties that play a central role in the CRC's scheme are also much 
weaker, or absent, in other parts of Melanesia, though Reilly showed 
that AV could nevertheless encourage accommodative behaviour 
between candidates themselves, regardless of the party system. 
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1 
Encouraging electoral accommodation in 
divided societies 
Donald L. Horowitz 
The constitution recommended by the Fiji Constitution Review 
Commission is the result of a careful process of investigation and 
deliberation that produced an extraordinarily rich and well-reasoned 
report. One important aspect of the report that might otherwise go 
unnoticed requires mention at the outset. The Commission took its 
mission to embrace the need for a cross-national examination of 
constitutional possibilities for countries situated similarly to Fiji. The 
report includes serious consideration of the experience of other states 
and of international standards applicable to the matters within its 
terms of reference. In this respect, the report does not exactly break 
new ground, but it carries the effort to a new level of seriousness and 
sophistication. First and foremost, then, the Commission conceives of 
constitution-making as a comparative exercise. The Commission 
learned everything it could from experience elsewhere and made its 
recommendations in the light of that experience and Fiji's own 
experience. There is no doubt whatever, in view of practice elsewhere 
and of emerging standards of human rights, that the Commission 
was entirely correct to proceed as it did. 
Like the Commission, I intend to set the electoral system issues 
that face Fiji in a comparative framework. I want to focus on the 
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political institutions a polity like Fiji may wish to adopt and 
comment on some problems of process involved. Divided societies 
need special institutions to foster political accommodation, and they 
need a coherent, consistent set of them. The most powerful lever of 
political engineering for conflict reduction is the electoral system. 
Accordingly, I intend to evaluate the merits of various electoral 
systems and mechanisms for fostering accommodative coalitions and 
reducing conflict. Finally, I shall have some generally discouraging 
words about the relationship of negotiation to the institutions created 
by negotiation. As I shall show, there is a disjunction between process 
and substance that is likely to affect constitutional outcomes. 
I start with three propositions 
• institutions should aim not for love but accommodative 
behaviour 
• it is important to get institutional arrangements right from 
the beginning 
• it is best to build in incentives for participants to comply 
with the intentions of constitution-makers. 
In severely divided societies, no constitution can make the __ 
1 
contending groups love each other. What a constitution can do is to : 
~e!__acc~~dati~e behaviour. It can reduce conflict by providing 
security_ for groups, includin~em in the politicaCs~sfem, and_ 
decreasing the incidence of zer<H>um outcomes. at it cannot do, l 
except pernaps over a very long period o time, is transcend ethnic 1 
identity, create wholly new, supraethnic identities, or alter -
dramatically the feelings of group members about members of other 
groups. Fortunately, maximal goals of this kind are not necessary. 
That is my first proposition. 
My second relates to prospects for correcting constitutional 
mistakes. The conventional wisdom, _!h_~t if ~greements are flawed at 
the outset they can be fixed later, is misguided. It is not usually 
possibl~to amend as stem in mid-course. Interests quickly 
crystallise around whatever arrangemen were initially adopted. As 
a result, even if the institutions fail in their public objectives, there 
are actors whose private success will depend on the maintenance of 
the arrangements. Electoral s stems everywhere are difficult to 
~ge-for xactly this _reas~:.. In a div1Qea society, consensus on any 
institution is rare, much less consensus on trulyaprinstitutions, and-
it is a fallacy that whatever the parties agree to willoe not only 
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acceptable but durable. An agreement only indicates what was 
accepta e to the parties concerned at a particular moment. The 
existence of an agreement is no evidence that it embodies the best 
arrangements or the most durable arrangements. It is a mistake to 
exaggerate the importance of reaching an agreement, at the expense 
of its substance and content. There is a need to choose apt 
arrangements and to do so at the outset. 
The more enduring and effective arrangements for conflict reduc-
tion are those fortified by internal incentives rather than by external 
constraints. By C-onstraints, f mean admorutions to do something, 
even if it is not in one's interest. By incentives, I mean principally 
those that operate on politicians and that harness their self-interest to 
the cause of conflict reduction, regardless of personal feelings. Such 
incentives make moderation pay. Institutions that tell political 
leaders what they should do or must do are less effective than 
institutions that make it in the interest of leaders to behave in an 
accommo ative fashion.__,. 
Mechanisms for conflict reduction 
Incentive-based institutions that give politicians a stake in 
moderation need to be put into a broader context of mechanisms that 
produce conflict reduction. There are at least four such mechanisms. 
First, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by dispersing it. r Proliferating the points of power ~ay take the heat off of a single 
{ _foca point. One way to do this is by scattering power amom 
institutions at the centre, as the United States' political system does. 
If the capture of no single body or office will suffice for any ethnic 
group to gain complete power, then ethnic conflict may lose some of 
its capacity to inspire fear tha~ th~ worst is.about.to come to ~ass. _1 Dispersal may also take a terntonal form, involving the creation of 
lower-level units with important policy functions. Either way, politics I 
becomes a more diffused game th~ is when all of power can be \ 
captu~ ~y caE..._turing parliament alone. - - - -- -
Second, inter-ethnic conflict (between groups) may be reduced by 
arran ements that emphasise intra-ethnic conflict (within groups) 
instead. Intra-ethnic conflict is iis~ally, thoughnot always, less 
dangerous and violent than inter-ethnic conflict. If intra-ethnic 
conflict becomes more salient, this may reduce the energy available 
for conflict with other groups. 
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Third, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by policies tha~e _ 
incenti':~~_!.or inter.-ethnic cooperation. Electorafll\ducements for 
coalih on may be one way to heighten the incentives for cooperation. 
Certain territorial arrangements may also do this. Inter-ethnic~ 
cooperation may be more likely where intra-ethnic divisions are 
present, since links m~y be easier to forge between portions of 
groups than between groups that are cohesive and undivided. 
Generally, intra-ethnic solidarity provides the leeway for inter-ethnic 
cooperation, but often not the incentives. Intra-ethnic competition 
provides the incentives but sometimes not the leeway. That is 
because political leaders who do not need to compete for the support 
of their group, since they have a monopoly position, are able to deal 
across group lines, whereas those whose position is vulnerable to 
competitive outbidding need to be cautious about making 
concessions to other groups. However, those who have monopoly 
support among their own group, especially if it is a majority group, 
do not need to cooperate across group lines, whereas those who do 
not have such a monopoly could usually enhance their support by 
such cooperation, provided their competitive position permits them 
to engage in such cooperation. 
__J Fourth, inter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by policies thatl 
( encourage alignments based on interests other than ethnicity. In~, I 
l deeply divided societies, it seems unlikely that non-ethnic lines of cleavage, such as those based on social class or territory, can be ·-~ 
manipulated so as to displace ethnic cleavages. If they could, e
\ conffict would not be the intractable force that it is. But some 
measures may provide the impetus for non-ethnic lines of cleavage, 
like class or territory, to compete for attention with ethnic cleavages. 
Mentioning these mechanisms implies no judgement of likelihood 
that any regime will seek to utilise any given mechanism. Nor does it 
tell us how to choose among these, although sometimes they are 
mutually reinforcing. Intra-ethnic divisions and inter-ethnic 
cooperation often go together. A divided group more often needs 
outside help. Where conflict is reduced, one of these mechanisms is 
generally involved. 
Electorally, the way to induce politicians to be moderate is to 
structure voting arrangements so politicians must rely, in part, on 
votes delivered by members of a group other than their own. Such 
incentives are effective because those votes will not be forthcoming 
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unless the candidates receiving them can be portrayed as being 
moderate on inter-ethnic issues. Consequently, any compromises 
achieved at the top will be supported by electoral incentives at the 
bottom. Politicians respond to them from a basic desire to be re-
elected. What I call vote pooling-the dependence, in part, on votes 
of members of groups other than one's own-works at the voter 
level, not at the level of an elite deal. 
Vote pooling 
To explain why vote pooling is so crucial, it is necessary to 
understand clearly the main difficulty of democracy in a divided 
society. Democratic results are difficult to attain with permanent, 
ascriptive (birth-based) majorities and minorities, such as 60 per cent 
A and 40 per cent B. In a divided society, ascriptive minorities tend to 
be permanently excluded. Anyone who thinks two-party systems are 
always superior to multiparty systems ought to consider the 
implications of two-party politics when a great cleavage divides the 
As and Bs. Two parties overlaid on ascriptive majorities and 
minorities reinforce bipolar politics. 
Democratic elections presuppose no permanent majority and 
minority. They assume the existence of floating voters, some fraction 
of electors who are not permanently committed to any party and 
who may therefore shift their votes and open the possibility of 
altering the electoral outcome. The problem of engineering 
democracy in a divided society entails coping with the dual problem 
of ascriptively defined groups and the propensity for parties to 
follow group lines and become ethnic parties. The only floating that 
takes place in a system where parties represent only their own 
groups is centrifugal. In response to compromise and moderation at 
the centre, some voters move to extremist parties, but they do not 
float across the ethnic cleavage. 
What electoral incentives can be created for inter-group 
moderation? Is it enough that no party receives a majority of seats 
and therefore two or more than two parties must form a coalition in 
order to govern? If that is enough, then List-system Proportional 
Representation (PR) is a good system, because it helps proliferate 
parties. This system permits each party to put up a list of candidates. 
Each voter then votes for one or another party list, each of which is 
numbered in order of the party's preference for its own candidates. 
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Candidates at the top of the list are elected first. Often no party 
secures a majority of seats, necessitating a coalition to form a 
government. 
Unfortunately, however, the need to form a coalition is not 
enough to induce moderation on potentially divisive issues. In many 
severely divided societies, such coalitions have had to be formed, but 
they fell apart at the first divisive issue, leaving inter-group relations 
worse than before (for examples, see Horowitz 1985:369-78). A post-
electoral coalition, formed merely to gain a majority of seats, 
generally does nothing for inter-group accommodation. What is 
needed is an incentive to compromise in the first instance, not merely 
an incentive to coalesce after the election. What is needed, then, is a 
pre-electoral coalition, formed to pool votes, not just seats. 
Pre-electoral coalitions of parties representing more than one 
ethnic group do not form easily in severely divided societies. Three 
conditions are necessary to bring them into being 
• party proliferation, so no one party can form a government 
alone 
• heterogeneous constituencies, consisting of a mixture of 
members of each group, so candidates cannot be sure of 
election on the votes of their own group alone 
• strong electoral incentives to make vote pooling politically 
profitable. 
Seat pooling 
Contrast coalition formation after elections, where parties merely 
pool seats to secure a legislative majority. Under seat pooling, if five 
ethnic parties each have 20 per cent of seats, any three can form a 
government by pooling seats. None needs to seek votes from voters 
outside its own group. And no inter-group compromise will result. If, 
however, there are strong incentives to vote pooling, candidates must 
appeal outside their group to succeed, in order to be elected to office. 
Politicians seek to pool votes before the elections rather than seats 
after. To be elected president of Nigeria in 1979, a candidate needed a 
plurality in the whole country plus at least 25 per cent of the votes in 
at least two-thirds of the then 19 states. The technique was based 
upon plurality plus distribution of the vote. Since territory was a 
proxy for ethnicity, a candidate whose vote was spread over many 
states necessarily had support from many groups. No one could be 
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elected without being a pan-ethnic figure. The incentives continue if 
the politician wants to be re-elected. The mechanism is simple: a 
candidate cannot attract B votes without attending to B interests. 
At independence, the Malaysians, without electoral enginee · 
stumbled into such a situation. For a variety of idiosyncratic (an 
non-replicable) reasons, one Malay and one Chinese party had 
formed a coalition to pool each other's votes in heterogeneous 
constituencies. To do so, they had to compromise. Those 
compromises saved Malaysia from becoming a truly deadly society 
for more than 15 years. The coalition was located at the centre of the 
party spectrum, flanked by extreme parties whose raison d'etre was 
opposition to the coalition's compromises. 
Once it was established, the coalition was locked into the centr. 
position, committed to the compromises, because the centre parties 
could not compete with the extremes for the votes of extremists. 
Likewise, the extremes, which thrived on the sell-out argument, were 
not able to form a coalition with each other or with a centre party of 
the other group. The extremes were less attractive as partners to 
those in the middle. So the spectrum was divided into three: roughly 
50 per cent in middle, and roughly 25 per cent on each flank. The 
parties on either flank could not form a government alone, while the 
centre coalition saw the continuing benefits of pooling each others' 
votes. 
This may be a good model for Fiji-an accommodative centre 
coalition flanked by less accommodative parties. It is exactly what 
was wanted for Northern Ireland in the power-sharing experiments 
of 1973. Those elections came at a time when British government 
specified that no post-electoral government would be permitted to 
take office unless it was committed to power-sharing. That meant not 
merely inter-group accommodation but also actual participation of 
Catholic-based parties, as well as Protestant-based parties, in 
government. The basic idea of an accommodative inter-group 
coalition was certainly on the right track. 
Single Transferable Vote 
The problem in Northern Ireland was the electoral system, based on 
the Single Transferable Vote. It was thought conducive to prolifera-
tion of parties, so that coalition would be necessary. But the next set 
of assumptions, sound in principle, did not work out in practice. 
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In the Single Transferable Vote, voters cast ballots for candidates, 
not parties, in order of voters' preference. In a multimember 
constituency, with 4 seats but 10 candidates, a voter might cast up to 
10 preferential votes. This opens up possibility that some of those 
votes might be cast for candidates across the sectarian or ethnic 
divide. By contrast, List-system Proportional Representation requires 
that votes be cast for a single party list, so there is no way to transfer 
votes across group lines, if parties are ethnically based, as they tend 
to be in severely divided societies. The voter is locked within his 
ethnic party. The hope in Northern Ireland was that there would be 
intergroup vote transfers that would help elect people who were 
moderate on ethnic issues, because they had been elected on votes 
provided by voters of both groups. 
The Single Transferable Vote requires multimember 
constituencies. To be elected a candidate must receive an appropriate 
quota of votes. The quota depends on the number of seats in the 
constituency: the larger the number of seats, the smaller the quota 
required. Once a candidate is elected, surplus votes (above the quota) 
cast for the candidate are transferred to the candidates who stand 
next in preference among the candidate's supporters. Here is how the 
quota is determined 
1 
Quota= +1 
Number of seats + 1 
Applying this formula in a three-member constituency, it takes 
only one-fourth of the total vote plus one to be elected. It is easy to 
win a seat and therefore easy to win a seat based on the votes of 
voters of one's own ethnic group alone. Under the Single 
Transferable Vote, as indicated, surplus votes (after a candidate has 
met his quota) get transferred. If candidates anticipated needing such 
transfer to get elected, agreements across the sectarian divide to 
secure them would have been made and would have fostered 
moderation, as vote pooling does. 
The problem in Northern Ireland was that, because of the way the 
Single Transferable Vote works, it was relatively easy for candidates 
to get elected, and to get elected on votes of their own group 
members, so they did not need to negotiate for reciprocal transfers. 
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The agreements were not made, and the transfers did not appear. 
A new Protestant party sprang up to oppose power-sharing. It and 
other Protestant parties opposed to inter-ethnic coalition secured 35 
per cent of vote, compared to 27 per cent for the Protestant party 
committed to power-sharing. When the power-sharing cabinet took 
office, even the Protestant party committed to power-sharing, fearful 
of erosion of its support, rejected the arrangement, thereby dooming 
it. According to the assessment of Richard Rose 
The electoral system offered parties no incentive to seek votes across 
the religious divide, because the chances of winning an extra seat by 
adding a few votes from the other community were much less than 
the chances of appearing 'soft' on the issues which were of central 
concern within the party's home community (Rose 1976:78). 
The concept of vote pooling is sound, but the task is to change 
these calculations, by making it harder to get elected without 
agreements leading to vote transfers across group lines. It is the 
threshold for election that is the key. The Nigerians added a second 
requirement to having most votes: distribution. Distribution across 
territory was a proxy for distribution across ethnicity. Another way is 
to use a majority threshold. The need to get to a majority creates 
stronger incentives to make deals for inter-group vote pooling. 
Alternative Vote 
A more promising system is the Alternative Vote. It yields more 
proportionality than First-Past-the-Post but less than List-system PR. 
Its effectiveness lies in its being a preferential and a majority system. 
Voters list preferences in order, and each candidate needs a majority 
to win. Suppose a country is divided into two ethnic groups, the As, 
with 80 per cent of the population, and the Bs, with 20 per cent. The 
As, however, divide their support equally between two political 
parties, the A party and the A1 party, whereas the Bs concentrate their 
support in the B party. Under many electoral systems, competition 
between the A and A1 parties will centre on the issue of who is more 
pro-A and anti-B. Under Alternative Voting, which requires a 
majority threshold for victory, some A candidates and one of the A 
parties will find reason to behave more moderately toward the Bs, in 
order to secure their second preferences. With a majority threshold, 
they cannot be elected in any other way. 
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The President of Sri Lanka is now elected this way, and a similar 
system has been used widely in Australia. The Sri Lankan system 
works as follows 
• if there are more than 2 candidates, each voter may vote for 
3 or 4 or however many candidates there are, in order of 
preference 
• if no candidate receives a majority, the election commission 
determines who the two leading candidates are 
• other candidates are eliminated 
• the preferences of all those voters whose first preference 
was eliminated are reallocated between the two leading 
candidates 
• second preferences then count as if they were cast as first 
preferences 
• whoever then receives a majority wins the election. 
That is one way to do the counting in an Alternative Vote system. 
Another is to drop off bottom candidates, one at a time, reallocating 
the second and subsequent preferences of the voters who supported 
them, until a single candidate receives a majority of votes, based on 
his or her own first preferences plus reallocated preferences of 
candidates who have been eliminated. This is the way the system 
works in Australia. Either way, for present purposes, the result is the 
same. The winning candidate owes his victory to the fervent support 
of his own supporters plus the more modest support of those whose 
more fervent support was given to candidates who were eliminated. 
The Commission, it will be noted, chose a third way to tally 
preferences (Fiji CRC 1996:319, para 10.69)-a way that is, in my 
view, more complicated and less desirable than either of these two 
ways. It also recommended multimember seats, in which all 
candidates compete against all other candidates (Fiji CRC 1996:296, 
para 9.167), making the process of transferring preferences unusually 
cumbersome. 
Those recommendations do not in any way impugn the validity of 
the Commission's reasoning about Alternative Voting, which is 
impeccably correct. The tallying technique recommended by the 
Commission can easily be discarded in favour of one of the more 
commonly accepted methods: it entails only one paragraph of the 
Commission's report. By the same token, there is no need to have 
multimember constituencies. Indeed, Alternative Voting works well 
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in single-member constituencies. In multi-ethnic societies, however, 
those constituencies need to be significantly heterogeneous for 
Alternative Voting to foster inter-ethnic vote pooling. This suggests 
one of two possibilities: if significant heterogeneity is available at the 
geographic size level customary for constituencies in Fiji, then all that 
is needed is to draw the boundaries to maximise heterogeneity of the 
open seats. If achieving such heterogeneity requires much larger 
constituencies than Fiji has customarily had, then it would be 
possible to draw boundaries for larger constituencies, in which two 
or three separately-elected seats would be located. These would not 
be multimember seats; two or three members would have to be 
elected by the same electorate to fulfill the requirement of 
constituency scale for heterogeneity, but candidates competing for 
one seat would compete only with candidates competing for that 
same seat, and preferences would be transferred only within single 
seats. Neither of these solutions is in any way radical or difficult to 
implement. Alternative Voting would work smoothly with either. 
What needs to be borne in mind is that the Commission was 
entirely on the right track in pursuing the goal of vote pooling. 
Alternative Voting, a modest modification of First-Past-the-Post, in 
that it substitutes a majority threshold for victory for a plurality 
threshold, is perfectly apt for this purpose in Fiji. It is an electoral 
system that meets the tests of simplicity of operation, lack of 
ambiguity in producing electoral results, and conduciveness to the 
goal of inter-ethnic accommodation. If there is party proliferation 
and if candidates cannot win the election on a plurality, then many 
contests will be decided on second, and possibly even third, 
preferences. That is the feature that induces candidates and parties to 
behave moderately toward those voters who are not among their 
most ardent supporters. The votes of those voters are still valuable. 
How does this work out in a divided society? To illustrate how 
Alternative Voting would work and how it would produce 
conciliatory results, consider an imaginary conversation between 
party leaders seeking the presidency in Sri Lanka, where Alternative 
Voting is used. Suppose two Sinhalese candidates are contesting the 
election. The first estimates 40 per cent first preference support, and 
the second estimates 35 per cent. There is also a Sri Lankan Tamil 
candidate, who can count on perhaps 10 to 12 per cent of all first 
preference votes. A meeting is convened between the first Sinhalese 
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candidate and the Tamil candidate. Since no candidate will have a 
majority of first preferences, the discussion centres on the subject of 
Tamil second preferences. The Tamil leader is asked whether he 
would be willing to urge Tamil voters to give their second 
preferences to the first Sinhalese candidate. He replies that his ability 
to do so depends on the Sinhalese candidate's willingness to be 
hospitable to Tamil aspirations. Otherwise, his appeal to Tamil voters 
to cast second preference ballots for a Sinhalese candidate would be 
futile. Before long, concrete policy issues are being discussed. By the 
end of the negotiations, the first Sinhalese candidate has emerged as 
decidedly more accommodating on Tamil issues than the second 
Sinhalese candidate. A compromise is reached. 
Knowing of this bargain, the second Sinhalese candidate will 
probably seek to differentiate himself from the first, by becoming less 
accommodating on Tamil issues, in order to attract hardline defectors 
who are displeased by the compromise commitments of the first 
Sinhalese candidate. For this reason, accommodation of Tamil 
interests will lose the first Sinhalese candidate some Sinhalese first 
preferences. It will be noted that the first candidate cannot go 
overboard in accommodating the Tamils, if he is to have a net gain 
from the transaction. But he can compensate, to some extent, for the 
loss of hardline Sinhalese votes by appealing to the other minorities 
in Sri Lanka as well. They, too, can offer votes to conciliatory 
Sinhalese candidates. The 50 per cent threshold means that, every 
time there are more than two candidates, parties need to search hard 
for pockets of votes to reach a majority. If there were more than two 
Sinhalese candidates, the majority threshold would be harder to 
reach, the extreme Sinhalese vote would be more divided, and the 
votes of minorities would be both more valuable and less risky to 
attract. In an Alternative Voting system, then, inter-group 
compromise can become useful in getting elected, whereas in most 
other systems compromise makes it more difficult to get elected 
(Horowitz 1991:193). 
Obviously, this system can work for each parliamentary seat as 
well, provided constituencies are heterogeneous. As the Sri Lankan 
example shows, party leaders will take over the job of arranging the 
exchange of votes between supporters of moderate candidates. Of 
course, not all of the incentives of Alternative Voting point to mod-
eration. As indicated, there will be some votes to be had by being 
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anti-Tamil and by being opposed to the first candidate's concessions 
to the Tamils as a sellout of Sinhalese interests (although, of course, it 
is not a sellout but merely a compromise). Alternative Voting does 
not narrow the party spectrum or draw all parties toward the moder-
ate centre. It does create centripetal forces, to be sure, and the hope of 
inter-ethnic accommodation depends on them. But it also differenti-
ates the spectrum into the moderate centre and, again, the extremes 
on the flanks. Under propitious conditions, one of the Sinhalese 
parties will be able to secure more votes under Alternative Voting 
by behaving moderately toward the Tamils, and that moderation, 
which induces vote pooling, is the price of winning the election. 
Note that Alternative Voting is all incentives-there are no 
constraints at all, except the constraint of desiring election and the 
constraint of needing 50 per cent-plus-1 to get elected. These 
mechanisms of vote pooling work at a mainstream voter level, not at 
the level of a deal among the elite over the voters' heads. Alternative 
Voting uses an electoral market to encourage compromise, and party 
leaders respond to the market in votes, not to mere exhortations that 
they should behave virtuously (compare Lijphart 1977). 
Another virtue of these arrangements is that they put majorities 
and minorities into real participation in power, not in the sense of 
officeholding but in the sense of influence. There is often a tradeoff 
between officeholding and influence. For ethnic officeholding, List-
system PR is best. For influence in plural societies, a system that 
builds in incentives for moderation is best. 
To be sure, there is an undeniable lure to guaranteed officeholding 
in divided societies. A 40 per cent minority that is offered 40 per cent 
of the cabinet seats will be sorely tempted, for the alternative may be 
to win 40 per cent of the legislative seats and, because the majority 
party gets to form the government, none of the cabinet seats. More 
often than not, however, such guaranteed officeholding proves 
illusory. The victory of the 60 per cent party was not dependent on 
the votes of the 40 per cent party, and the strong tendency will be for 
the 40 per cent party's cabinet participants to be considered 
peripheral to government. If inter-ethnic disputes arise, those 
minority ministers are likely rather quickly to find themselves on the 
opposition benches again. In short, arrangements like these fail 
because they are not underpinned by political incentives that are 
likely to bind both sides, and they are not underpinned by votes. 
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. C?nseq~ently, in divided societies, officeholding is decidedly 
mfenor to influence. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to 
neglect commitments made to members of groups other than one's 
own when those members are among the voters (albeit a minority of 
those voters) who_wer~ responsible for one's election. The best way 
to assure mode~ah~n: m short, is through floating voters. Floating 
voters are rare m divided societies, but their numbers can be 
increased through preferential electoral systems. 
An important word about the difference between Alternative 
Voting and First-Past-the-Post (FPP). First-Past-the-Post is a plurality 
electoral system, and it often produces odd results. Very commonly; a 
party with less than half the total vote nonetheless receives more 
/ 
thc:u1 half ~e. seats in a plurality system, and sometimes a party may 
gam a maJonty of seats even if it wins fewer votes overall than a 
competitor party. These tendencies in FPP can cause very severe 
problems of governmental illegitimacy in divided societies. AV has 
n~ne of these problems, for, by definition, it requires a majority to 
wm each and every seat, and so it produces a majority consisting 
entirely of me~bers supported, at some level of preference, by more 
than half of the~ ele~to_rates every time. Where political legitimacy is 
a rare commodity, thIS 1S an important advantage. 
Elect~~al literature and electoral engineering: implications 
for FIJI 
The ~tru:idard_academic literature on electoral systems emerged from 
st~di~s m mainly homogeneous societies. Accordingly, it is concerned 
with issues that are, at best, marginally relevant to inter-ethnic 
~ccommodation. These are the questions that have been central to the 
literature 
• :'roporti~nality, which only matters if minority officeholding 
1S more important than influence 
• Strength or weakness of party organisations. List-system PR is 
co~ducive to strong party centres, while FPP gives more 
weight to constituency organisations. 
• R~lationship between legislatures and their constituents. 
LISt-system PR is inimical to constituency accountability. 
• Seat bonus for FPP. FPP systems may provide stable 
governments by giving the winners a greater proportion of 
seats than votes, but at the cost of underrepresentation of 
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minorities, and, as indicated, of frequently excluding a 
majority of voters from electing the government. In ethnic 
party systems, FPP simply facilitates minority exclusion, by 
providing a seat bonus to the largest party. 
Some of these objections can be met by amending the electoral 
system, but in ways likely to discourage inter-ethnic cooperation. For 
example, if one mitigates the absence of constituent accountability in 
List-system PR by moving to constituency Proportional 
Representation, great harm will be done to the representation of 
dispersed minorities. With four seats to a constituency, a 15 per cent 
minority in that constituency could be ignored. The same applies to 
permitting voters to change the order of election on a list. In Sri 
Lanka, where this is possible in parliamentary elections, Sinhalese 
voters move Sinhalese candidates up and Tamil candidates down on 
the list. Likewise, Alternative Voting provides less proportionality 
than does list-system proportional representation, but that is much 
less important than its provision of strong incentives to vote pooling. 
In summary, to obtain moderation, an electoral system needs to 
encourage vote pooling across group lines. Vote pooling in tum 
requires 
• party proliferation, so that no party can necessarily form 
government alone 
• heterogeneous constituencies, so that candidates cannot be 
sure of election on the votes of their own group alone, and 
• electoral incentives that make vote pooling politically 
profitable, incentives such as the need to achieve a majority 
or the need to demonstrate support distributed across the 
country. 
Process and outcome 
Finally, I want to discuss the limits of compromise in constitutional 
design, including the design of electoral systems. There is a differ-
ence between a constitution and a contract, and there is a crucial 
disjunction between the mode of decision-making and the content of 
accommodative arrangements. Bargaining, reciprocity, and exchange 
are ways that groups agree to arrangements that may moderate their 
conflict. The outcome of these processes is compromise. In crafting 
institutions to facilitate inter-ethnic compromise, however, there is a 
need for something other than a compromise. There is a need for 
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consistent, coherent institutions of accommodation that prevent 
backsliding into conflict. It would be better if there are several 
redundant institutions. To use an engineering analogy, if one measure 
fails, there will be a backup. In Nigeria, for example, the president 
was elected on a vote pooling formula, but the legislature was not. 
The latter, with its built-in incentives for conflict, overwhelmed the 
former. The presidential electoral system was alone in fostering 
accommodation. And it was not enough by itself. In 1983, the Second 
Republic was terminated by a military coup. Malaysia started with 
heterogeneous constituencies and vote pooling, but only some 
politicians were elected on such marginal votes from other groups. 
Each constituency delimitation produced fewer and fewer hetero-
geneous constituencies, and cooperative arrangements eroded. The 
disjunction between process and substance is very serious and 
difficult to overcome. Incentives to moderation need to be built in at 
every step, wherever there is an office to be elected. Unfortunately, 
however, the process of bargaining over a constitution is usually at 
odds with the coherence of the product. 
Since this kind of consistent constitutional plan is so difficult to 
adopt, in most severely divided societies incentives to conflict 
outweigh incentives to compromise, and many of them have 
succumbed to the unfavourable balance of incentives. Fiji has a 
unique opportunity to create structures conducive to a future of 
inter-ethnic accommodation. The constitutional technology exists. 
The Commission has already drawn on much of it, and it has 
produced a quite coherent plan of the sort that would be very 
unlikely to emerge out of a process of bargaining. It would be a 
shame if that plan were fragmented into bits and pieces, some 
adopted, some rejected, so that the outcome was a set of institutions 
only some of which conduced to accommodation. It would be 
especially unfortunate because, with the Commission's work in 
place, all that is really required are some imaginative constitutional 
engineers prepared to build a strong system. 
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Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
recommendations for a new electoral 
system for Fiji 
Introduced and summarised by Brij V. Lal 
An electoral system is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Nor is 
there a perfect electoral system, neutral in its content and 
implications, tailor-made to suit every occasion and every need. Very 
often, a country's electoral system is the result of historical accident 
or, in the case of the former colonies of the European powers, a 
legacy inherited at the time of independence. Although they may be 
inappropriate or unsuited, indeed even harmful to the larger 
interests of the country, politicians are often reluctant to discard them 
in favour of other more appropriate and relevant alternatives 
because of, among other reasons, habit, inertia or simply the dread of 
the unknown: better the devil you know than the one you don't. 
Yet, electoral systems play a critical role in shaping not only tpe 
the pa.ture and irec foil. of the political process of a country lmt also 
,___.,,.,... ---- - -- -the foundations of its political culture. They reward certain kinds of 
policies and strategies and punish others. They influence the compo-
sition of political parties and determine the nature of the relationship 
between them. They structure the relations between the voters and 
their representatives in parliament. They can reward the politics of 
moderation or they can encourage the politics of extremism, depend-
ing upon the incentives the system provides. In short, the stability of 
a political system depends greatly on the way its electoral system 
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functions. In divided societies, Donald Horowitz argue~, the _electoral 
system is a vital tool in the arsenal of co_ns~tutional engrneenng. 
The Fiji Constitution Review Comrmss1on was c~ea~ly aware ~f. 
these thoughts as it set out to review the 1990 constitution. ~e v1s1on 
that underlies its work is spelt out in its report and captured ill the 
btitle 'Towards a United Future'. The Commission revisited past 
SU ' h" h. 
efforts at constitution-making, tested the assumptions w ic ill-. 
formed both the 1970 as well as the 1990 constitutions and explamed 
why, in its view, they were wanting or inappropriate. It concluded 
that the 1990 constitution was not only not a product of consensus. 
among the people of Fiji, but did not meet their widely-s~~;ed de~rre 
for a system of government that took proper acc~unt of FIJI s ~ulti­
ethnic character. It encountered widespread and rrrefut~ble ev1d~nce 
of mutual respect, trust and cooperation among the vanou
1
s ~thn1c. 
communities in Fiji, and concluded that it was the c~~tr~ s. consti-
tutional arrangements [which] seem to make peoples illd1v1dual 
ethnicity a barrier to effective cooperation' (Fiji CRC 1996:5). The 
way forward for Fiji, the Commission conclu~~d, ":as. ~~.o encoura~e 
the emergence of multi-ethnic parties or coalitions (FUJI CRC 1996.5). 
The choice of the electoral system that the Commission 
recommended was greatly influenced by this overarching objective: 1 
to foster multi-ethnic cooperation and a multi-ethnic government. 
The Commission was convinced that this objective was widely 
shared by the people of Fiji, though they naturally diffe~d about 
how to attain it or the extent to which Fiji should move ill the . 
direction of multi-ethnic bridge-building in the political arena. In its 
report, the Commission made a number of recommendations that 
aim to achieve that goal. The Preamble it recommends acknowledges 
the culturally rich and diverse character of the country. The Comp~ct 
provides a (non-justiciable) framework for the principles upon which 
the conduct of the government should be based, and the interests and 
values which need to be recognised in the formation of governments. 
Its recommendations on Affirmative Action emphasise the need for 
more non-racial inclusiveness, while taking proper account of the 
interests and aspirations of the communities indigenous to F~ji. Its 
recommendations on the functioning of branches of the public sector 
underline the importance of transparency and effective 
accountability. 
Brij V. Lal 
Electoral systems in divided societies: the Fiji Constitution Review 
All this is to emphasise the overarching vision of the Commission 
and the need t? l~ok at its recommendations in their totality. 
The CommISs1on recommended the retention of a 70-seat Lower 
House, to be called the Bose Lawa. Forty-five of these seats would be 
elected from 15 three-member open, heterogeneous, constituencies 
made up of members of the different communities, with no 
constitutional restriction or reservation of race either for the voters or 
the candidates, and 25 reserved seats of which 12 would be for 
Fijians, 10 for Inda-Fijians, two for General Voters and one for 
Rotumans. :1fle Upper House, to be called the Bose e Cake, presently a 
totally nommated body, would comprise 35 seats, of which 28 would 
be elected from the 14 provinces (two each), again with no 
constitutional restriction or reservation of race, one from Rotuma 
and six appointed by the President on the advice of the Electoral ' ~omm~sion to represent groups (ethnic, cultural, religious, and the 
like) which are under-represented in the Bose Lawa. The President 
would also be elected, without debate, at a joint sitting of both 
houses of Parliament from a list of three to five names submitted to 
them by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga. All elections of candidates for seats 
in the Bose Lawa and the Bose e Cake, as well as the election of the 
President and Vice-President, would be held under the preferential 
system known as the Alternative Vote (AV). Citizens of Pacific island 
origin would again vote with members of the Fijian community 
rather than as general voters; and citizens of mixed descent would 
have the option of regarding themselves as members either of their 
father's community or their mother's community for voting 
purposes (but not for any other constitutional purpose, and without 
any effect on any matter relating to the ownership of land). 
What follows now is the Commission's reasons for choosing the 
AV over oth~r syste~. To prevent distortions or misunderstanding 
and to ~eep illtac~ the integrity and spirit of the report, the ensuing 
text, with only z_nmor editorial interventions (in the interests of clarity 
and economy), IS taken from the Commission's report. The aim is to 
lay before the reader as accurately as possible the Commission's think~g on the subject. This is not the place nor the time to respond 
to various comments and criticisms which have been made of the 
Commission's choice of the electoral systems, though I allude to 
some of them at the end of this text. 
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The choice of voting systems 
F
.. . like most other former British colonies, inherited the First-Past-
iJi, d"d . . 
the-Post (FPP) system used in Britain, where. the cru: i ate wmrung 
most votes is the one who gets elected. This is a l~gical sys~em. when 
the choice is between only two candidates. B.ut i~ th~ choice is 
b than tw
o candidates the situation is different. Then, a 
etween more ' . . 
lurality system may mean that the winning candidate receives ~ess ~an 50 per cent of the votes-that is fewer votes than those received 
by the competing candidates when their votes are added together. If 
there are three candidates, A, B and C, who receive 45 per ~ent, 40 
per cent and 15 per cent of the votes respectively, it is pos.sible to 
imagine that some of the 15 per cent who supported C might have 
f d B to A 
if it was impossible to elect C. A further 
pre erre ' ·d disadvantage of FPP is that the number of successful candi ates 
belonging to a particular party who are elected under FPP i:n~st be 
added up, to determine whether or not that party h~s a maJon~. 
Conceivably a party getting a majority of the votes in the election 
may not get a majority of the seats because its suppo~ters a~e 
unevenly distributed through all constituencies. Theu candidates 
will be elected only if they obtain more votes than an~ other 
candidate in the constituency for which each is standing. 
Various ways of modifying the plurality system have been 
devised to ensure that the winning candidate gets an absolute 
majority (more than 50 per cent) of the votes cast. c:me is to hol~ an 
election under FPP, but if no candidate in the constituenc~ obtains 
more than 50 per cent of the votes, a subsequent ballot is held 
between the two highest-polling candidates, or those who have 
received a specified percentage of the votes. AV is based on the same 
principle, but avoids the need for a seco~d elec~on at a later date. It 
is a refinement of the FPP system in that it requires voters to ran~ 
candidates in the order of their preference. To be elected, a candidate 
must have a majority of the votes cast. It will produce the same result 
as the FPP system if one or more candidates receive 50 per c~nt plus 
1 of the first preference votes. If there is only one seat to be filled, the 
ca.ididate who passes this threshold and has the greatest number of 
votes will be declared elected. Only if no candidate reaches the 
threshold when first preferences are counted, will it be necessary to 
count and allocate second and subsequent preferences. 
Brij V. LAI 
Electoral systems in divided societies: the Fiji Constitution Review 
Then, if the election is for a single-member constituency, the 
candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated. 
In the second round of counting, the ballot papers giving a first 
preference to that candidate are re-examined, and votes are allotted 
to those of the remaining candidates for whom the voter has 
expressed a second preference. After the second preferences are 
added to the first preferences for the candidates still in the running, 
the candidate with the lowest number of votes is again eliminated, 
and so on, until one of the candidates has obtained the required 
quota. The Alternative Vote system can be used in multimember, as 
well as single-member constituencies. 
Unlike the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, which need not 
necessarily require voters to indicate preferences in respect of all 
candidates on the ballot paper, AV requires voters to indicate 
preferences in respect of all or most candidates. Otherwise, all ballot 
papers may be exhausted before any candidate obtains the quota. 
There must in any case be a fall-back provision under which the 
candidate with the greatest number of votes is elected, but if this 
happens regularly because voters have failed to indicate sufficient 
preferences, the advantages of AV as compared with FPP will be lost. 
Also, under the AV system, the election of the successful candidates 
does not, as in proportional representation (PR) systems, depend on 
the proportion of votes cast for the candidate. However, it is argued 
that, like PR systems, AV mitigates the winner-takes-all aspects of 
FPP and generally achieves better proportionality of seats-to-votes 
than the FPP system. 
Plurality systems like First-Past-the-Post and majority systems 
like the Alternative Vote may be contrasted with proportional 
systems, where the seats a party receives in Parliament are broadly 
proportional to the number of votes it receives, either in all 
constituencies or in a separate vote treating the whole country as a 
single constituency. Of the three main types of proportional system, 
the Commission received submissions in favour of two: a system 
based on Party Lists and STV. The latter had been recommended for 
open seats by the Street Commission in 1975. The submissions 
expressed limited interest in the Mixed Member Proportional system 
(MMP) adopted in post-war Germany, and recently in New Zealand. 
The general inclination was to wait and see how that system operates 
in New Zealand. 
Fiji Constitution Review Commission recommendations 
43 
44 
State, society and governance in Melanesia 
List-system PR allocates seats to parties in proportion to th~ 
number of votes won by the party using one of several recognised 
formulae. The party managers decide the names and the order in 
which they should appear on the lists. Frequently, this gives better 
opportunities than most system~ to include women and mem~e~s of 
minority groups sufficiently high on the list to win a seat, but it is 
often seen as giving too much power to the party and not enough to 
individual voters. If the system treats the whole country or major 
regions of a country as a single constituency, the List-system also fails 
to provide the important links between a voter and his or her 
member. Measures to reduce the size of the constituency represented 
through the list, or to open the list to variation by individual voters 
deprive the system of the simplicity and proportionality it would 
otherwise have. 
Under the STV system, the constituencies must be multimember 
because the allocation is based on the range of preferences within the 
constituency. The greater the number of members, the greater the 
proportionality. As in the case of AV, the voter numbers the . 
candidates in order of preference. But under STY, the underlying 
principle is the distribution of fractions of a single vote: If any 
fraction of the vote is not needed to help elect the candidate of the 
voter's first choice, or cannot be used because the candidate has been 
eliminated, it is transferred at a discounted value to help elect the 
candidate of second choice, and so on. The quota needed to secure 
election is the lowest possible, taking account of the number to be 
elected. In a three-member constituency it is just over 25 per cent. If 
three candidates each get just over 25 per cent, no other candidate 
can get more. 
The criteria for choosing a voting system in ethnically 
divided societies 
Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of literature on the best 
voting system for ethnically divided societies. The Commission's 
work is not concerned exclusively with the relative merits of 
plurality systems, majority systems and proportional systems ~s 
ways of turning votes into seats. It focuses on the e~tent to whi~ 
each is likely to bring about the representation of different ethmc 
communities and give them the opportunity to participate in 
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government. The Commission had access to analyses of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the voting systems in use or 
?ropo~ed for use, in a number of ethnically divided societies, 
including South Africa, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, various African and 
Caribbean states, Lebanon, Cyprus and Northern Ireland as well as 
the consociational democracies of western Europe like S~itzerland 
the Netherlands and Belgium. ' 
Politi~al scientists base their analysis of voting systems on the 
assumptions that politicians are motivated by the desire to be elected 
and re-ele~ted . They see the voting system as probably the most 
?owerful instrument for shaping the whole political system, because 
it encourages politicians to behave in ways that maximise their 
chan_ces of e_le~toral success. There is general agreement that, in an 
~thnically divid~d society, at least to begin with, political parties are 
likely to ~e ethnically based. The objective is to find ways of 
encour~gmg such parties to come together for the purpose of 
governing the country in a way that gives all communities an 
oppor_tunity to take part. However, scholars disagree about the kind 
o~ vot_mg system _that will produce this outcome partly because of the 
differing per~eptions about the importance of proportionality, as 
compared with other likely consequences of particular voting 
. systems, and partly because of differences of opinion about the 
consequences of particular voting systems. 
Identifying and ranking the criteria 
In identify~~ the criteria for judging voting systems for use in Fiji, 
the Commission focused mainly on the voting system for electing 
candidat.es for the recommended 45 open seats in the Bose Lawa 
because it saw those seats as providing the main stimulus for the 
emergence of a multi-ethnic political culture in Fiji. The Commission 
recommend:d that a single voting system should be used, not only 
for the election of members in the Bose Lawa and the Bose e Cake, but 
also for the election of the President and Vice-President. Therefore 
the syste1:1 c~osen has to be suitable for all these purposes. 
The cntena the Commission considered relevant included those 
set out in the New Zealand Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Electoral Sys~~.':1 (1_986), suitably adapted where necessary to take 
account of FiJl s different circumstances. The Commission ranked the 
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criteria in the order of their importance, while bearing in mind the 
Royal Commission's own conclusion about how a voting system 
should be chosen 
If a system is designed to achieve one particular objective, the 
likelihood of meeting together objectives may thereby be lessened. 
The best voting system for any country will not be one which meets 
any of the criteria completely but will be one which _provides the 
most satisfactory overall balance between them, taking account of 
that country's history and current circumstances 
The Commission's own list of the relevant criteria is as follows 
• encouragement of multi-ethnic government 
• recognition of the role of political parties 
• incentives for moderation and cooperation across ethnic 
lines 
• effective representation of constituents 
• effective voter participation 
• effective representation of minority and special interest 
groups 
• fairness between political parties 
• effective government 
• effective opposition 
• proven workability 
• legitimacy. 
Encouragement of multi-ethnic government 
The consistent theme of the Commission's report is that the 
encouragement of multi-ethnic government should be the overriding 
objective of constitutional arrangements for the Fiji Islands. It must 
therefore appear at the head of the list of criteria. The voting system 
must be one which promotes the emergence of multi-ethnic 
governments. The Commission also sees political parties as playing a 
key role in the political process. The voting system should take full 
account of the fact that the goal of political parties is to be elected 
and to be re-elected. Everything in the experience of Fiji confirms 
that the nature of the voting system moulds the character of political 
parties. They respond to the forces which will determine their 
success or otherwise at the polls. 
Political scientists differ about the best way of encouraging 
moderation and cooperations across ethnic lines. Some argue that, in 
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order to come together in stable multi-ethnic coalitions or perhaps a 
multi-ethnic party, political parties must have strong electoral 
incentives to take account of the interest of other communities. The 
voting system can provide these incentives by making it in a party's 
interests to enter into arrangements not only for seat pooling, but 
also for vote pooling. 
The pooling of seats refers to the formation of coalitions where 
parties that do not have enough seats to govern alone agree to 
cooperate to achieve a legislative majority while vote pooling refers 
to arrangements where parties exchange votes across party lines to 
secur~ the election of candidates who would not win otherwise. 
Parties will pool votes if sufficient candidates of each ethnically 
based party, or component of a party, are marginally dependent on 
the support of voters in other ethnic communities. A contrary view is 
that the voting system need not itself be directed to producing inter-
community accommodation. The consociational model assumes that 
people will continue to vote communally. Therefore, the voting 
system should ensure that, through its party or parties, each 
community is represented in proportion to its size. However, unlike 
the communal system of representation, the system should not 
channel members of communities into monolithic blocks, but allow 
the emergence of cross-cutting interests and identities, so that no one 
community gains sufficient electoral support to govern alone. 
The parties representing different communities will still need to 
come together in a coalition in order to govern. ldeally, all ethnic 
parties will be members of an all-embracing 'grand coalition'. This, it 
is said, calls for sufficient willingness to compromise and 
accommodate each others' interests. The viability of the coalition 
should be reinforced by giving communities maximum autonomy, 
even veto power where necessary, in the things that concern them 
most. The difference between the two approaches is that the first uses 
incentives that are essentially self-serving in order to induce or 
reinforce accommodations, while the second uses agreements to 
cooperate, and constraints in the form of exclusive or veto powers. 
These rely for their effectiveness on the wisdom and tolerance of 
political leaders. 
In the case of Fiji, the Commission considers that electoral 
incentives are necessary to reinforce accommodations among ethnic 
communities. The pre-1987 system focused on the need for their 
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adequate representation, but this alone did not bring about multi-
ethnic governments, reflecting perhaps an artificial solidarity within 
communities resulting from representation through communal seats 
elected from a communal roll. But because present realities require 
the retention for the time being o~ some reserved seats, it is important 
to induce political parties to exercise moderation and take initiatives 
to cooperate. A voting system that provides strong incentives would 
be a strong candidate for adoption. That does not mean favouring the 
incentives approach over aspects of the consociational model. The 
important interests of communities or groups should be safeguarded 
by veto powers. The Compact recommends principles and processes 
designed to secure respect for the interests of all communities, 
reassuring them 'that their rights and interests will be protected, 
even if changes are made to the electoral arrangements', and 
recording 'the peoples' recognition of the principles on which the 
conduct of the government is based' (Fiji CRC 1996:82). The value of 
farsighted leadership should not be discounted in reaching 
agreement to put new arrangements in place. 
The criteria just discussed can be used to evaluate the AV system. 
In recognition of the role of political parties will play in bringing 
about multi-ethnic government, it is important to provide incentives 
for moderation and cooperation through the voting system. That 
objective can be attained better through the AV system than any of 
the other systems mentioned. For the AV system to work effectively, 
two preconditions must be met: a multiplicity of parties based in the 
various communities, and heterogeneous constituencies. 
A multiplicity of parties 
Ethnic communities in Fiji have never remained united in support of 
a single political party. Some parties are already committed to 
encouraging multi-ethnic membership. The willingness of members 
of the various communities to support such a party depends on 
whether it will take account of the interests of all communities. There 
is already a base for cooperation among communities and parties, 
which could be strengthened by electoral incentives for communities 
to cooperate rather than compete. Such incentives might lead to the 
formation of a widely-supported multi-ethnic party. But even if this 
did not happen, they would encourage cooperation among moderate 
parties based in the different communities. The spread of parties in 
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Fiji suggests that not all may wish to reach out for multi-ethnic 
support. Some may remain ethnically based. But this disadvantage 
could be overcome if moderate parties based in another ethnic 
community are more attractive to some voters than more extreme 
parties within their own community. Exclusively ethnic parties still 
have a useful role in preventing multi-ethnic parties or coalitions 
from going too far in fostering the interests of any one community. 
Heterogeneous constituencies 
Heterogeneous constituencies are required because of the likelihood 
.that the candidate or candidates of an ethnic party may be unable to 
succeed if supported only by members of that community, an 
outcome all the more likely if there is competition with other parties 
also based in that community. The design of constituencies 
deliberately to improve the chances of success of a particular party or 
community or social class or interest group is wisely condemned as 
'gerrymandering'. Nonetheless, constituency design can also be a 
legitimate element of a voting system, specially in an ethnically 
diverse society; everything depends on the purpose for which 
constituencies are designed in a particular way. 
The use of constituencies in Malaysia and Mauritius illustrates 
these points. In both these countries, the constituencies originally 
drawn by the British administrators were relatively homogeneous, to 
secure the representation of all ethnic groups in proportion to their 
size. It was assumed that each constituency would elect a member 
from the predominant ethnic groups. In Malaysia, enough 
constituencies nevertheless had a sufficiently mixed population to 
enable Chinese voters to influence the election of some Malay 
candidates. They could not dominate, but they could not be ignored. 
However, since the riots of 1969, constituencies have been more 
heavily weighted in favour of Malays, reducing the ability of Chinese 
voters to influence electoral outcomes. In Mauritius, every two of the 
original ethnically based constituencies were combined to form 
heterogeneous constituencies, each electing three members. Elections 
largely are contests between coalitions of ethnically based parties 
sponsoring a multi-ethnic slate of candidates in each constituency. 
~thnicity has therefore become less important than political ideology 
m determining the outcome of elections and the composition of 
Parliament. 
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The Commission asked whether, given the residential pattern of 
the different communities within Fiji, it would be possible to create 
heterogeneous constituencies, each having roughly the same number 
of inhabitants, within a tolerance of 10 to 15 per cent. The principle of 
equality may be departed from to the extent expedient 
in order to take account of geographical features, the boundaries of 
existing administrative and recognised traditional areas, means of 
communication and density and mobility of populations (Fiji CRC 
1996:314). 
One exercise involved the drawing of 45 single-member 
constituencies and the other to producing 15 constituencies, each of 
which could be represented by three members. These exercises 
showed that the choice between single-member and three-member 
constituencies did not affect the potential for heterogeneity in the 
more densely-populated areas in the Western Division, Macuata and 
the greater Suva and Nausori area. Using three-member 
constituencies made it marginally easier to achieve a reasonable 
degree of heterogeneity by combining the less densely populated 
areas, such as the maritime provinces, with other areas having 
similar interests. 
Heterogeneity within the constituency was understood as a mixed 
population ranging from a more or less equal balance between Fijians 
and Inda-Fijians, to a proportion as high as 85 to 90 per cent of one 
community and 15 to 10 per cent of the other. This last figure 
represented the limit of reasonableness in constituencies which 
included island populations consisting mainly of Fijians. The average 
distribution was 60 per cent of one community and 40 per cent of the 
other. It is entirely possible to draw constituency boundaries in Fiji to 
achieve a reasonable heterogeneity. The question now is how 
Alternative Voting, coupled with heterogeneous constituencies and a 
multiplicity of parties, can provide strong electoral incentives for 
cooperation among communities. 
The nature of the incentives 
Obviously, the best method of inducing vote pooling is to avoid inter-
ethnic competition. A multi-ethnic party or pre-election coalition can 
put up a multi-ethnic slate of candidates. Ethnic parties based in 
different communities can agree not to contest a particular seat in a 
Brij V. Lal 
Electoral s stems in divided societies: the Fiji Constitution Review 
constituency where one community is outnumbered, in return for a 
corresponding favour in another constituency where that same 
community predominates. Such arrangements are more likely 
between moderate parties than between more extreme ones. One 
way in which AV provides incentives for vote pooling is by requiring 
the winning candidate to obtain more than 50 per cent of the votes. In 
a heterogeneous constituency, this threshold increases the need for 
the winning candidate to have multi-ethnic support. The second is by 
requiring voters to rank candidates in the order of their preference. 
The candidates with the lowest totals of preferences at each level are 
eliminated and preferences at the next level are allocated to those still 
in contention until a candidate is found who has more than 50 per 
cent of the votes. 
Although the successful candidate may not have been every-
body's first choice, he or she must be broadly acceptable to over half 
the voters in the constituency. 
The AV system allows parties to trade preferences. They may 
d~ide to put up competing candidates because their supporters may 
WISh to give their first preferences to candidates of their own party 
~d.ethnicity. However, the party least likely to succeed may be 
willing to encourage its supporters to give their second or third 
preferences to the candidate of the other party, in return for recipro-
cal support, in the same constituency or in another where the ethnic 
balance is reversed. The effect of a preferential system like AV is to 
keep alive the value of second, third and subsequent preferences as 
~e weakest candidate is eliminated after each round of preferences 
IS counted. 
Only moderate parties with conciliatory policies are likely to 
trade preferences and persuade their supporters to honour the 
a~ment. The system therefore encourages the emergence of such 
Parties. It may be feared that, in response to the perceived pressures 
created by open seats and heterogeneous constituencies, ethnically 
based parties may not be willing or able to cooperate across the 
ethnic divide, but may coalesce into single ethnically based parties, 
one or other of which might be able to win an outright majority. In 
the long run, however, such united positions would be a reversal of 
the evident tendencies for ethnic communities to divide their support 
among two or more parties based in that community. It would also 
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run counter to the experience of some other ethnically divided 
countries. There is no actual experience of AV with open seats in 
heterogeneous constituencies in an ethnically divided country, but an 
analogy can be drawn from the experience of Mauritius and 
Malaysia, both of which have open seats under FPP. The Malaysian 
experience is relevant, even though there has always been a large 
Malay party in a dominant electoral position, and constituencies 
have become less heterogeneous since 1969. In neither country have 
small, ethnically based parties coalesced into larger ethnic parties. 
Even a large ethnic party like the main Malay party the United 
Malay National Organisation, which can govern alone, is committed 
to the perpetuation of the multi-ethnic coalition now called the 
National Front. 
AV's potential to provide electoral incentives to moderation and 
cooperation may be contrasted with such incentives under other 
voting systems. Under FPP, a candidate can be elected with 
substantially less than 50 per cent of the votes. The voter has no way 
of indicating a second or third choice if the candidate who is the 
voter's first choice is unsuccessful. Some voters may, however, decide 
not to vote for their most preferred candidate, if that candidate has a 
very poor chance of success. They may feel that such a vote would be 
'wasted'. Preferences may be expressed under some Proportional 
Representation systems, but their effect is quite different. The object 
is to elect a number of candidates in proportion to the number of 
votes received by the party. List-system PR requires that votes be cast 
for a single party list. Although some systems have been devised 
under which voters may make choices across party lists, it is argued 
that, if parties are ethnically based, there is no practicable way of 
inducing voters to exercise such an option. STV has the advantage of 
allowing voters to express second, third, or subsequent preferences 
for individual candidates the same way as AV does. But because STV 
is designed to be proportional in its outcomes, the quota that each 
candidate must obtain in a three-member constituency is just over 25 
per cent. This may be compared with the just over 50 per cent 
required under AV. 
The overall effect of proportional systems compared with AV or 
even FPP is that, if people vote communally, ethnic parties can expect 
to succeed in getting a number of candidates elected in proportion to 
the number of their community members in the constituency, and 
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therefore in the country. This is irrespective of whether they are 
moderate and seek to reach accommodation with the ethnic parties 
of other communities. If a party wishes to appeal to voters in other 
communities by putting up a multi-ethnic list, it has to calculate 
whether this will attract more voters from those other communities 
than the number it will iose from its own. Set alongside the reserved 
seats proposed to be retained in Fiji as a transitional measure, any 
proportional system would, in our view, offer few incentives to 
parties to become more multi-ethnic in their composition or more 
willing to take account of the interests of all communities. 
In terms of the extent to which it provides electoral incentives for 
moderation and compromise, AV is to be preferred to either List-
system PR or STY, the proportional representation systems advocated 
in some submissions. AV is also to be preferred to FPP, though FPP is 
more conducive to moderation and compromise than PR systems. 
For this reason alone the adoption of AV is favoured. Additionally, 
AV adequately meets the other criteria the Commission adopted for 
judging electoral systems. 
Effective representation of constituents and AV 
Experience in Fiji shows that voters expect close links and 
accountability between individual members of Parliament and their 
constituents. It is important for voters to see themselves as 
represented not only by the member elected to the seat reserved for 
their community, but also by the member for their open seat 
constituency. Communal representation has obscured the usual 
expectation that a member of Parliament serves all the people in the 
constituency whether or not they support the member's party, and 
does so regardless of the community to which they belong. 
The AV system requires the election of candidates to represent 
territorial constituencies. It is suited to the recommended single-
member reserved seat constituencies and also the three-member 
open seat constituencies. In this respect it compares with FPP and 
STV (except that STV requires multimember constituencies). It is to 
be contrasted with List-system PR if, as suggested in one submission, 
the whole country were treated as a single constituency. Voters 
usually feel strongly that they want to know who their member is 
and to have access to him or her both individually and as a group 
With common interests arising from their residence in a particular 
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geographical area. In 1995 when the Commission visited South 
Africa, there were strong indications that, for this reason, the List-
system PR used as the only feasible way of conducting the first 
democratic election in that country was likely to be modified. (In its 
final form the constitution requires only that the electoral system 
must result, in general, in proportional representation, leaving the 
details of the system to national legislation). 
The introduction of List-system PR in a Fiji-wide constituency 
might be acceptable if combined with representation through open 
seat constituencies, as under MMP, but if List-system PR were to be 
combined with reserved seats, the members for reserved seats would 
tend to be seen as people's 'real' representatives. It might be hard for 
List-system members to associate effectively with them, even though 
belonging to the same party, and it would be harder still if the 
member's ethnicity was different from that of the community to 
which the seat belongs. STV has the defect of allowing constituency 
representation to become a dominant preoccupation. Because the 
threshold is so low, each party is likely to nominate more candidates 
than there are seats. Therefore, each candidate is competing not only 
with candidates of other parties, but also with other candidates 
belonging to the same party. Consequently, members representing the 
same party in a particular constituency sometimes seek to outdo one 
another in their commitment to constituency work, to the neglect of 
other Parliamentary duties. They may also concentrate on obtaining 
reciprocal support for constituency projects, to the detriment of a 
national outlook 
Under AV, the problemsof intra-party competition in 
multimember constituencies can be avoided by adding first, second 
and third preferences together before the candidate with the lowest 
number of votes is eliminated. This facilitates the adoption of party 
slates under which the party may ask voters to give their first prefer-
ences to A, their second preferences to B and their third preferences 
to C. As all preferences have equal weight when added together, it 
would be wrong to eliminate B or C before taking account of voters' 
second and third preferences, as well as first preferences. The Com-
mission proposes that the AV system should be applied in this way in 
elections for the three-member open seats in the Bose Lawa. 
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Effective voter participation and AV 
If individual citizens are to play a full and active part in the political 
process, they should have a real choice among political parties and 
their candidates. They should feel that their vote will affect the 
outcome and will be of equal weight to the votes of other citizens . 
The voting system, and, in particular the ballot paper, should be one 
they can understand and use effectively in order to cast valid votes. 
The AV voting system would give citizens a considerable 
opportunity to affect the outcome of the poll by expressing . 
preferences among individual candidates. It is sometimes argued 
that, by requiring voters to indicate preferences for all or most . 
candidates, it forces them to give at least some support to candidates 
they would otherwise not be prepared to vote for. This is more of a 
philosophical than a practical problem, but to mitigate it we propose 
that votes should be treated as formal if voters express preferences 
for a least 75 per cent of the candidates. It is also possible to have 
rules preserving the validity of the ballot paper even if candidates 
accidentally fail to number preferences correctly beside the names on 
the ballot paper. For example, they may put in the same number 
more than once, or omit one number in the numerical sequence. To 
make sure that the election always produces a valid result, it should 
be provided that, if the requisite number of candidates has not 
reached the quota when all the preferences have been distributed, 
those with the highest number of votes should be deemed elected. 
Generally, the high level of literacy in the Fiji Islands will mean that 
few voters will have any difficulty in numbering the candidates in 
the order of their preference beside the names of particular 
candidates. Certainly, the Commission envisaged no difficulty in the 
elections of the single-member for each reserved seats. The number 
of names on the ballot paper is not likely to be more than three or 
four. 
However, there are likely to be at least three times that number of 
candidates on the ballot paper for the three-member open seats. To 
assist people in marking the ballot paper, and also to encourage 
parties to exchange preferences and assist them in delivering them in 
accordance with the agreement, the Commission proposed that an 
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'above the line/below the line' ballot paper should be used for 
elections to all seats. The ballot paper for the election of candidates 
for the multimember seats in the Australian senate provides a model. 
Voters wishing to vote on a 'ticket' basis need only tick the name or 
symbol of the party, coalition or independent candidate whose ticket 
they wish to support. The effect is to allocate that voter's preferences 
in the order predetermined by the party, coalition or candidate, and 
registered with the Electoral Commission. If the voter wishes to 
indicate a different order of preferences, he or she is free to do so by 
putting numbers beside the names of the candidates in the bottom 
part of the paper. 
There should be a statutory requirement that the Electoral 
Commission must ensure that voters are given full information about 
the consequences of choosing a particular ticket. The Act should 
provide that, if a ballot paper is marked both above and below the 
line, it should not, for that reason alone, be treated as informal. If the 
preferences indicated below the line are otherwise formal, they 
should be regarded as the expression of the voter's intentions and 
counted accordingly. If, however, the preferences below the line are 
themselves informal, the vote for the party ticket, if formal, should be 
treated as expressing the voter's choice. 
The principle of eliminating the lowest-polling candidate in each 
round of preferences and redistributing the preferences of the voters 
whose candidates are eliminated, until one candidate reaches the 
quota, is easily understood. Voters do not need to concern themselves 
with the mechanics of counting and distributing the preferences. 
These are relatively complicated and time-consuming. However, they 
are less complex then the allocation of surplus votes at a discounted 
value under STY, and training the requisite number of electoral 
officers for the purpose of conducting elections under the AV system 
can be arranged without too much difficulty. The process of vote 
counting and distribution is done openly. Candidates' agents will 
quickly understand and follow how it is done. 
Effective representation of minority and special interest 
groups and AV 
The voting system should ensure that parties, candidates and 
members of Parliament are responsive to minority groups and 
special interests. This is particularly important in those cases where 
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the minority group is required to belong to, or is in competition with, 
a larger ethnic community for the purposes of political 
representation. AV does not have the same capacity as proportional 
systems to secure the election of representatives of every group in the 
country which chooses to organise politically and can win a 
minimum share of the votes. However, the need for a candidate to 
achieve an absolute majority means that no candidate can afford to 
neglect any small pocket of voters who might be willing to give their 
support in exchange for a policy which takes account of their 
interests. Just as AV encourages appeals across ethnic lines, so also it 
encourages appeals to women and to minorities with special 
interests. In this respect it is greatly superior to FPP. However, it is 
difficult to gauge whether, under AV, parties would seek to gain 
wider support by nominating more women and members of minority 
groups as candidates then they do now under FPP. The evidence 
suggests that, under a proportional system, it is easier for candidates 
from disadvantaged or minority groups to win election. However, 
this advantage is outweighed in Fiji by the disadvantages of a 
proportional system. 
Fairness between political parties and AV 
When they vote at elections, voters are choosing between alternative 
party governments as well as alternative constituency members. The 
voting system should encourage competition between potential 
majority parties or pre-election coalitions, so that voters can make a 
clear choice about the identity of their future government. At the 
same time the voting system in its method of turning votes into seats 
should not have the effect of unfairly excluding the representation of 
small parties, provided they win a significant share of the vote. 
However, the voting system does not need to allow for the 
representation of every small party with just enough votes to justify 
an allocation of a seat of a percentage basis-1.4 per cent in a house 
of 70 members. Carrying the representation of minority interests to 
extremes creates a danger that they will be able to exert pressure out 
of proportion to their number. It should also be kept in mind that 
some of the support for minority parties results from 'protest' voting. 
A vote for the small party may not represent the voter's expectation 
that it will become the government or even win a seat. Rather it may 
express unwillingness to support any of the larger parties which 
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have a realistic chance of winning the election or at least obtaining 
representation. Finally, the voting system should not produce a · 
consistent pattern of electing governments that have less than 50 per 
cent of the total number of votes cast in the election. In contrast to the 
position in New Zealand, that has not happened in Fiji. Most if not 
all governments that have taken office in Fiji since 1970 have received 
a majority of the total number of votes. 
AV is not designed to secure the representation of political parties 
in proportion to their share of the total votes cast in the election. In 
this respect it has some of deficiencies of PPP, though not to the same 
extent, because of the need for a candidate to win majority support. 
Taking account of all preferences which become effective, it would be 
virtually impossible for a party to win an election without obtaining 
a majority of the overall votes. Some argue that AV has the same 
tendency as PPP to favour larger parties at the expense of smaller 
ones. They consider that this tendency is exacerbated when AV is 
used in multimember constituencies, as it was in the Australian 
Senate between 1919 and 1946. The AV system was then replaced by 
STV with the object of securing the fairer representation of all 
political parties in the Upper House. The question of encouraging the 
fair representation of ethnic communities was not at issue, so too 
much should not be read into the decision to make the change. 
Even if the disproportionality of AV is greater in multimember 
seats than in single-member seats, multimember constituencies for 
open seats are nevertheless desirable. They are likely to encourage 
multiracial party slates, not only across the country as a whole, but 
also in individual constituencies. This seems likely to make 
individual voters more willing to cast their votes on the basis of 
party, not ethnicity. The encouragement of such a development is yet 
another essential building block in enabling parties to adopt 
moderate policies and to broaden their electoral support across 
ethnic lines. If the consequence is that, as not under PPP, smaller 
parties may not be represented in proportion to the number of votes 
they receive, that seems a small price to pay. 
The Commission also considered the question of fairness to 
parties in the context of drawing constituency boundaries. It 
accepted that problems of fairness would not arise under a 
proportional system of representation. Under such as system, parties 
will get a number of seats in proportion to the number of votes they 
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receive, regardless of the way in which boundaries are drawn. 
However, the advantages of putting in place heterogeneous 
constituencies for the open seats outweighs any difficulty that may 
arise in also being fair to parties. Any change in the voting system, 
including the transition from a system of exclusively communal seats 
to a mixed system of reserved and open seats, will require all parties 
to rethink their policies and to decide on the groups to which they 
will appeal. The situation is quite unlike that which can arise when 
boundaries under an existing system need to be revised. In those 
circumstances there may be real questions about interfering with the 
representation of areas from which particular parties have 
traditionally drawn support. 
The initial drawing of new constituency boundaries will be an 
essentially political process calling for both fairness and compromise, 
if the essential objective of homogeneous constituencies is to be 
achieved. Once the new constituencies are in place, we envisage that 
the only major change in the distribution of the population would 
call for an adjustment of their boundaries. It is possible that the 
objective of heterogeneous constituencies may run counter to the 
instinct of parties that constituencies should bring together the 
groups that have traditionally supported them. That instinct will 
have to be resisted. The objective of heterogeneous constituencies 
will need to be agreed upon as part of the overall political settlement 
under which new constitutional arrangements are put in place. 
Effective government and AV 
The voting system should allow the election of Governments that 
have the support of a sufficient legislative majority to enable them to 
act decisively. In normal circumstances they should also be able to 
obtain Parliamentary approval of their budgets and defeat 
Opposition no confidence motions, so that reasonable stability is 
assured. The passage of other legislation should not normally be seen 
as an issue of confidence. The Government should have sufficient 
flexibility about the means of implementing its policies in 
legislation-if not the policies themselves-to allow the proposed 
Parliamentary select committee system to function effectively. 
As a majoritarian, not a proportional system, AV is likely to 
encourage the emergence of a strong party or pre-selection coalition 
government. AV, with its requirement that candidates win majority 
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support, not a mere plurality as under FPP, should mean that 
relatively small swings in the electoral support for particular parties 
will not have the effect of putting governments into or out of power. 
However, strong and stable government should not, in itself, be seen 
as an overriding goal of the voting system. Even if an ethnically 
based party were to win a majority of the seats in the Bose Lawa, it 
should not necessarily signal immediately its ability and willingness 
to form a government on its own. Under the Compact, it would be 
bound to consider the objectives of multi-ethnic government and the 
duty to take the interests of all communities into account. It would 
therefore need to consider whether other ethnic parties could and 
should be drawn into a coalition government. 
Second, if a multi-ethnic pre-election coalition wins an election, it 
is still a coalition, though we believe it is likely to have a stronger 
base for remaining united than a coalition which comes into 
existence after an election because no party has the necessary 
majority to govern alone. Third, what cannot be excluded, even 
under AV, is the need for parties, none of whom has a sufficient 
majority to govern alone, to form a governing coalition after an 
election. For some time to come, the people of the Fiji Islands will be 
juggling the two variables of party and ethnicity. It would be 
surprising if the introduction not only of a new voting system but 
also the reconstitution of both houses of Parliament took some time 
to settle down. But it can be said that AV is just as likely as FPP, and 
more likely than a proportional system, to produce strong and stable 
governments. 
Effective opposition and AV 
The voting system should ensure that, as well as effective 
government, there is also effective opposition. It should not be one 
under which relatively small swings in electoral support can have the 
effect of unduly reducing or eliminating the representation of the 
Opposition party or parties. It is difficult to foresee the character and 
composition of future Opposition parties if the goal of multi-ethnic 
government is achieved. However, AV is less likely than FPP to allow 
relatively small swings in voter support not only to bring about a 
change of government but also to give it an overwhelming majority. 
The equitable representation of Opposition parties is more assured 
under proportional representation, but, in the circumstances of Fiji, 
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the greatest need is the encouragement of multi-ethnic government 
through the AV system in the manner described above. 
AV as a proven system 
The people of Fiji should adopt a voting system that has been 
successfully used elsewhere, preferably in the region. No unexpected 
problems would be likely to arise, and there would always be ready 
access to technical advice and help. AV is used for the election of 
candidates to single-member seats in the Australian House of 
Representatives and the lower houses of most Australian states. From 
1919 to 1946 it was used in the Australian Senate to elect candidates 
to multimember constituencies. Apparently it is also used in 
multimember constituencies in Nauru. STV is used in electing the 
members of the Australian Senate, the lower house in Tasmania and 
the single chamber legislature in the Australian Capital Territory. 
New Zealand, in implementing MMP, is gaining experience with 
party lists. All three systems have shown themselves to be workable 
in actual operation in other countries over a considerable period. 
Legitimacy of elections under AV 
Under this heading the New Zealand Royal Commission said 
Members of the community should be able to endorse the voting 
system and its procedures as fair and reasonable and to accept its 
decisions, even when they themselves prefer other alternatives 
(quoted in Fiji CRC 1996:327). 
The Royal Commission saw this criterion as a test of whether the 
requirements of all of its proceeding criteria had been adequately 
met. In a society like Fiji, legitimacy means that the members of all 
communities must be able to accept election results as fair and 
needing to be upheld, even when they themselves would have 
preferred another outcome. On this basis, legitimacy as a criterion 
deserves a higher priority, but we have left it at the end of the list 
because it still measures the overall effect of the voting system. 
This Commission's basic argument is that multi-ethnic 
government is in the interests of all communities in Fiji. If this is 
accepted, then the electoral arrangements must not be unfairly 
Weighted in the interests of any one community. In any event, there is 
no guarantee that a weighted system will produce the desired result 
in all circumstances. If it does not, the reaction is to think that the 
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electoral system has failed the interests of the community which sees 
itself as disadvantaged. Their likely response is that in order to 
remedy the situation, the system should be made even more 
lopsided. The electoral system should not favour one community 
more than another, but that this alone is not sufficient. If the goal was 
the certainty that all communities will be proportionally represented, 
there might be no reason to move away from a system under which 
all seats are reserved on a fair basis. But that would not in itself lead 
to multi-ethnic government. 
Within a fair electoral system, the people of Fiji should adopt a 
voting system that helps to dissolve the present link between 
ethnicity and party. If all ethnic groups are adequately represented in 
the Government party or parties and in the Cabinet, then, so far as 
that outcome is facilitated by the voting system, that system should 
be seen as legitimate. The Commission concentrated on the election 
of candidates for the 45 open seats in the Bose Lawa, because the 
voting system will have its most important effect in that context, but 
it also saw AV as encouraging multi-ethnicity in the election of 
members to represent at least some of the provinces in the Bose e 
Cake. In the election of the President and Vice President by the 
Electoral College constituted by the members of both houses, the 
need for an absolute majority under AV provides a necessary 
guarantee that the choice will have widespread support across the 
political spectrum. For that reason it will be regarded as legitimate. 
This is not the first time that the AV system has been proposed for 
electing members for the reserved seats which need to be retained for 
the time being. The Street Commission made a similar recommenda-
tion in 1975. That body saw the need for the successful candidate for 
a reserved seat to obtain more than SO per cent of the votes as an 
advantage, compared with the possibility of election by a minority of 
the votes cast in the constituency under PPP. AV will add to the 
legitimacy of the election of reserved seat members. The dynamics 
affecting elections for reserved seats will be changed, not only by the 
move to the AV system, but also by all the other changes affecting the 
composition of the two houses of Parliament and the election of their 
members. Overall, the incentives for moderation applying to the 
election of other members of Parliament will also affect the election 
of members for the reserved seats. 
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The Commission concludes that all elections of candidates for 
seats in the Bose Lawa and the Bose e Cake, as well as the election of 
the President and Vice-President, should be held under the 
preferential system known as the Alternative Vote; that the 45 open 
seats in the Bose Lawa should be filled by voting in 15 three-member 
heterogeneous constituencies, that is, constituencies in which there is 
a mixed population made up of members of the different ethnic 
communities. The detail of conducting elections by the Alternative 
Vote should be provided for in an Electoral Act, which should, 
among other things, provide 
• in elections for the 3-member open seats in the Bose Lawa, 
the first, second and third preferences given to each 
candidate should be added together, before the candidate 
with the lowest number of votes is eliminated 
• votes should be treated as formal if voters express 
preferences for at least 75 per cent of the candidates 
• there should be rules for preserving the validity of the 
ballot paper, so far as possible, even if candidates fail to 
number preferences in the correct numerical sequence 
• if the requisite number of candidates has not reached the 
quota when all the preferences have been distributed, those 
with the highest number of votes should be deemed elected 
• in the election for all seats, an 'above the line/below the 
line' ballot paper should be used. In the top part of the 
ballot paper voters should be given the opportunity to vote 
on a 'ticket' basis, indicating support for the candidates in 
an order of preference registered by a party, coalition of 
parties or independent candidate. If the voter wishes to 
indicate a different order of preferences, he or she should 
be free to do so by putting numbers beside the names of the 
candidates in the bottom part of the paper 
• the Electoral Act should require the Electoral Commission 
to ensure that voters are given full information about the 
consequences of choosing a particular ticket 
• the Act should also provide that, if a ballot paper is marked 
both above and below the line, it should not for that reason 
alone, be treated as informal. If the preferences indicated 
below the line are otherwise formal, they should be 
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regarded as the expression of the voter's intentions and 
counted accordingly. If, however, the preferences below the 
line are themselves informal, the vote for the party ticket, if 
formal, should be treated as expressing the voter's choice. 
The determination of constituency boundaries 
The constituency boundaries for all seats in the Bose I..awa should be 
drawn so as to divide the Fiji Islands into the requisite number of 
territorial constituencies for each category of seats. So far as possible, 
each should contain an equal number of inhabitants of the relevant 
category, and should ensure that the inhabitants of every constitu-
ency can be effectively represented, taking into account geographical 
features, the boundaries of existing administrative and recognised 
traditional areas means of communication and density and mobility 
of population. In addition, the constituencies for the open seats 
should be required to be heterogeneous. 
This recommendation departs from the criteria in section 48 of the 
1990 Constitution by referring to 'inhabitants' rather than 'adult 
inhabitants'. The Commission proposes the change to reflect the 
principle that members of Parliament represent all inhabitants of 
their constituencies, regardless of age or eligibility to vote. Another 
relevant factor is that the census data relating to the distribution of 
the total population is readily available. The Constitution allows the 
principle of equality of the population to be departed from in order 
to take account of other relevant factors. We consider that, in princi-
ple, the variation should not be greater than 10 per cent on either side 
of the norm obtained by dividing the relevant population figure by 
the number of constituencies. However, we think it would be too 
restrictive to impose this target as a constitutional limit, particular in 
drawing the boundaries of the open seat constituencies which are 
required to be heterogeneous. That requirement is basic to the idea 
that the open seats should act as a catalyst for a move away from 
ethnic politics. If need be, we therefore see it as overriding the 
requirement for equality. 
Reserve constituencies 
There will need to be 12 reserved seat constituencies for Fijian voters, 
10 for Indo-Fijian voters, 1 for Rotuman voters and 2 for general 
voters. The starting point will be the number and distribution of the 
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members of the population regarded as belonging to a particular 
community for representation purposes. However, it would not be 
practicable to apply these rules when determining the distribution of 
the population belonging to each community. The Constitution 
should therefore refer to the distribution of inhabitants classified for 
census purposes as Fijians or Pacific islanders, Indo-Fijians, Rotumans, 
and persons not belonging to any of those ethnic communities. 
Open seat constituencies 
There will also need to be 15 open seat constituencies, each electing 
three members. Although the distribution of the ethnic communities 
will not be relevant for the purpose of applying the principle that 
constituencies should have an equal number of inhabitants, it will be 
relevant in fulfilling the requirement that open seat constituencies 
must also be heterogeneous. Again, account should be taken of the 
distribution of the population as classified for census purposes. It 
may not be feasible to specify the degree of heterogeneity required, 
but the open seat constituencies should be as heterogeneous as 
possible. In some cases this criterion may need to be fulfilled in 
innovative ways, for example, by placing more weight on lines of 
communication than on traditional ties. Through their elected 
members in the reserved and open seats in the Bose I..awa and the 
provincial seats in the Bose e Cake, all the people of Fiji will have the 
opportunity to be represented in a variety of ways which will take 
full account of their range of interests. 
Constituencies for the election of the members of the Bose e 
Cake 
There will be no need to determine the boundaries of constituencies 
for the purpose of electing members of the Bose e Cake. The bounda-
ries of the provincial constituencies should be the provincial 
boundaries prescribed under the Fijian Affairs Act. The boundaries of 
Rotuma should be those referred to in the definition of 'Rotuma' in 
the Rotuma Act. 
Constituencies Boundaries Commission 
The task of determining the boundaries of constituencies for the 
election of members of the Bose I..awa should continue to be carried 
out by a Constituency Boundaries Commission. The Constitution 
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should require the Constituency Boundaries Commission to 
determine the initial boundaries of all constituencies on the basis 
described above. It should also require the Constituencies 
Boundaries Commission, in the year following each census, to review 
the b.ound~r~es of all constituencies and decide whether or not they 
require rev1s1on to take account of changes in the distribution of the 
popul~ti~n as a whole, or of the members of any community. The 
Constitution should also empower the Constituency Boundaries 
Commission to review and redetermine all or any constituency 
boundaries at any other time during the intervals between each 
census (at present 10 years), if it has reason to think that such a 
review and redetermination might be desirable on those grounds. 
After the Constituency Boundaries Commission has reviewed 
constituency boundaries on any occasion, it should be required to 
report its findings to Parliament with an explanation of the reasons 
why it has decided either to redetermine boundaries or not to do so. 
The procedures to be followed by the Constituency Boundaries 
Commis~ion in determining or redetermining constituency 
boundar1~s should be prescribed by Act. Such an Act would require 
the Constituency Boundaries Commission to give notice of its 
propos~d ~eterminations and hear objections before making a final 
determmation. Once made, the boundaries should continue to be 
final. They should not be subject to appeal, but judicial review 
should be available to test whether the Commission has acted within 
its powers and in accordance with the prescribed procedures. 
Although the Constituency Boundaries Commission will only. 
need to exercise its functions periodically, we consider that it should 
be a standing Commission. Otherwise there is a risk that 
constituency ~oundaries will not be reviewed as and when necessary. 
Its membership should be entirely separate from that of the Electoral 
Commission. The functions of the two bodies are quite distinct. The 
composition of the Constituency Boundaries Commission should 
take account of the fact that, although constituency boundaries 
should be drawn as impartially and fairly as possible and in 
accord~ce. with the constitutionally prescribed principles, any 
determmation of boundaries inevitably has political implications. 
Th~ Commission should therefore consist of three members holding 
office for terms of three years. The Chairperson should be a person 
who is, or is qualified to be, a judge of a superior court in the Fiji 
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Islands, and should be appointed by the President acting in his or her 
own deliberate judgement, after consultation with both the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. The two other members 
should be appointed by the President on the nomination of the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition respectively. 
No qualifications should be specified for members other than the 
Chairperson, but no person should be qualified to be a member of 
the Commission if at any time during the four years preceding 
appointment he or she has been a member of Parliament or an 
elected member of the council of any municipality, as defined in the 
Local Government Act (Cap. 125). A serving member of the public 
sector, the police or the military forces should also be disqualified. 
The Constituency Boundaries Commission should also be subject to 
the general principles and rules applying to all Commission 
established by the Constitution. 
The names of constituencies 
It is fair to say that not much imagination has been shown in naming 
constituencies in Fiji. The names of the main cities and the provinces 
have been used, with the addition of a reference to the relevant point 
of the compass if it was necessary for a geographic area to be 
subdivided. In addition, the designation of a member for a 
communal seat has included a reference to his or her community. 
The names of the provinces and Rotuma should be used 
exclusively to describe the constituencies for election to the Bose e 
Cake. As now, the members for a particular providence will each be 
entitled to use the designation 'Senator for Rewa', or whatever the 
province might be. However, the constituencies in the Bose I..awa will 
take account of, but will not be based on, provincial boundaries. 
Although some seats in the Bose I..awa will continue to be reserved, 
the member should no longer be identified by reference to his or her 
community. This not only puts undue emphasis on communal 
id.entity, but will also become less practicable in the light of our 
recommendations for identifying the voters belonging to each 
community for voting purposes. Fiji should do what is done in other 
countries and give constituencies distinctive names that prevent 
them from being confused with areas that have recognised 
geographic boundaries. Constituencies for all the seats in the Bose 
lawa might be named after well-known physical features, like 
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mountains or rivers, or after local flora and fauna. By way of 
example, the following list of names might be considered. 
Suggested Bose Lawa constituency names 
Open seat constituencies 
1. Uluiqalau (Cakaudrove) 9. MedrauSucu 
(Naitasiri North) 
2. Seatura (Bua) 10. Toma ni lvi (Ra) 
3. Babasiga (Macuata) 11. Suka (Ba-Lautoka) 
4. Veiyanuyanu 12. Dobu (Ba-Tavua) 
(Lau-Lomaiviti-Rotuma) 
5. Tebara ni Siga (Tailevu) 13. Naloto (Nadi Yasawa) 
6. Vunivadra (Rewa) 14. Voma-Cakaubalavu 
(Namosi-Serua-Kadavu) 
7. Korobaba (Rewa) 15. Maseki (Nadroga-Navosa) 
8. Waimanu (Naitasiri South) 
Reserved seat constituencies 
Fijians including other Pacific islanders (local flowers) 
1. Mocelolo 6. Seniuci 
2. Kukuwalu 7. Tomole 
3. Lagakali 8. Buasala 
4. Cevuga 9. Maha 
5. Kurukoto 10. Saku 
Indo-Fijians (local fish) 
1. Babale 
2. Saqa 
3. Kawago 
4. Kawakawa 
5. Kurukoto 
General voters (local fruit trees) 
1. Dawa 
Ro tu mans 
1. (To be chosen by Rotumans) 
6. Ula vi 
7. Walu 
8. Kanace 
9. Nuqa 
10. Saku 
2. Kavika 
The right to be entered on reserved seat consistency 
A number of submissions expressed concerns about the existing rules 
governing registration on the various communal rolls. First, a 
number of Fijians raised questions about linking registration in the 
Vala ni Kawa Bula, which is a register of customary rights in land, 
with the classification of a person as a 'Fijian' for voting and other 
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constitutional purposes. The Commission agrees that this link puts 
too much strain on the integrity of both systems and should be 
removed. The Constitution should deal only with the right to be 
entered on a roll for a Fijian reserved seat constituency. It should not 
define a 'Fijian' for any other purpose. For example, it should not be 
concerned with the question of who is a 'Fijian' for the purpose of 
being eligible for nomination as President-a matter safely can be left 
to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga-nor with the duty of the government to 
establish programs promoting ethnic justice for 'Fijians' . If necessary, 
the requisite Act can set out exactly who is eligible to benefit from a 
particular program. 
Second, many members of the various Pacific island communities 
in Fiji expressed unhappiness about the fact that the 1990 
Constitution had removed them from the Fijian roll and included them 
on what is usually called the 'general' roll. They considered that they 
had little community of interest with most of the other voters on that 
roll. None of them had succeeded in being selected to a seat 
belonging to the general voters' community. One suggested solution 
was the allocation of a communal seat to their community, an idea 
the Commission was unable to accept. Alternatively, they suggested 
that they should be restored to the Fijian roll, on the ground that 
many of them were vasu1 and lived closely with the Fijian community. 
Because we view the retention of the reserved seats as a transitional 
measure, we consider this solution is the better one. We therefore 
propose that Pacific islanders should be eligible to vote in the Fijian 
reserved seat constituencies. 
Third, a number of submissions from members of all communities 
expressed unhappiness about the fact that persons have always been 
classified as 'Fijians' and 'Indians' for constitutional purposes by 
reason of patrilineal descent. The only exception allowing for descent 
to be traced through the mother has been if the identity of a person's 
father is not known. In those cases where persons of mixed descent 
have been brought up in their mother's community rather than their 
father's, the provision has inflicted personal hardship by requiring 
J>eople to vote as members of a community to which they do not 
belong. 
Rotumans are not affected in the same way, because section 156(b) 
Of the 1990 Constitution classifies a person as Rotuman if of Rotuman 
descent through either the father or the mother. This gave persons of 
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mixed Rotuman and Fijian or Indian descent through the father a 
choice of rolls. The original 1970 provisions were unduly preoccu-
pied with having clear roles which could be applied automatically. 
Recognition of descent through the father was acceptable to Fijians 
because the customary right to land is usually based on descent 
through the father rather than the mother. However, as proposed 
above, the right to vote in a Fijian reserved seat constituency should 
not depend on having a customary right to land. 
By returning Pacific islanders to the Fijian roll, many persons 
descended from an indigenous Fijian through their mother will 
acquire the right to vote in Fijian reserved seat constituencies. It 
would be unfair if other citizens also descended from an indigenous 
Fijian through their mother were not given the option of voting as 
members of the Fijian community. The Commission proposes that a 
person should be allowed to be registered on the roll for a Fijian 
reserved seat constituency if descended, through either the male or 
the female line, from an indigenous inhabitant of the Fiji Islands 
(other than Rotuma) or any other island in Melanesia, Micronesia or 
Polynesia. Similarly, a person should be permitted to register on the 
roll for an Indo-Fijian reserved seat constituency, if descended, 
through either the male or the female line, from a person who was 
originally from the subcontinent of India. A person who is 
descended, through either the male or the female line, from an 
indigenous inhabitant of Rotuma should have the right to be entered 
on the roll for the Rotuman reserved seat constituency. 
A reference to 'the male line or the female line' would allow 
descent to be traced back though the generations on either side of the 
family, obviating any question of discrimination on the ground of a 
person's sex and give persons of mixed descent a choice. People will 
only want to change their present registration if it cuts across their 
sense of personal identify. The number is likely to be very small. 
The right to be registered on the roll for a general reserved seat 
constituency should remain residual, so that registration is open to 
all persons who have no other options or, if they have the option of 
registering on another roll by reason of descent through the male line 
or the female line, but not both, have chosen not to exercise it. 
No one may be registered on the roll for more than one reserved 
seat, open seat or provincial consistency. The Commission's 
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proposals will foster a stronger sense of shared identity among all 
those who are registered on the roll for a particular constituency. 
Some concluding comments 
I now close this contribution with some comments of my own. The 
electoral recommendations of the Commission have been subjected 
to some criticism. Some of the comments have been illuminating, 
providing the basis for informed and vigorous discussion of the 
topic. Contributions to the Workshop2 and chapters in this volume 
fall in that category. But some criticisms have been unnecessarily 
strident and petty, and some driven by political considerations or 
other personal agendas. That is to be expected, I suppose, given that 
the Commission's recommendations represent a significant shift 
away from the electoral system currently in Fiji. At the Workshop a 
number of views were aired. Perhaps the most persistent criticism 
concerned the Commission's recommendations for electing members 
on AV from multimember constituencies. The system had been 
abandoned in number of countries, it was said. Others feared that AV 
in multimember constituencies would throw up unpredictable 
results. Yet others pointed out the supposed superior qualities of 
other electoral systems. In response, it was said that Fiji already had 
multimember constituencies for the Fijian seats, and the fear of 
capricious results were exaggerated, even unfounded. Tomasi 
Vakatora reiterated the Commission's consideration that the AV in 
multimember constituencies was the best way to realise the vision 
that underlay its work: the attainment of multi-ethnic government in 
Fiji. li, however, there was a reluctance to go that route, then, but 
only then, it might be adopted in single-member constituencies. That 
system is widely practiced, including in Australian federal elections. 
AV in single-member constituencies would delay the achievement of 
the Commission's vision, but it was still far preferable to 
Proportional representation systems. 
I return to the point I made at the beginning. An electoral system 
iS a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The most important 
objective, perhaps the overriding objective endorsed by the 
Commission, was to encourage the formation of multi-ethnic parties 
(or coalitions) and governments in Fiji that broadly reflected the 
lllulti-ethnic character of the country, that fostered nation building, 
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reinforced the value of integration and cross-ethnic cooperation, 
rather than accentuating divisions in society, that put the national 
interest ahead of communal interests. The Commission's considered 
view, a view that I have found absolutely no reason to change, was 
that the Alternative Vote was the electoral system best likely to 
achieve that objective: of taking Fiji towards a united future for all its 
people. 
Note 
1. Vasu ~ean.s the m?th~r's brother's son, who has a right known as 
vasu m hlS uncle s village to take whatever he wants from his 
uncle's goods. 
2. 'Elector~.~yste~ in ~e gov~rance of divided societies: the report 
of ~e F1JI Constitution Review Commission', 17 January 1997, 
National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian 
National University, Canberra. 
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Constitutional engineering and the 
alternative vote in Fiji: an assessment 
Ben Reilly 
The single most important institutional issue for encouraging the 
development of peaceful multi-ethnic politics in Fiji is the design of 
the new electoral system. Electoral systems have long been recog-
nised as one of the most important institutional mechanisms for 
shaping the nature of political competition-first because they are, to 
quote one electoral authority, 'the most specific manipulable 
instrument of politics' (Sartori 1968:273)-that is, they can be 
purposively designed to achieve particular outcomes-and second, 
because they structure the arena of political competition, offering 
incentives to behave in certain ways, and rewarding those who 
respond to these incentives with electoral success. The great potential 
of electoral system design for influencing political behaviour is thus 
that it can reward particular types of behaviour and place constraints 
on others. In terms of ethnically divided societies, for example, where 
ethnicity represents a fundamental political cleavage, particular 
electoral systems can reward candidates and parties who act in a 
cooperative, accommodative manner to rival groups; or they can 
Punish these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only 
to their own ethnic group. Unfortunately, most academic studie:; of 
electoral systems are largely silent on the potential for electoral 
systems to produce these kinds of incentives.1 
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It is therefore a pleasure to assess the report of the Fiji 
Constitution Review Commission (CRC), which deals directly and 
comprehensively with these issues (Fiji CRC 1996). The 
Commission's report puts forward a compelling argument for 
utilis~g the .electoral system to promote multi-ethnic politics in Fiji. 
In dorng so, It presents a well-reasoned intellectual case for the 
virtues of 'vote pooling' for future Fijian elections, via the use of a 
preferential electoral system known as the Alternative Vote. Despite 
some technical misjudgements (which, I argue, can be corrected 
relatively easily), the overall depth and quality of the report make it a 
~ignificant contribution to the field of constitutional engineering, and 
It deserves to be widely read and acted upon in the years ahead. 
This chapter provides an assessment of the Commission's elec-
toral system recommendations. First, I will show how the Alternative 
Vote (AV) works to promote accommodative behaviour both in 
Australia, where it is a well established feature of elections at the 
national and state level, and how it worked when used in another 
South Pacific state, the then Territory of Papua New Guinea, between 
1964 and 1975. This second example is particularly important, not 
only because it represents the only example of the use of AV in a 
plural society, but also because an analysis of the three elections held 
under AV rules in Papua New Guinea provide detailed evidence of 
how AV influences campaigning strategies and promotes accommo-
dative and cooperative behaviour in an environment with some 
similarities to Fiji. 
Second, I will tum to the Commission's specific recommendations 
for AV in Fiji, which involve a departure from the type of AV used in 
Australia and Papua New Guinea towards a confused hybrid model. 
This hybrid model of electoral system represents the Commission's 
major 'technical misjudgement' mentioned above. I will show how 
and why this proposed hybrid model cannot and will not work in Fiji 
(or anywhere else, for that matter) and how it may instead, if 
adopted, deliver unpredictable and even nonsensical results which 
will not promote inter-ethnic accommodation. Essentially, I am 
arguing that the Commission got the big picture decision of which 
elec.toral _s~stem to use right, but then got some of the details wrong. 
While this IS understandable in what can be a highly technical area, it 
nevertheless means that the specific system recommended by the 
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Commission will, if adopted, produce the opposite of the effects 
intended. I will show why this is so. 
Third, I will make some recommendations, within the framework 
of the Commission's report, for what systems will work to produce 
the conciliatory multi-ethnic politics advocated by the Commission . 
These are actually very close to the Commission's own recommenda-
tions: either conventional AV in single-member districts, or the Single 
Transferable Vote if multimember districts are required. I will argue 
that the key question to be addressed is whether, in the Fiji context, it 
is possible to draw single-member districts which are sufficiently 
ethnically mixed-heterogeneous-to allow meaningful cooperation 
between ethnic groups to take place. If it is, then I would recommend 
straight, single-member AV, as used in Australia. If multimember 
electorates are required to ensure sufficient heterogeneity, then I 
would recommend the use of STV in small, three-member districts. 
These recommendations will be based on my experience as a consult-
ant to governments in the electoral systems field and on my research 
into the effects of particular electoral systems in divided societies in 
the Asia Pacific (Reilly 1997a, 1997b). 
The Alternative Vote in action 
The Alternative Vote (AV) was first developed as a modification of 
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system of Proportional 
Representation (PR)-the system recommended by the Street Royal 
Commission of 1975 for Fiji-which would enable preferential 
elections to take place in single-member districts, rather than the 
large multimember electorates required for Proportional 
Representation (Reilly and Maley 1996). Both STV and AV oblige 
voters to rank-order all candidates in order of their preference from 1 
onwards. The difference between the two systems is manifested in 
the way votes are translated into seats. Under STY, candidates must 
gain a 'quota' of votes for election-usually defined as the number of 
votes divided by one more than the number of seats to be filled, 
rounded up to the next whole number. In a case where three 
candidates are to be elected, the quota for election will thus be just 
over a quarter of all votes. The AV, by contrast, applies this sam.e 
formula to the election of only one member, so that the quota for 
election is much higher: 50 per cent plus one. This requires a 
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candidate to receive an absolute majority of votes in order to win 
election, and it is thus rightly classified as a 'majoritarian' system. 
Under AV, if no candidate has an absolute majority of first 
preferences, the candidate with the lowest vote total is 'eliminated' 
and his or her ballots are re-examined for their second preferences, 
which are assigned to the remaining candidates in the order as 
marked on the ballot. This process is repeated until one candidate 
has over 50 per cent of all votes, and is declared elected. 
The argument for the accommodative effects of AV are premised 
on the assumption that politicians are rational actors who will do 
what needs to be done to gain election. Under AV, 'what needs to be 
done' varies considerably depending on the makeup of the 
electorate. Where one candidate is confident of achieving an absolute 
majority of first preferences, they need only focus on maximising 
their own vote share from their own supporters in order to win the 
seat. In cases where no candidate has outright majority support, 
however, the role of second and later preferences becomes crucial to 
attracting an overall majority. Those candidates who successfully 
'pool' both their own first preferences and the second preferences of 
others will be more successful than those who fail to attract any 
second-order support. To 'pool' votes, candidates need to attract the 
support of groups other than their own, and this is usually achieved 
by their moving to the centre on policy issues to attract floating 
voters, or by successfully accommodating 'fringe' issues into their 
broader policy. There is a long history of both these types of 
behaviour in Australian elections (Reilly 1997a). 
The Alternative Vote in Australia 
The Alternative Vote was introduced by the Nationalist government 
in Australia in 1918 to replace the existing First-Past-the-Post system 
after it became clear that several aligned conservative candidates all 
standing in the same electorate could split their vote between them 
under First-Past-the-Post, thus handing victory to the less popular 
but more disciplined Labor Party forces. Its introduction was thus 
intimately related to the need to counter the possibilities of vote 
splitting and to encourage and reward collaboration or coalition 
arrangements between parties (Graham 1968). This ability to 
aggregate aligned interests, rather than divide them, has long been a 
(largely unrecognised) feature of Australian electoral politics. The 
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most graphic example of this process in action occurred at the 1990 
federal election in Australia, where the incumbent Australian Labor 
Party was polling badly and looked to be heading for electoral 
defeat, and where voter support for left-of-centre parties such as the 
Australian Democrats and Greens reached its height. The then Prime 
Minister, Bob Hawke, went on national radio to campaign directly 
for the second preferences of these parties' supporters, offering 
policy concessions on key issues (for example, the environment) and 
arguing that the Labor Party was far closer to their interests than the 
major alternative, the Liberal/National coalition (Hughes 1990). This 
strategy was markedly successful: with minor party support levels at 
an all-time high of around 17 per cent, the ALP was the beneficiary of 
around two-thirds of all preferences from Democrat and Green 
voters-a figure which probably made the difference between it 
winning and losing the election (Papadakis and Bean 1995). This was 
thus a 'win-win' situation for both groups: the ALP gained 
government with less than 40 per cent of the first preference vote, 
while the minor parties, who did not win lower house seats, 
nonetheless saw their preferred major party in government and 
committed to favourable policies in their areas of concern. 
Analyses of the effects of AV in Australia have tended to concen-
trate almost exclusively on its partisan impacts. Some commentators 
have seen the system as an instrument for maintaining the dominance 
of the two major parties, the ALP and the Liberal/National Coalition, 
and for restricting the role of minor parties in the lower house to one 
of influencing the policies of the major parties rather than gaining 
election themselves (Papadakis and Bean 1995). Others claim that it 
can enhance the power and position of minor parties, especially if 
they have the potential to hold the balance of power between two 
major parties (Aitkin et al. 1989:150). There is widespread agreement 
that AV has facilitated coalition arrangements such as that between 
the Liberal and National parties, and that it works to the advantage 
of centre candidates and parties, encouraging moderate policy 
positions and a search for the 'middle ground' (Bean 1986:65). The 
sometimes fiery and aggressive rhetoric of Australian politics has 
often distracted observers from recognising just how much 
cooperative behaviour there is between parties-via preference-
swapping deals, for example-and how close the major parties are 
on most substantive policy issues. There is little doubt that the AV 
Constitutional engineering and the alternative vote in Fiji: an assessment 
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electoral system provides a significant institutional incentive for 
these tendencies . 
Despite the fact that Australia is one of only two countries which 
currently uses AV to elect its national legislature, most of the interest 
in the system in recent years has 1Jeen international in origin.2 The 
potential benefits of AV for encouraging collaboration and 
accommodation between competing interest groups saw it 
recommended as the most suitable electoral system for post-
apartheid South Africa (Horowitz 1991a). The former Australian 
Territory of Papua New Guinea, which used AV until independence 
in 1975, has been the site of a long-running campaign for the re-
introduction of AV, with much attention focused on the potential of 
the system to encourage moderate campaigning, reduce candidate 
numbers and nullify the effects of 'vote splitting'. In addition, 
another ethnically divided polity in the Asia Pacific region, Sri 
Lanka, has used a form of preferential voting to elect its president 
since 1978. Details of these cases and others can be found elsewhere 
(see Reilly 1997a). For the purposes of this discussion, I want to 
briefly focus on how AV worked in Papua New Guinea, because I 
believe this is by far the most illuminating example for those 
interested in Fiji. 
The Alternative Vote in Papua New Guinea 
We have seen above how AV can work to encourage the aggregation 
of common interests, via the exchange of preferences, in the case of a 
stable western polity, Australia. While the circumstances in ethnically 
divided societies are very different, the same broad approach can be 
used to induce inter-ethnic bargaining and promote accommodative 
behaviour. At the core of this approach is the need, as Donald 
Horowitz has argued, 'to make politicians reciprocally dependent on 
the votes of members of groups other than their own' (Horowitz 
199lb:471). The most reliable way of achieving this aim, naturally 
enough, is to offer sufficient electoral incentives for campaigning 
politicians to court voter support from other groups. In deeply 
divided societies, this can be very difficult to achieve. Under 
conditions of primarily ethnic political identity, for example, policy-
based cleavages are considerably less salient than ethnic or linguistic 
identities, and almost nothing will convince a member of one ethnic 
group to cast his or her vote for a member of a rival group. However, 
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under AV a voter can give a first preference vote to a member of his 
or her ethnic group, but then use lower-order preferences to indicate 
secondary choices. Where a candidate needs the support of other 
ethnic groups to gain election, there is a powerful incentive for him 
or her to reach out to these groups in search of these second 
preferences. There is thus an inbuilt centripetal spin within AV: those 
candidates and parties who are broadly attractive to others will tend 
to be rewarded, those who have polarised support will generally not. 
Ideally, candidates who are elected will be dependent on the votes of 
groups other than their own for their parliamentary positions, and 
can be expected to serve the needs of these groups as well as their 
own ethnic group if they are to establish their positions and gain re-
election. 
The only time that these theories have been properly tested have 
been in pre-independence Papua New Guinea (PNG), which held 
elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972 under AV rules. The Constitution 
Review Commission mistakenly claimed that 'there is no actual 
experience of AV . .. in heterogeneous constituencies in an ethnically 
divided country' (Fiji CRC 1996:316). The PNG case represents just 
that. Papua New Guinea is a Melanesian society in which political 
affiliation rests predominantly on an exceptionally diverse ethnic and 
linguistic basis of several thousand 'clans' -ascriptive extended 
family networks which are the primary, and often the only, unit of 
political and social loyalty. With over 800 separate languages and 
several thousand tribal groups, this clan-based level of ascriptive 
ethnic identity means that Papua New Guinea is one of the world's 
Jl\08t heterogeneous societies. 
We are fortunate that all of Papua New Guinea's elections to date 
have been the subject of major book-length election studies (Bettison 
etal. 1965; Epstein et al. 1971; Stone 1976; Hegarty 1983b; King 1989; 
Oliver 1989; Saffu 1996). These studies provide a wealth of compara-
tive information on political behaviour in the context of an electoral 
CCll\test. Crucially, they detail numerous instances of accommodative 
Vote pooling and preference-swapping activities under AV; and 
Increasingly violent, zero-sum campaign behaviour since the re-
placement of AV with First-Past-the-Post in 1975. Essentially, there is 
lignificant evidence that accommodative vote pooling behaviour was 
tlncouraged by the incentives presented by AV, and further significant 
Widence that behaviour became markedly less accommodative upon 
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the introduction of First-Past-the-Post, under which the incentives for 
electoral victory are different (Reilly 1997b). 
Under AV, vote pooling took place in three primary ways, all of 
which were predicated on the assumption that most voters would 
invariably give their first preference to their own clan or 'home' 
candidate. The most common and successful method of vote pooling 
was for a candidate who had a limited 'home' support base to 
campaign widely for second-level support amongst rival groups. 
This required a range of techniques, such as translating campaign 
speeches and travelling widely throughout an electorate, with the 
essential request being not for a first preference vote but for a second 
preference. This enabled electors to cast their primary vote for their 
'home' candidate-an essential element in cases of ascriptive ethnic 
identity-but to also indicate their second choice if their ascriptive 
candidate was not elected. For this strategy to succeed, candidates 
needed to be able to sell themselves as a good 'second-best' choice-
which meant, in general, someone who would look after all groups, 
not just his own. At the first AV elections in 1964, for example, Bill 
Bloomfield in the Kaindi electorate emerged as the winner of the seat 
after the preferences of seven candidates had been distributed. 
Without a strong local support base or home area, Bloomfield 
campaigned extensively, translated his speeches into local dialect and 
emphasised that if electors did not want to give him their first 
preference 'then give me number two'. This was a highly effective 
strategy which saw him carry a seat that he would have had no 
chance of winning on first-preferences. Similarly, the contest for the 
seat of Henganofi provided a classic example of the way disciplined 
preference-swapping amongst a group of aligned candidates can 
overcome a single dominant plurality winner (see Table 3.1). 
Candidate Bono, with massive support from his own region but 
negligible support elsewhere, lost to candidate Ugi, situated in the 
centre of the electorate and attracting a smaller clan block vote but a 
considerably broader range of support. Ugi was well behind on first . 
preferences, but gained the majority of all other candidate's 
preferences to win the seat. 
Ben Reilly 
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Table 3.1: Allocation of preferences in Henganofi Electorate, 1964 
Candidate lstcount 2nd count 3rd count 4th count final count 
Fora pi 787 (787) 
Posi 1758 12 (1770) 
Punupa 3708 73 41 (3822) 
Bono 8028 12 35 224 8299 
Ugi 3295 667 1362 3274 9228 
Exhausted" 23 334 324 681 
Note:• An 'exhausted' vote comprises a ballot under an optional 
preference marking system in which preferences have not or cannot be 
assigned to a continuing candidate, hence 'exhausting' before the full 
distribution of preferences. 
Source: Chief Electoral Officer, 1964. Statistical returns showing the voting 
within each open and special electorate in relation to the General Election for the 
House of Assembly, 1964, Government Printer, Port Moresby. 
A second strategy for victory under AV was for candidates with 
significant existing support bases to reach out to selected allies for 
secondary support. Traditional tribal contacts and allegiances, for 
example, could be utilised to create majority victors. This similarly 
necessitated a commitment to behave positively towards those 
groups if elected. In the Dei Open Electorate at the 1972 elections, for 
example, tribal leaders of previously hostile clans made deals with 
each other for preference support. The winning candidate forged 
particularly close connections with a traditional ally tribe via 
'intensive ties of ceremonial exchange', urged his supporters to cast 
their preferences for a member of a hostile rival tribe as well as for 
himself, and consequently received a generous proportion of that 
opponent's second and later preferences to win the seat. 
A third strategy, and increasingly common by the time of the third 
AV election in 1972, was for groups and candidates to form mutual 
alliances, sometimes campaigning together and urging voters to cast 
reciprocal preferences for one or the other. This necessitated a strong 
cooperative approach to electoral competition, in stark contrast to the 
zero-sum attitudes that have prevailed at elections since 
independence in 1975, when Papua New Guinea changed to a First-
Past-the-Post system. At the first post-independence election in 1977, 
David Hegarty found that vote splitting and other 'anti-system' 
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tactics 'heightened tension between clans and groups and in some 
cases polarized electorates to the point of violent conflict ... this 
situation contrasted markedly with campaigning styles in previous 
elections where opposing candidates often toured their electorates 
together urging voters to cast preferences' (Hegarty 1983a:l5). 
Despite problems of literacy and numeracy, the percentage of 
voters in Papua New Guinea utilising preferences increased with 
every election between 1964 and the last preferential voting election 
in 1972, where 70 per cent of all seats were decided on preferences. In 
addition, the incidence of preference distribution deciding outcomes 
increased over time. By 1972, 16 per cent of seats returned different 
members than would have been the case under a straight First-Past-
the-Post contest. These are much higher rates of preferences being 
counted and results being changed than has ever been achieved in 
national elections in Australian, the 'home' of AV, and reflects the 
way AV works in situations of highly fragmented support. 
There is thus a considerable accumulation of hard evidence that 
AV did serve to encourage cooperative and accommodative political 
strategies and behaviour in Papua New Guinea. There is also 
considerable evidence for the obverse: that is, that when incentives 
for cooperation were removed, ethnic groups reverted to their 
traditional hostilities. This return to conflict was considerably 
enhanced by a new set of incentives for non-accommodative 
behaviour inherent under a First-Past-the-Post, which rewarded vote 
splitting and appears to have contributed to zero-sum campaigning 
styles. Attempts since 1975 to constrain these activities have generally 
proved unsuccessful: candidates have reacted to the electoral 
incentives of the First-Past-the-Post by focusing their energies on 
maximising their own clan vote, and in many cases by restricting the 
campaigning of opposition candidates, via threats of violence, to 
their own home areas (Standish 1996; Dinnen 1996). This has led to 
candidates being elected on increasingly minuscule pluralities, and 
to ever-increasing numbers of candidates standing for election: the 
higher the number of candidates, the smaller the total vote needed to 
gain a plurality and hence win the seat (Reilly 1996). 
The significance of the PNG example for Fiji is clear: it provides 
detailed evidence of how and why AV promotes inter-ethnic 
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accommodation. And Fiji, as a part Melanesian country, does itself 
have many social structures in common with Papua New Guinea 
within its indigenous population. There are two crucial differences, 
however. One is that the ethnic division in Fiji is a bipolar one 
between the native Fijian and Indian populations, rather than 
fractionalised between many different groups, as it is in Papua New 
Guinea. Second, the combination of the communal electoral system 
and the mixture of Polynesian and Melanesian elements in 
indigenous Fijian society-such as the existence of traditional chiefs, 
for example-means that there has traditionally been less intense 
competition for elected office in Fiji than in other Melanesian 
countries, and thus that the lessons of the PNG case may not hold 
true in Fiji. To assess the way AV will work in Fiji realistically, we 
must first assess the CRC's specific proposals, and it is to this subject 
which I will now tum. 
The CRC's recommendations 
The recommendations for an AV electoral system in Fiji are set out in 
detail in chapter 10 of the CRC's report (and summarised in Chapter 
2 of this book). The Commission argues-persuasively I think-that 
AV would encourage multi-ethnic government, would fit in well 
with Fiji's existing multi-party system, would provide incentives for 
moderation and cooperation across ethnic lines, and would 
effectively represent constituents. They noted the appropriateness of 
using AV in single-member constituencies, but went on to argue that 
AV could also be used effectively in multimember constituencies by 
adding first, second and third preferences together before eliminating 
the candidate with the lowest numbers of votes. These two 
recommendations-that multimember rather than single-member 
electorates be used, and that first, second and third preferences be 
added together before the elimination of lower-placed candidates 
begins-represent a significant departure from AV as used in 
Australia and Papua New Guinea which (with one exception which I 
Will discuss below) have always utilised single-member districts and 
counted each preference separately. As I will show, the combination 
of the recommendation that AV be used in multimember districts, 
and the recommendation that first, second a:nd third preferences be 
Constitutional engineering and the alternative vote in Fiji: an assessment 
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combined when counting votes, together represents a crucial error in 
the CRC's reasoning. 
AV in multimember districts 
The only time that AV has been used in multimember districts was in 
the Australian Senate between 1919 and 1946. In contrast to the 
CRC's claims that AV can be used successfully in multimember 
constituencies, this experience was anything but a success, producing 
winner-take-all outcomes and extremely lopsided parliaments. This 
was because when AV is used in multimember districts, the 
majoritarian features of the system become overwhelming. In effect, 
each vacancy was filled by a separate election, but with the same 
electorate voting at each. This showed a strong tendency to produce 
an outcome under which the same party grouping won every seat, 
and produced such sustained periods of single-party dominance that 
on a number of occasions the Senate was scarcely workable as a 
legislative body, let alone as a house of review. In the period from 
1947to1950, for example, there were only three opposition 
Senators-a leader, a deputy leader, and a whip-facing 33 
government Senators (Reilly and Maley 1996). This level of system 
dysfunction meant that the electoral system itself was primarily 
responsible for the erosion of public confidence in, and the legitimacy 
of, half the federal Parliament; some have argued that it increased 
popular opposition to any strengthening of the federal government's 
powers (see Goot 1985:226). Multimember AV was replaced with the 
Single Transferable Vote in 1948 which, having been designed for 
multimember constituencies, has operated in a far more logical way. 
The inappropriateness of multimember AV evidenced by the case 
of the Australian Senate was such that no proposal for multimember 
AV has ever again been forthcoming in Australia. Horowitz did 
propose that multimember AV may have to be used to ensure 
sufficient electorate-level heterogeneity in the case of South Africa, 
and it is notable that most critiques of his proposal focused on the 
unworkability of multimember AV as one of their major criticisms 
(Lijphart 1991; Reynolds 1995). 
Combining first, second and third preferences 
So the first major problem with the CRC's proposal is the recommen-
dation that a majority-style method be used in a situation of choosing 
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three, rather than one, representatives-a situation which requires 
some form of proportional system to work well. The experience of 
multimember AV elections for the Australian Senate-which also 
utilised three-member districts-resulted in the most disproportional 
electoral results ever experienced at any Australian elections. This, 
however, is not the only problem with the system as proposed by the 
CRC. The CRC also suggested that, to avoid problems of intra-party 
competition 
in elections for the three-member seats in the Bose Lawa, the first, 
second and third preferences given to each candidate should be 
added together, before the candidate with the lowest number of votes 
is eliminated (Fiji CRC 1996:329). 
This is the most unusual aspect of the CRC's electoral 
recommendations, as it introduces a completely new approach to the 
counting of preferences which has never been used anywhere else. 
Essentially, the effect of this recommendation is to count a second 
and third preference as being of the same value as a first preference. 
This will, according to the Commission, result in party slates where 
members are not competing with each other for votes-thus, 
presumably, strengthening internal party solidarity. Unfortunately, as 
I will show, whatever positive effects this may have are 
overwhelmingly outweighed by the capricious and often arbitrary 
results that this provision will deliver. 
The easiest way to demonstrate the problems caused by counting 
the first three preferences together is to conduct a hypothetical count. 
I have taken the sample ballot paper produced at p. 321 of the 
Commission's report, which consists of a hypothetical three-member 
election in the Vunivadra Open constituency contested by the Viti 
Uberal Party, the Fiji First Party, the National/Republic Coalition and 
some independents (see Table 3.2). I have assumed that there are 
11,000 voters in the constituency, that there is a slim overall 
indigenous Fijian majority of electors, that electors vote along ethnic 
and party lines, and that support for the parties stands at 15 per cent 
for the Viti Liberal Party, 40 per cent for the Fiji First Party and 35 per 
cent for the National Republican Coalition, with Independents 
tnaking up the remaining 10 per cent. 
As you can see, most voters follow the party's suggested ordering 
of candidates-that is, most give the first candidate on the party list 
their first preference, the second candidate on the list their second 
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first three preferences before they register their next choice-in other 
words, that they will be disciplined party voters. In this case, most of 
the electors who gave their first preference to Solomone would have 
given their second and third preference to other members of the Viti 
Liberal Party. However, because we are aggregating first, second and 
third preferences before we eliminate lower-placed candidates, these 
preferences have already been counted and we need to look at 
Solomone's fourth preference to see where the votes should be 
transferred. In most cases, it will be this fourth preference that 
determines which candidate will receive a transferred vote. Or, to put 
it another way, most vote pooling, on which the Commission is 
relying to encourage inter-ethnic accommodation, will have to take 
place as requests for fourth-level preference support-which does 
not augur well for its prospects. 
In this case, all of Solomone's fourth preferences go to candidate 
Cama of Fiji First. So do Qarikau's, who is eliminated fifth. Candi-
date Cama now has over 6,990 votes. We still have more candidates 
remaining in the count than available seats, so we need to go on 
eliminating candidates. The next to go will be Nunia of the Viti 
Liberal Party, who has 2,410 votes. All his fourth preferences go to 
Yuki of the National/Republican Coalition. By now it is clear that the 
election is going to be fought out between the two major parties, who 
are the only ones left in the race. However, because they did not 
receive any preferences from the eliminated candidates, the next 
lowest placed candidates is Kumar of the National/Republican 
C~alition (3,050 votes) and Jones (4,000 votes) of Fiji First. Jones, you 
will remember, was the most favoured candidate from any party, 
gaining 3,000 first preferences, and Kumar was the second most 
favoured with 2,000. Because, however, first preferences count for the 
same as third preferences under the Commission's scheme, both are 
now eliminated. And here we see another capricious paradox of the 
proposed system. Let us assume that Kumar's supporters gave their 
fourth preferences to friendly independents, who have all now been 
eliminated. Similarly, let's assume that most Fiji First voters gave 
their fourth and later preferences to the Viti Liberal Party or the 
indigenous Fijian independents. Because both of these groups have 
also now been eliminated, neither Kumar's nor Jones's votes can be 
passed on to any continuing candidate. And, because first, second 
and third preferences have already been aggregated, they cannot 
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even be passed on to a running mate. These votes are thus said to 
'exhaust', meaning there is no one left in the count to transfer them 
to. Under a rational preferential vote system, like the Alternative Vote 
or the Single Transferable Vote, Jones would at least have been able to 
pass his votes on to his party colleagues Khan or Cama, ensuring that 
one of them was elected. Under this system, however, these votes are 
now essentially dead. 
There are now four candidates left in the count--Cama with 
6,990, Yuki with 5,810, Singh with 5,292 and Khan with 4,001. Khan is 
the lowest placed of these and is thus finally eliminated. The final 
election result is thus Cama elected first, Yuki elected second and 
Singh elected third. As well as electing the less favoured candidates, 
it can easily be seen then that the National/Republic Coalition, with 
only 35 per cent of the vote, was able to gain two-thirds of the seats; 
the Fiji First Party with 40 per cent of the vote could gain only one, 
and the overall Fijian majority of electoral support translated into a 
clear minority of seats. This happened because of the quirks of the 
preference aggregation system, which counted votes for less popular 
candidates at the same value as those for more popular candidates. 
Wily political operators will already have observed the potential for 
destabilising opposition parties by strategic voting techniques-for 
instance, instructing your supporters to give their lower preferences 
to a low-ranked member of an opposition party, thus ensuring that 
an inferior opposition candidate is elected. 
This brief hypothetical example of the system proposed by the 
CRC should be sufficient to indicate that the aggregation of first, 
second and third preferences is a questionable practice when applied 
to a preferential electoral system. It should also demonstrate that the 
use of a majoritarian system like AV in a multimember context which 
demands a proportional system is a similarly bad idea. The conse-
quences of such a system can be highly disproportional results-such 
as the one, in the example above, which gave 67 per cent of the seats 
to the National/Republican Coalition even though they could only 
gain 35 per cent of the vote. If replicated in an actual election, this 
level of disproportionality could well undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of key institutions of government such as the parliament 
and the electoral system-the very institutions which most need 
public support and confidence in Fiji in the years ahead. 
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Conclusion 
If the system proposed by the CRC will not produce satisfactory 
results and promote inter-ethnic accommodation and compromise, 
then what will? My answer comes straight from the CRC's report, 
which argued that 
the people of Fiji should adopt a voting system that has been used 
successfully elsewhere, preferably in the region. No unexpected 
problems would be likely to arise, and there would always be ready 
access to technical advice and help (Fiji CRC 1996:326). 
I strongly concur with these wise words. And, as I have already 
argued, there is substantial evidence that a preferential electoral 
system can work to promote inter-ethnic cooperation and harmony, 
rewarding the centre and promoting broadly-based coalitions. There 
are two preferential systems with long histories of successful 
operation: AV in single-member districts, and STV in multimember 
districts. As the Commission noted, AV in single-member districts is 
widely used in Australia, at both the federal and state level and, as 
we have seen, has already been successfully used in Papua New 
Guinea. STV is used to elect members of the Australian Senate, 
legislatures in Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory, and 
farther afield in Ireland and Malta. I would strongly recommend that 
the final electoral system chosen for Fiji be one of these two systems. 
The choice of which system to adopt comes down to the simple 
question of whether single-member districts can achieve sufficient 
diversity in enough electorates to ensure meaningful vote swapping 
across ethnic group lines, or whether multimember electorates are 
needed to achieve this. This question was addressed directly by the 
CRC themselves, who noted the crucial importance of heterogeneous 
constituencies in facilitating the type of conditions favourable to inter-
ethnic vote pooling. The more heterogeneous a constituency, the 
more likely it is that no one group or party will command an overall 
majority, and thus the more likely it is that meaningful vote pooling 
will take place. In most ethnically divided countries, however, 
members of the same ethnic group tend to cluster together, meaning 
that the relatively small, single-member districts which are a feature 
of AV will result in ethnically homogeneous rather than 
heterogeneous constituencies. The CRC looked at whether, given the 
distribution of the different communities within the Fiji Islands, it 
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would be possible to divide the country into heterogeneous 
constituencies-that is, one in which there is a reasonable mixture of 
indigenous Fijians and Indians. They concluded that the choice of 45 
single-member or 15 multimember districts 'did not affect the 
potential for heterogeneity in the more densely-populated areas' but 
that 'three-member constituencies made it marginally easier to 
achieve a reasonable degree of heterogeneity' in the less populated 
areas. They concluded that, for both single and multimember 
districts, it is 'entirely possible to draw constituency boundaries in 
Fiji in a way that achieves reasonable heterogeneity' (Fiji CRC 
1996:314-15). 
If this is correct, then I would recommend the use of single-
member AV, in 45 single-member constituencies. The advantages of 
this system are clear. It is simple to understand and to operate, it . 
requires an overall majority of support to get elected (thus favouring 
the political centre and penalising extremes) and, importantly in a 
rural-based country like Fiji, it enables single-member representation. 
As the Commission noted, 'voters usually feel strongly that they 
want to know who their member is and to have access to him or her 
both individually and as a group with common interests arising from 
their residence in a particular geographic area' (Fiji CRC 1996:318)-
a need that, as Joel Barkan has shown, is particularly strongly felt in 
agrarian societies (Barkan 1995). The other advantage of using AV is 
that its vote pooling properties work just as well when ethnic divi-
sions transform into other, less destructive cleavages (for example, 
labour vs capital, for example), as the Commission clearly hopes they 
Will. In this context it is worth noting that, because party support 
from both major ethnic groups is divided between several parties, 
even relatively small numbers of one group can present an opportu-
nity for vote pooling. Take, for example, the case of a division in 
Which the population is 80 per cent indigenous Fijian and only 20 per 
cent Indian. If there is one monolithic Fijian party, then there is no 
incentive for vote pooling to occur. If, however, there are several 
parties all bidding for the Fijian vote, as is actually the case in most 
parts of Fiji, then the majority requirement for election under AV puts 
the 20 per cent Indian community in a much stronger position, 
because the Fijian party that gains their support (in the form of 
second and later preferences) will be more likely to win the seat than 
Others. To do this requires attracting the Indian voters somehow-by 
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behaving moderately on ethnic issues, or by offering policy proposals 
that appeal to the Indian community. Of course, it is also possible to 
go the other way-for the Fijian parties to 'outbid' each other by 
being more and more anti-Indian-but such extremism will tend to 
be punished by AV rather than rewarded. The disadvantages of the 
system are that, because of the majority threshold, it can under-
represent minor parties and can thus be disproportional-although 
not as disproportional as the existing First-Past-the-Post system. 
Overall, the potential of the system for promoting inter-ethnic 
accommodation would seem to outweigh these drawbacks in the 
Fijian case. 
However, it may be that, contrary to the Commission's 
expectations, it is not possible to create sufficiently diverse 
electorates from 45 single-member constituencies. The outer Fijian 
islands are almost entirely indigenous Fijian, so vote pooling there 
will have to take place on issues other than ethnic ones, if it takes 
place at all. The situation on the main islands and in urban centres is 
more mixed. Some commentators have argued that, even in urban 
areas, 'ethnic residential self-selectivity' occurs, rendering districts 
either predominantly Indian or Fijian (Premdas 1995:12). If this 
means that heterogeneity is impossible in single-member districts, 
then multimember districts will be necessary. But if multimember 
districts are necessary, then it is imperative that STV rather than AV 
be used. STV is similar to AV, but is a system of proportional 
representation, not a majority system. How proportional it is 
depends on how many members are chosen. If the Commission's 
favoured three-member districts are used, then the quota for election 
is just over 25 per cent, considerably lower than the overall majority 
required for election under AV. For this reason, the Commission 
concluded that STV would not work to break down ethnic communal 
voting to the same extent as AV, as most ethnic groups would be 
represented in the legislature in the same proportion as their 
numbers in the general community (Fiji CRC 1996:317). But this only 
tells half the story. If the hypothetical three-seat election at Table 3.2 
had been held under STV rules, for example, the first seat would 
most likely have gone to the most popular indigenous Fijian 
supported party, the second to the most popular Indian supported 
party, and the third seat would most assuredly have been decided on 
the basis of vote pooling. This would be the case in nearly all three-
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member divisions, provided they were drawn to ensure ethnic 
heterogeneity. Looked at in this way, a system of 15 three-member 
constituencies, as proposed by the Commission, would have the 
advantage of not just encouraging but often requiring vote pooling 
to take place, at least for the third seat in each district. STV can also 
be used in two-member districts, where the quota for election 
becomes quite high-33 per cent-making it more like a majoritarian 
system than a proportional one. In ethnically mixed constituencies, 
this would also have the advantage of usually electing one Indian 
and one Fijian candidate in each district. A further possibility is to 
use a mixture of single-member seats elected by AV and 
multimember seats elected by STY, as first recommended by the 
Street Commission twenty years ago. 
So, in conclusion, it seems to me that the two most feasible 
systems are the ones identified by the Commission itself-but in the 
form in which they are used elsewhere, rather than the unusual 
variant proposed by the Commission. Both have their specific 
advantages-AV is simpler and maintains single-member 
representation, STV is more complex but also more proportional-
but their similarities outweigh their differences and, in fact, one is a 
variant of the other. Both have been tried and tested elsewhere. The 
choice of which electoral system to choose is, of course, ultimately 
and properly a decision for the Fijian parliament and the Fijian 
people. I can only conclude by offering the services of International 
IDEA in this process: as an independent international body 
established specifically to deal with questions such as these, we 
would be happy to assist this process in any way we can. 
Notes 
1. Notable exceptions include the chapters on electoral systems in 
two seminal works by Donald L. Horowitz (1985, 1991a). See also 
Sisk (1996). 
2. The tiny Pacific micro-state (and former Australian Territory) of 
Nauru inherited the preferential voting system from Australia 
but, in a unique departure from the Australian model, combines 
the preferential counting system with multimember 
constituencies. Preferences are counted as fractional votes (that 
is, a second preference is worth half a vote, a third preference is 
worth a third of a vote and so on). 
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Fiji's proposed new voting system: 
a critique with counter-proposals 
D.G.Arms 
While the Fiji Constitution Review Commission (henceforth the CRC) 
has made many excellent recommendations, its proposals for a new 
electoral system are controversial. If I stress the negative aspects of 
the CRC's proposals, it is because they tend to vitiate many of the 
good points made. This chapter will consider in particular 
• the problem in principle with the CRC's position 
• the need for a transparently fair electoral system 
• difficulties with the latter part of Chapter 9 of the CRC's 
Report, which deals with Parliament 
• difficulties with the early part of Chapter 10 of the CRC's 
Report, which deals with elections 
• counterproposals, in particular, the use of the Single 
Transferable Vote system (henceforth STV) of proportional 
representation (henceforth PR) for both Houses of 
Parliament. 
A flawed foundation 
The CRC recommends 'that the revised arrangements should be 
designed in such a way as to meet the following objectives 
• they should encourage the emergence of multi-ethnic 
governments 
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• they should comply with the international standards by 
applying the principle of equal suffrage 
• they should be based on a more open system of 
representation 
• they should provide a gradual but decisive means of 
moving away from the present constitutional arrangements 
(Fiji CRC 1996:290). 
The CRC also states that 'the main thrust of this report is to 
encourage the emergence of multi-ethnic parties or coalitions' (Fiji 
CRC 1996:79). We also find the following set of criteria 
• encouragement of multi-ethnic government 
• recognition of the role of political parties 
• incentives for moderation and cooperation across ethnic 
lines 
• effective representation of constituents 
• effective voter participation 
• effective representation of minority and special interest 
groups 
• fairness between political parties 
• effective government 
• effective opposition 
• proven workability 
• legitimacy (Fiji CRC 1996:310). 
These objectives and criteria are commendable, but if they are 
ranked and given precedence over other values, injustices and 
inconsistencies could flow from them. 
In particular, putting 'encouragement of multi-ethnic government' 
as top priority in choosing an electoral system is against the 
international standards the CRC says it wishes to uphold. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures (Article 
21.3). 
However, it cannot be assumed that the will of the people and the 
CRC's feelings about multi-ethnic government are one and the same. 
The internal logic of Article 21.3 is that universal suffrage should 
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determine the will of the people as accurately and fairly as possible. 
It implies that one should choose a system where every vote has the 
same effect. However, for the CRC 
The concept of 'equal suffrage' means that, within reasonable limits, 
every vote is to be given the same weight. It does not imply that 
every vote must have the same effect in electing members of 
Parliament. Therefore it does not mandate a particular system for 
translating votes into seats (Fiji CRC 1996:47). 
Thus, the CRC has not put the people first. It has put the 
encouragement of multi-ethnic government first, the role of political 
parties second, and incentives for multi-ethnic moderation and 
cooperation third. The people speak through their votes. No one has 
the right to try and twist the content of those votes towards a 
particular objective, no matter how noble that objective may be. If the 
people opt for mono-ethnic parties rather than multi-ethnic ones, that 
is their right. The CRC, however, wants to advantage multi-ethnic 
parties and penalise those which are not. It explicitly opposes PR 
systems because they are fair to both. It clearly believes the system it 
advocates will not provide ethnic parties with the representation 
their support would warrant. 
While I would prefer that Fiji's political parties were more multi-
ethnic in composition, there can be no justification for trying to 
weight the electoral system to achieve this. Ethnically based parties 
have a right to exist. To advocate a system that will force them into a 
coalition that will mute their effect, or that will deprive them of their 
due representation, is a dangerous choice. It tends to force such 
groups to seek redress outside the democratic system. 
If the objective is to penalise ethnically based parties as being 
'extremist', other 'extreme' positions too will be forced into 
coalitions. Not all 'extremists' are bad. Some extreme views fall by 
the wayside, others end up becoming mainstream positions. For 
instance, environmentalists and feminists were once regarded as 
extreme, and possibly still are in Fiji. In many places however, their 
influence, originally small, has pervaded the political scene. The 
electoral system is not capable of differentiating between one sort of 
'extreme' position and another. 
In addition, it may also be unnecessary. It is feasible for a number 
of mono-ethnic parties to work in a cross-ethnic coalition, and to 
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provide the Opposition with a real say in things. The current 
'winner-takes-all' is not the only workable model. 
The CRC's position regarding ethnically based parties is also 
inconsistent. The CRC itself recommends ethnically-defined reserved 
seats in the Lower House, and presumes that some of the presidential 
appointees in the Upper House will also be selected on an ethnic 
basis (Fiji CRC 1996:300). In addition, it supports affirmative action 
on ethnic grounds, for example in Sections 8.68 (Fiji CRC 1996:240) 
and 8.79 (Fiji CRC 1996:243) and the notion of protected ethnic rights 
(Fiji CRC 1996:chap 17). In other words, the CRC concedes there are 
legitimate political interests that may pertain to a particular ethnic 
group as such. 
By its willingness to sacrifice fairness, the CRC may anger those 
most likely to lose out by the system. And by advocating such a 
system, the CRC does nothing to allay the fears of many people, 
especially Fijians. It has allowed a political objective to take 
precedence over a moral one. How can it then appeal to politicians to 
take into account the opinion of all groups when considering the 
Report? Most serious of all, the CRC has unwittingly given a 
justification for staying with the electoral status quo. If it is alright to 
be unfair and go against the international instruments for one good 
purpose (multi-ethnic government), why is it not alright to be unfair 
and go against the international instruments for another (the 
progress of the indigenous people)? 
Voting systems 
There is more than one 'good' electoral system to choose from, 
although it is not an unlimited field. We can more easily evaluate the 
workings of the Alternative Vote system that the CRC recommends if 
we consider it in relation to other possible voting systems. 
First-Past-the-Post 
The system most familiar to Fiji is the First-Past-the-Post (FPP) 
system. In this system, the candidate who gains the relative majority 
of votes as between all contenders is declared the winner. In a 
situation where A gets 40 votes, B gets 35, C gets 15 and D gets 10, 
candidate A will be declared the winner. In ethnic terms if B, C, and 
Dare Fijian parties and A an Indo-Fijian party, B, C, and D may 
prefer that one of themselves be elected, rather than A. However, 
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because their supporters have divided their votes among the three 
parties, and are not reconsulted as to their second choice, none of the 
three Fijian parties gets their candidate elected. The undivided 
minority Indo-Fijian party (40 per cent) wins the seat. 
When electing a number of people to a body simultaneously, it is 
better to elect them in groups rather than singly. In multimember 
constituencies, parties are likely to run a much larger variety of 
candidates, including women, younger people, and members of 
ethnic minorities. WIBhing to pick up the votes of a wide cross-
aection of the electorate, they will appeal to many different groups. In 
single-member constituencies on the other hand, parties tend to run 
the safest candidates who will appeal only to the largest group, or 
widest-held viewpoint. Multimember constituencies in a place like 
Fiji have the other obvious advantage that parties can clearly express, 
through the range of candidates they run in each constituency, 
whether they are ethnically based or multi-ethnic. 
Multiple Vote 
One system using multimember constituencies is the Multiple Vote 
(MV), also known as the Block Vote (BV). The rules for such an 
election are the same as for FPP except that each voter votes for as 
many candidates as there are places to be filled. It was used in Fiji's 
national elections under the 1990 Constitution for most Fijian seats.1 
It is also used for municipal elections. However, the Multiple Vote 
system is even worse than FPP in the unfair results it usually 
produces. 
Voters nearly always vote for their party candidates as a block. 
Thus in a three-member constituency, supporters of party A will tick 
the three candidates of party A, supporters of party B will tick the 
three candidates of party B, and so on. Taking the example above 
again, party A will win because each of its candidates gets about 40 
votes. The other candidates get only about 35 votes (Party B), 15 
votes (Party C) or 10 votes (Party D) respectively. The win for Party 
A, however, no longer consists of just one candidate, but three. With 
40 per cent support, Party A takes all three seats and the 60 per cent 
are left without any representation at all. Even where the winning 
party has an absolute majority (more than 50 per cent), the system is 
still unfair, as the minority is without representation. We see this 
anomaly very clearly in the recent Western Division municipal 
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elections where the NFP won all the seats on a few councils. While 
the NFP may rightly have won a majority, surely residents of other 
political persuasions deserve to be represented. 
So the two systems actually used in Fiji for single-member or 
multimember constituencies-the FPP and the MV systems 
respectively-are poor systems. Let us first try to improve on the 
system for single-member consituencies. 
Alternative Vote 
The Alternative Vote system (AV) builds on a notion mentioned 
above. In the example, supporters of parties B, C, and D-a majority 
of the voters-would probably have had something more to say if 
they had been reconsulted. In some countries, for instance in France, 
voters are literally reconsulted in that a second round of elections is 
held. This is a costly exercise. However, in the AV system voters can 
be reconsulted without their having to go a second time to the polls. 
They indicate their preferences amongst the various candidates by 
writing 1 beside their first choice, 2 beside their second choice, 3 
beside their third choice, and so on. 
In tallying the results, the first step is for all the first preferences to 
be counted. Let us say the results were as discussed above. The next 
step is to eliminate the candidate with fewest votes-candidate D. 
The scrutineers in eliminating D reconsult D's supporters, as if 
asking 'Your candidate doesn't really have much of a chance, so if he 
or she is out, whom would you like to vote for?' The answer is 
written as a second preference on those votes. The scrutineers 
transfer those votes to their second preferences. We will pretend that 
5 of D's 10 votes went to B, 4 to C, and 1 to A. The result of the 
counting at this stage is: A41, B 40, C 19. Now C, holding fewest 
votes, has to be eliminated. The scrutineers first look at the second 
preferences of the 15 votes C first received. If they show a preference 
for A or B, the scrutineers give them to those candidates. If they show 
a preference for D (who is already eliminated), they look further 
down the vote to the third preference and assign it accordingly. They 
also look at the third preferences2 of the 4 votes transferred to C in 
the last round. Let us say C's 19 votes divide up as 3 for A and 16 for 
B. The final results are thus: A 44, B 56. Since 51 is the minimum 
number of votes a candidate must get to be unbeatable, B is declared 
the winner. 
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The result of the above election is much fairer than the result 
der FPP. Candidate B enjoys more overall support than candidate 
A (who only has 44 per cent). True, candidate B was not the first 
thoice of quite a few voters, but that is no reason for saying he or she 
is not the preferred candidate. If they had wanted A, those voters 
could easily have put A as their second preference. The Alternative 
Vote is as good a system as there is for electing a single candidate.3 
If the AV system is so good, need we look any further? The AV 
tern is only good where there is justification for electing a single 
didate, such as a committee chairman, a director, a mayor, a 
resident. Where a number of representatives are being elected, the 
~ system suffers from very similar defects to FPP. All it does is 
guarantee that for each constituency, at least 50 per cent of the voters 
pport the candidate. This may seem fair, but it is by no means 
hnpossible for one party to hold 51 per cent or more of the votes in 
every constituency. If it did so, this would mean that 49 per cent of 
the populace would get no representation at all. 
Such extreme cases do occur in practice. For instance, in Alberta 
(Canada) in 1948, Social Credit took a clean sweep of seats with only 
SS per cent of the vote. In Victoria (Australia) in 1967, the Liberals 
received fewer first preferences than Labor, but secured three times 
as many seats (Lakeman 1970:65). AV allows great imbalances of 
.representation to occur once we move beyond the single vacancy 
situation. Furthermore, AV is even less fair to minority groups than 
FPP. Let us say there is an extreme party which can secure between 
10 per cent to 20 per cent of the national vote but which is not popu-
lar enough to draw many second or third preferences. Some candi-
date of the party (the leader, say) may be able to muster 40 per cent 
in his or her constituency, but no more. If the remaining 60 per cent of 
the vote is divided, then this candidate is likely to get elected under 
FPP, thus providing this minority party with some representation. 
Under AV however, this will not happen, as no candidate of the party 
Will be able to draw enough preferences to reach the required 50 per 
cent. When talking of electing a number of representatives, we have 
to start thinking in terms of multimember constituencies. 
Single Transferable Vote 
Extending the virtues of AV in single-member constituencies to 
IJ\ultimember constituencies is done by the system known as the 
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Single Transferable Vote (STV). The principle behind the system is 
that, as for AV, the winners are the candidates who reach the 
minimum required to warrant a place. Where there is only one 
candidate to be elected, as for the AV system, that minimum is 51 per 
cent of the vote.4 Where there are two to be elected, the minimum for 
election is 34 per cent, because if two people get 34 per cent, no one 
else can beat them-the most such a challenger can get is 32 per cent. 
Where there are three to be elected, the minimum for election is 26 
per cent, and so on. 
The use of this minimum (or 'quota', as it is called) ensures that 
there will be fair representation of various groups.The voting paper 
is just like that for the AV system. Voters are asked to give their 
preferences by writing numbers beside their choices. 
Let us look again at the example used earlier where the results of 
the first count were A 40, B 35, C 15, and D 10. Since there are three 
places to be filled, the quota is 26 votes. From the first count two 
candidates are elected immediately: A and B. However, they have 
more votes than they need. Rather than waste these votes, the system 
requires them to be transferred to further candidates. Xs surplus 14 
votes are transferred first. Let us say there are 4 for C and 10 for D. 
The counting now stands at: A 26, B 35, C 19 and D 20. Now B's 
surplus of 9 votes has to be transferred. Let us say there are 6 for C 
and 3 for D. The distribution of votes will now stand at: A 26, B 26, C 
25, and D 23. Neither C or D has yet reached the quota of 26, so the 
lowest is eliminated. We end up then with A, B, and C being elected. 
We have here a very fair result-much fairer than the Multiple 
Vote which gave all three seats to A. We indicated earlier how A is the 
minority party, holding only 40 per cent of the votes, and that B, C, 
and D are subdivisions of another viewpoint that holds 60 per cent of 
the vote. The STV system takes the voters' preferences nicely into 
account and awards one seat to party A, the minority viewpoint, and 
one seat each to B and C, thus giving the majority viewpoint two 
seats to the minority's one. 
Multiple Alternative Vote 
Instead of looking at the 51 per cent required by the AV system as 
being the minimum required to warrant a place, one can look at it as 
an absolute majority. One can then extend this concept to require that 
all candidates in a multimember constituency must get such an 
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solute majority. This is the system the Commissioners have chosen. 
ey call it the Alternative Vote system, but there are at least two 
ays in which the absolute majority-oriented AV system can been 
pplied to such constituencies: the Multiple Alternative Vote (MAV) 
d the Repeated Alternative Vote (RAV). One has to conclude from 
eir Recommendation 268a (Fiji CRC 1996: 329) that it is the MAV 
~stem that the CRC has in mind. 
The CRC's use of the term 'Alternative Vote (AV)' to refer to both 
)he single-member version of AV and the multimember version is 
nfusing. The two systems are very different in their effect. Single-
Jnember AV (hereafter SAV) is a very reputable system, and in certain 
circumstances the best, whereas multimember AV (whether MAV or 
RAV) is a disreputable system. 
Voters in the CRC's MAV system indicate their preferences as they 
would in SAY, or STY. It is in the counting that the difference lies. 
Since there are three candidates to be elected, the first three 
preferences on all votes are counted as effective votes 'the first, 
second and third preferences given to each candidate should be 
added together' (Fiji CRC 1996:329). If nobody reaches 51 per cent of 
the total votes cast, the lowest candidate is eliminated and the total of 
first three available preferences is again assessed. If somebody is 
elected, the lowest candidate is likewise eliminated, but all votes are 
reassessed only as to their first two available preferences-and so on 
until all three places have been filled.5 
What is particularly bad about this system is that 51 per cent of 
the electorate can get all three of their candidates elected, while 49 
per cent get none. This is not just a possibility, it is a probability, if 
voters tend to vote for their party as a block. This feature is not 
merely understood by the CRC but actively encouraged, as it 
proposes (Fiji CRC 1996:329) to have an 'above-the-line' (or 'ticket') 
oPtion on the ballot paper. Instead of writing out all the preferences 
number by number, voters may just tick the particular order of 
preferences their chosen party has suggested. 
The MAV and MV systems differ from each other in the same way 
as the SAV and FPP systems. The MAV system (like SAV) requires an 
absolute majority whereas the MV system (like FPP) requires a 
relative majority in order to have candidates elected. It can 
nevertheless be unfair to as much as 49 per cent of the electorate. In 
our original example when the MV system was applied to it, gave a 
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result where party A with 40 per cent of the votes won all three seats. 
In this MAV system, Party A will not win all three seats, but Party B 
(or possibly C or D or a combination of them) will. This is better in 
that at least the majority (60 per cent) get representation, but it is 
nevertheless not fair to the 40 per cent who do not get represented at 
all. The STV system, on the other hand, is fair to both groups. 
The MAV system is much more ruthless on the minority than the 
SAV system Gust as the MV system is, compared with the FPP 
system). MAV constituencies are three times the size of SAV ones. 
Three SAV constituencies could, for example, have the following 
divisions of voters: 1) A 60, B 40; 2) A 44, B 56; 3) A 70, B 30. In this 
case Party A would win 2 seats, Party B would win 1. But if these 
same three constituencies were combined into one MAV constituency, 
Party A would have 174 votes and Party B 126. Party A would more 
than likely take all three seats, leaving Party B without any 
representation. 
Thus the two multimember systems MAV and MV are even worse 
in their effects than the SAV and FPP systems (respectively) when 
these latter are used for several constituencies. The CRC seems aware 
of such possible distortions. It reports how in Mauritius no 
Opposition candidates at all got elected in two national elections (Fiji 
CRC 1996:285). Mathur's chapter shows how this happened under 
the Mauritian MV system. It is even more likely to happen under an 
MAV system, which is even harder on minorities. In spite of this 
alarming precedent, the CRC recommends MAV. 
Two houses and their seat distribution 
The CRC has also proposed the SAV system for use in the Lower 
House reserved seats, for the Rotuman seat of the Upper House, for 
the Presidential team, and for certain positions requiring only one 
person. As indicated earlier, it is as good a system as there is for 
filling just one position. It is suitable therefore for the latter tasks, but 
not for the election of members to the reserved seats of the Lower 
House. These seats should be filled using a system suitable for 
multimember constituencies. However, an exception can be made in 
both Upper and Lower Houses where it is felt that a particular 
constituency cannot reasonably be multimember. In that case, use of 
the SAV system is called for. For all multimember constituencies, the 
STV system is strongly recommended. 
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Upper House 
The CRC has proposed that there be an Upper House consisting of 35 
members: 28 members representing the 14 provinces (two each), one 
member representing Rotuma, and six members appointed by the 
President (Fiji CRC 1996:302). There is a gap, however, in the CRC's 
explanation of the Upper House electoral system. Each of the 14 
provinces is to elect two representatives. But are they to be elected 
singly, or are they to be elected together treating each province as a 
two-member constituency? This proposal could be realised by 
dividing each province into halves except that it is ruled out by 
paragraph 10.117 (Fiji CRC 1996:331), which says there is no need for 
boundaries to be set for the Upper House elections. 
The CRC states that 'the revised arrangements ... should comply 
with the international standards by applying the principle of equal 
·suffrage' (Fiji CRC 1996:290). However, it justifies using the 
provinces as the basis for representation in the Upper House in this 
way 
Where the Upper House is designed to allow the representation of 
particular territorial units of unequal geographical size and 
population, there is a recognised freedom to depart from the 
principle that every vote should be of equal value (Fiji CRC 
1996:296). 
However the provinces are of very different sizes so the 
representation will be far from equal, and the arrangement clearly 
favours Fijians. 6 There is no need to represent the provinces in this 
unfair way. In a PR system the provinces could get much more 
meaningful as well as fair representation-a fact the CRC chooses to 
ignore. While the CRC supports provincial representation in the 
Upper House, it is prepared to question it in the Lower House 
the use of the provinces as constituencies for the election of the Fijian 
members .. . had led to divided loyalties. It was not always clear 
whether members represented their parties or the Provincial 
Councils which had often been instrumental in their selection. In 
addition, the old iJ:tter-provincial rivalries had tended to come to the 
fore, to the detriment of a focus on national issues and interests. For 
these reasons, we consider that the provinces should no longer be the 
constituencies for the Fijian reserved seats [in the Lower House] (Fiji 
CRC 1996:296). 
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The CRC fails to point out that, even though more people than 
Fijians will be electing the Upper House candidates, the same 
'divided loyalties' and 'inter-provincial rivalries' will exist and exert 
their influence. 
The main reason for having presidential appointees is the 
unrepresentative electoral system-which the CRC has advocated for 
both the Upper and Lower Houses. The CRC says 'there should be 
provision for the appointment to the Bose e Cake [Upper House] of a 
limited number of members to represent communities and groups 
that would otherwise be under-represented in Parliament' (Fiji CRC 
1996:298). If a PR system were employed, under-representation of 
smaller groups would be minimal, and occasional. The presidential 
appointees exist specifically to make up for smaller groups' under-
representation but cannot be expected to do so adequately or 
consistently. In addition, there is, obviously, the disadvantage that 
these representatives are the President's choice, not the choice of the 
minority groups themselves. 
Lower House 
The CRC has suggested that 45 of the total 70 seats of the Lower 
House be elected on a common roll. This is a major change both from 
the present and previous electoral systems in Fiji. It is an expression 
of the idea that all citizens are equal partners in electing the leader-
ship of the country. 
The CRC proposes dividing the country into 15 three-member 
constituencies (15 x 3 = 45 seats) with an approximately equal 
number of constituents in each. It is not possible, however, to do this 
and retain existing provincial designations as supplied in the Report 
(Fiji CRC 1996:334). For instance, Bua and Ra are barely half the size 
of either of the proposed Ba constituencies. Boundaries are going to 
have to become highly unnatural, not just to get the heterogeneity the 
Report desires, but to get constituencies of equal size. The Constitu-
ency Boundaries Commission (henceforth CBC) will have to carve off 
and reattach segments of provinces in ways that do not reflect 
people's traditional, social, or political connections. 
By not presenting any figures, the CRC avoids confronting the 
ungainliness of the system it has proposed. For the reserved seats 
too, there is not enough specificity. The CRC does provide some good 
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rinciples that would help the CBC in drawing constituency 
undaries (Fiji CRC 1996:330-31). However, before agreeing to such 
system, politicians would need to have a much clearer idea of how 
e constituencies would look concretely. 
Regrettably, in the case of the 25 reserved seats of the Lower 
ouse, the CRC has again built in unfairness. The breakdown of 
ats is given as: Fijians 12, In.do-Fijians 10, General Voters 2 and 
tumans 1. However, the ethnic breakdown of possible electors for 
999 (the date of the next regular election) shows percentages of 50.7 
r cent,7 44.4 per cent, 3.4 per cent, and 1.5 per cent respectively. To 
t the proper ratio for the 25 communal seats, all one has to do is 
"vide these figures by 4. This gives 12.7, 11.1, 0.8 and 0.4. The seat 
tio therefore should not be 12-10-2-1, but 12-11-1-1.8 The CRC says 
the following 
We consider that the allocation should be based on population 
figures. Without creating imbalancing, it should also take account of 
historical and other factors that have affected the present and past 
allocations of communal seats (Fiji CRC 1996:294). 
What the last sentence means in plain English is: 'We will 
aintain the traditional pro-General-Voter and anti-Indian bias'.9 
Even though the population of In.do-Fijians is projected to drop in the 
future, that of General Voters are projected to drop even more. In any 
event, the reserved seats are supposed to be a temporary 
:'arrangement. 
We must also consider the rationale for the 25 reserved seats that 
lhe CRC has proposed as a transitional measure. It is an 
'understandable concession made to help the populace-especially 
l;jians perhaps-to accept the new arrangements more readily. The CRC 
is also right in claiming that any more reserved seats would tend to 
defeat the purpose of the open seats. It must be pointed out, 
however, that the need to retain any reserved seats at all in the Lower 
liouse is brought about by the electoral system the CRC has 
proposed. If the STV system were employed, such reserved seats 
Would not be necessary. The desired transitional guarantee could be 
achieved in another and much more reassuring way. 
The transitional guarantee I will suggest to go along with STV can 
be straightforwardly withdrawn when its usefulness has expired. 
Not so the reserved seats proposed by the CRC. There is the grave 
•::;. 
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danger that the transitional arrangements will remain permanent. 
This is Fiji's experience, with the 1970 arrangements and the shelving 
of the Street Commission's report. All the more so with the CRC's 
electoral system, since it will soon be obvious that it does not 
guarantee fair ethnic representation. It will likely be insisted upon 
that the reserved seats remain in e?<istence indefinitely so as to give at 
least some assurance in this regard. 
The CRC's electoral system arguments 
Chapter 10 of the CRC's report commences by considering the main 
kinds of voting system. Its criticism of FPP is accurate, and its claim 
that AV is a refinement of FPP is true. The CRC argues that 'like PR 
systems, AV mitigates the winner-take-all aspects of FPP and 
generally achieves better proportionality of seats to votes than the 
FPP system' (Fiji CRC 1996:306). However, as I have argued above, 
when used over a number of constituencies, neither is proportional 
in effect, nor can they realistically be compared with proportional 
systems. 
The CRC here implicitly acknowledges that proportionality is a 
desirable object. It does so again when it professes to want a voting 
system which 'is likely to bring about the representation of different 
ethnic communities and give them the opportunity to participate in 
govemment'10 (Fiji CRC 1996:308). By its own admission (Fiji CRC 
1996:322) PR systems are superior in this respect to the AV system it 
recommends. The CRC also points out that South Africa's 
Constitution requires 'that the electoral system must result, in 
general, in proportional representation', though details are to be left 
to national legislation (Fiji CRC 1996:318). Under these 
circumstances, the CRC should have evaluated PR systems much 
more fully. 
The CRC does not point out that List-system PR is used by many 
countries, several of which have an excellent history of democracy 
and some being multi-ethnically constituted.11 The CRC does admit 
that a List-system 'gives better opportunities than most systems to 
include women and members of minority groups sufficiently high on 
the list to win a seat' (Fiji CRC 1996:307), but it criticises it for giving 
too much power to the party and for using constituencies that are too 
large. These criticisms are true for some types of List-systems, but 
remedies exist. On this point the CRC says 'Measures to reduce the 
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of the constituency represented through the list, or to open the 
t to variation by individual voters deprive the system of the 
plicity and proportionality it would otherwise have' (Fiji CRC 
6:307). This criticism is not well-founded. Any loss of simplicity 
proportionality in such systems is minimal. The only question is 
here to keep the proportionality more exact-at constituency or 
tional level. From a voter's as well as a scrutineer's point of view, 
ere is nothing in it more complicated than what the CRC itself 
ggests. 
The CRC states that 'under STY, the underlying principle is the 
· tribution of fractions of a single vote' (Fiji CRC 1996:307). This is 
true. The vast majority of votes are not fractionalised at all, but 
main with their first preference at full value, or are transferred at 
value. The distribution of fractions is in no way 'the underlying 
rinciple', and only occurs for some votes. Indeed some versions of 
e rules do not employ fractions but deal only with whole votes12 
e underlying principle of the STV system is to make each vote as 
ective as possible for the highest choice possible as registered on 
e CRC's criteria 
e CRC next goes on to consider the criteria for choosing a voting 
stem in ethnically divided societies. Here I group them together for 
ussion. 
Encouragement of multi-ethnic government; recognition of the 
le of political parties; incentives for moderation and cooperation 
cross ethnic lines. Being a majority system, MAV, in the CRC's 
view, will provide an incentive for parties to come together. If they 
o so, they will be part of the government. If they do not, they will 
.not. But what the CRC does not go on to say is that failure of a party 
ltt> be part of the government is likely to lead to its being grossly 
under-represented in the Lower House, or not represented at all. This 
is certainly a strong incentive to be in the winning team, but will it 
not drive some politicians to desperate ends? As one renowned 
electoral expert says 
The second ballot and alternative vote are clearly often responsible 
for unhappy effects on the relations between the parties .. :[and] may 
involve party combinations that are quite incongruous and dictated 
by nothing more than political opportunism (Lakeman 1970:68). 
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Fiji has already had experience of incongruous combinations and 
their effects, such as the Labour Party's support for Major-General 
Rabuka's prime-ministership in 1992. While this could take place 
under any electoral system, Fiji's experience should make it wary of 
adopting a political model whi~ actively encourages deals of this 
kind. Desperate deals are too easily reneged upon, with consequent 
accusations of misinterpretation or betrayal, which in tum may even 
embitter inter-ethnic relations. 
The CRC's assumption is that in order to get a majority, parties 
will run a wider range of candidates, formally unite, enter into 
coalition, or agree to trade preferences (or even not contest seats), on 
multi-ethnic grounds.13 However, it is important to consider 
alternative scenarios. 
Over the past 30 years, parties could have joined together on 
multi-ethnic grounds. There was nothing stopping them. Surely we 
must learn from that experience. The vast majority of people are 
likely to vote on ethnic grounds. The Fijians do not need the lndo-
Fijians in order to form a government. They form almost 50 per cent 
of the electorate on their own (Fiji CRC 1996:791). The Rotumans 
alone would bring the total above 50 per cent-not to mention 
citizens of Pacific island origin and General Voters, the vast majority 
of whom have supported Fijians politically over the years. 
The MAV system, instead of shutting out some of the more 
extreme groups in favour of multi-ethnic combinations, may well 
have the opposite effect of driving the various parties of one ethnicity 
together (as in 1977 and post-coup 1987). And of course a new voting 
system is going to make all groups feel threatened until they see how 
it works. The CRC is aware that an ethnically based party could win 
the election outright, but points out that Fiji's ethnic groups have 
factionalised in the past and can be expected to do so again in the 
future (Fiji CRC 1996:316). But what happens in the meantime? The 
AV electoral system, which is supposed to promote multi-ethnic 
government could provide instead a mono-ethnic government and, 
because of the lopsided nature of the system, could well leave the 
other major community grossly under-represented. How can this be 
preferable to PR where, at the very least, ethnic balance will be 
maintained? 
A not unlikely MA V scenario is the re-emergence of an Alliance 
type mega-party, basically Fijian in composition but with a sprinkling 
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other support, including the odd Indo-Fijian. It would not really be 
ulti-ethnic government any more than was the Alliance party's 
"od of rule from 1970 to 1987. Other parties, mainly Indo-Fijian, 
ould languish in opposition, but because of the extreme 
proportionality of the MA V system, their numbers could be very 
all. The system is likely to maintain the one party in government 
a long period-like the Alliance of yore, and like the situation in 
aysia where, as the CRC notes, 'the ruling National Front, 
erly known as the Alliance, has been in power since before 
dependence' (Fiji CRC 1996:285). But Fijians should not get too 
erjoyed at this. Just as the Alliance did eventually lose in Fiji, so 
y new coalition could ultimately lose. Such loss is likely to be far 
orse than 1977or1987, because at least then, the number of Fijians 
the Lower House remained constant. With the MAV system their 
l;>ers could drop severely. 
It may be felt that I am being unduly pessimistic, but such 
tematives must be considered. Anew spirit of multi-ethnic 
peration could take hold, and a sincere undertaking to follow the 
irit of the Compact could push some major parties in the direction 
true multi-ethnic government. But if so, there is no need for the 
Y system. If the right spirit is there, a PR system, with all the 
·ous groups (including multi-ethnic parties) fairly represented, 
· produce a government of those parties who are genuinely 
pared to work together for this end. PR will produce what might 
called a 'love-marriage' of parties freely committing themselves to 
orking together. MAV will produce a 'shotgun-marriage' of parties 
ed by the system to enter liaisons they are not serious about. 
The CRC's explanation of its so-called incentives, though at first 
t lengthy (Fiji CRC 1996:315-17), is meagre. The main point from 
Voter's perspective is that the CRC expects parties to get voters to 
de preferences-that is, to give high preferences to this or that 
with similar policies. It says 'only moderate parties with 
ciliatory policies will agree to trade preferences and be able to 
uade their supporters to honour the agreement' (Fiji CRC 
:316), and draws the conclusion that multi-ethnic parties will 
refore triumph. But there is no evidence that only moderate 
·es will agree to trade preferences. Fiji's experience has shown 
t even unlikely extremes are willing to enter into political deals in 
uit of advantage.14 
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The CRC declares 
The overall effect of proportional systems, compared with AV or even 
PPP, is that, if people vote communally, ethnic parties can expect to 
succeed in getting a number of candidates elected in proportion to 
the number of their community members in the constituency, and 
therefore the country. This is irrespective of whether they are 
moderate and seek to reach accommodations with the ethnic parties 
of other communities (Fiji CRC 1996:317). 
But surely that is only fair? What better recommendation for PR? 
The CRC, however, is fully prepared to deprive these parties and 
their supporters of due representation by using the AV system. 
Some supporters of majoritarian systems (such as AV) maintain 
that what people want when they vote is influence, not 
representation. Nevertheless, many people vote knowing full well 
their vote will not elect anybody, and many parties (and candidates) 
run knowing they will gain no real power even if elected. What such 
people and parties want is to express their adherence to certain 
principles, and to be counted. 
The electoral system cannot be expected to do everything. The 
first task is to choose an electoral system that will represent the 
people fairly according to their wishes-a PR system. The next task is 
to ensure that these representatives have sufficient by setting up 
suitable structures for governance. One could have, for example, a 
Government of National Unity, a formal power-sharing arrangement, 
a more informal arrangement on Swiss lines, or a Government-
Opposition model where the Opposition has the means, as well as 
the clear right and obligation, to contribute constructively to the 
development of policy. The CRC has opted for the Government-
Opposition model. While one could question whether this is really 
the best model for Fiji's circumstances, the CRC has nevertheless 
made worthwhile suggestions for greater inter-ethnic cooperation. 
They are not part of the electoral system however, and hence beyond 
the scope of this chapter. The point to be made, though, is that 
solutions to the quest for multi-ethnic government can be found 
outside the electoral system. The electoral system chosen should 
(unlike the present one) be fully open to such developments. Forcing 
too many issues into the electoral system corrupts the system itself, 
and creates as many problems as it solves. 
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The CRC's conclusion that 'AV is greatly to be preferred to PR' 
··i CRC 1996:317) is at variance with the facts. If the CRC's hopes 
not realised the results could be disastrous. If the government 
out to be ethnically based and in addition the Lower House has 
sided representation, Fiji's political situation could become very 
er. With PR, however, an ethnically based government would at 
t be accompanied by fair representation, politically and 
"cally. On the other hand, if things worked out for MAV and 
ulti-ethnic government were achieved, the chances are great that 
y would have worked out just as well under PR. Consideration of 
.. ,s history is instructive. The Alliance and NFP parties did make 
me efforts towards multi-ethnicity, and the Bavadra coalition 
vernment was a substantial further move towards multi-ethnic 
vernment. All Fiji needs is a voting system that, unlike MAV, the 
0 or the 1990 systems, is fair, non-threatening, and responsive to 
people's wishes. It is then probable that multi-ethnic government 
ould develop rapidly. 
Effective representation of constituents. Although the CRC sets 
'fairness to political parties' as a separate criterion it does not 
ention 'fairness to voters'. Because the AV system elects people, it 
not make them representatives. If 51 per cent of the people can 
tall three 'representatives' of a constituency, who represents the 
er 49 per cent? Where is the 'effective representation'? 
The objections made to the List-system by the CRC regarding 
tituencies (Fiji CRC 1996:318) do not stand up to examination. 
e objection made to the STV system is also unsound. While the 
C is critical of parliamentarians neglecting parliamentary duties 
constituency work, it never takes up the wider question of the 
ountability of members of Parliament. 
The CRC has repeated the stock objection to the STV system 
0
thout looking at the weighty counter-arguments which have been 
de. It does not consider, for instance, how party candidates are 
ted by their parties. Are they selected democratically or not? Is it 
t often enough the case that an elite group decide on the party 
didate, and the 'election' is in fact a matter of 'ratification' by the 
ple of a choice already made? A system like STV re-inserts some 
ocracy into this process of selection. Even where there is a good 
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process, it is the MP's task to represent the voters, not just the party 
faithful, so it is fitting that the voters should have some choice in the 
matter of who is to be their candidate. What the CRC sees as a fault 
in STV is in fact a considerable virtue. 
Nor does this competition work against a party's interests. Party 
regulations can keep it within certain bounds. Backbenchers are 
likely to be all in favour of enabling talent and hard work to triumph 
over cronyism and elitism within the party. Party leaders see its 
advantage too as it serves to weed out slackness in the party. True, 
there may be very able potential MPs who may not be great on the 
hustings but would be valuable in Parliament. The party would not 
want to see them eliminated by more 'popular' candidates. 
Nevertheless, STV does provide some reasonably safe seats where 
the party can place such people and thus promote their chances of 
election to Parliament. If even this fails, then it has to be concluded 
that such talented candidates should be in the civil service, not in 
politics. 
Effective voter participation. A most important consideration 
under this criterion is whether voters feel their vote will make a 
difference. The CRC points out that having voters list their 
preferences, as in AV, gives them a greater chance of affecting the 
outcome of the poll. It depends on the rules of counting whether 
one's expressed preferences really have much impact. Whereas the 
rules of the STV system clearly go out of their way to make people's 
votes have full and equal effect, the rules of the MAV system 
frustrate it. 
As was shown in the example above, a majority in the electorate 
can take 60 per cent of the vote leaving the 40 per cent without any 
representation. In many constituencies it can be obvious which party 
is going to win by such rules. Many voters may therefore feel that 
voting is a waste of time, even if they do show up at the polls. This is 
true for the majority side as well as for the minority. For instance, as 
many votes are wasted when a candidate gets 75 per cent of the total 
poll (25 per cent more than necessary) as when he or she gets only 25 
per cent. In either case the 25 per cent has been ineffective, that is, 
has not contributed to the election of anybody. The STV system, on 
the other hand, transfers votes as soon as it is clear that they are not 
necessary to elect a particular candidate, or that a particular 
candidate cannot win. 
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Allocating surplus votes under STV is indeed a complex 
cedure not carried out in MAV, but MAV has complexities of its 
. Whereas in STV each count consists of transferring the ballot 
pers of just one candidate, in MAV each count requires the 
ecking of all ballot papers (or an extremely complex sorting of 
in the first instance). 
Most of the discussion under voter participation is given to 
viding details as to how the voter fills out the ballot paper.15 A 
ative feature here is that the CRC provides an 'above the line' (or 
cket') option. This should not be allowed in either the AV or STV 
terns. First, when one objective is to keep the ballot paper simple, 
'ticket' serves to needlessly complicate it. Second (and more 
·ously), it is a deliberate attempt to frustrate the very purpose for 
hich the AV and STV system were devised: to encourage people to 
e responsible individual choices. 
Effective representation of minority and special interest groups 
d fairness between political parties. The CRC candidly admits 
t 'AV does not have the same capacity as proportional systems to 
the election of representatives of every group in the country 
hich chooses to organise politically and can win a minimum share 
the votes', but goes on to argue that 'the need for a candidate to 
·eve an absolute majority means that no candidate can afford to 
lect any small pocket of voters. Just as AV encourages appeals 
ss ethnic lines, so also it encourages appeals to women and to 
orities with special interests' (Fiji CRC 1996:322). These latter 
rtions are unsubstantiated. SAV has been used in Australia for 
e time but has shown no special merits that benefit 'women or 
orities with special interests'. Nor is it likely to even in theory, as 
is by definition a majoritarian system. When a majority and 
· ority viewpoint conflict, politicians will simply discard the 
ority one. If a particular minority group has backed the losing 
e, it can miss out on any representation. If it has backed the 
· g side, some accommodation to its interests may indeed be 
de-but no more than, and probably not as much as, could be 
·eved by a post-election coalition. This is true also for MAV. A 
· ority person may indeed get elected within a party, but the 
erall benefits will be no more substantial than for SAV. In addition, 
e MAV system actually works against minority parties-to the 
tent that it is called 'perverse' by Newland (1982:31). 
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In order to work towards gaining a majority or at least to gain 
some representation, two minorities, A and B, may negotiate a 
compromise and enter some sort of coalition. The problem then is 
that neither of the two valid viewpoints may get representation, but 
only some sort of middle ground which the voters may not be very 
happy about, but which is the only viewpoint on offer. Because the 
agreements are made pre-election, no one really knows the break-
down of support for viewpoint A versus viewpoint B. 
The problem for the CRC, however, is not just one of generating a 
multi-ethnic government. They strongly desire a version of the two-
party system (Fiji CRC 1996:322). An alternative and much more 
democratic view is one that provides the people with the choice of 
whether or not they want a two-party style parliament. 
A PR system handles both pre and post-election coalitions well. It 
puts in place representatives who have the people's mandate to do 
what is necessary to govern for the good of the country. Both STV 
and List-system PR have provided majority governments frequently 
enough. What PR does not do is artificially create a majority 
government where there is not true majority support, which is what 
the AV system often does. 
The CRC maintains that 'it would be virtually impossible for a 
party to win an election without obtaining a majority of the overall 
votes' (Fiji CRC 1996:323). However, in Australia in 1954, 1961 and 
1969 (using SAV}, the Liberals won the election though polling fewer 
votes than Labor. 
A worrying factor is the role of the Constituency Boundaries 
Commission (CBC). What principles will be used? Will the CBC take 
its lead from the CRC and draw boundaries that will disadvantage 
ethnic parties? For instance, by splitting off parts of a province like 
Rewa, they could divide Nationalist support among a number of 
constituencies and thus bring about the defeat of the Nationalists at 
the polls. That would be unfair, but if unfairness is a 'small price to 
pay' (Fiji CRC 1996:324) for the CRC, why not for the CBC? 
Fijians being the majority population, the CBC can be expected to 
try to design constituencies so that a majority of Fijians will win in 
the MAV seats. If we look at Table B of the Report (Fiji CRC 
1996:791), the comparative percentages of electors can be 
summarised as follows: Fijians plus all others 55.6 per cent, Indo-
Fijians 44.4 per cent. This means that Fijians plus all others should 
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25 of the 45 seats available, and lndo-Fijians 20, (if the voting 
ains ethnic, as it almost certainly will for some time).16 
This way of thinking is against the multi-ethnic concept the CRC 
trying to develop. But you can be sure that the CRC has not 
glected-nor will the CBC, the political parties, or the people 
glect-to look at how the seats are likely to divide up ethnically. If 
, 25-20 is a fair distribution of seats as between Fijians and Indo-
0ians, the total Lower House ethnic composition will likely be: 
·ians 37, Indo-Fijians 30, General Voters 2 and Rotumans 1.17 This 
ks to be a tidy enough victory for the Fijian group. If the General 
ters and Rotumans side with them as they have to date, the 
ce in the House would be 40-30. Indo-Fijians would hardly feel 
· eved as their representation would certainly be fairer than at 
y stage heretofore. 
But consider if just one open constituency changes hands in an 
·cally based election. The Lower House ratio then becomes 37-33 
ther than 40-30 (for, because of the MAV system, the high 
bability is that all 3 seats will change hands, not just 1 or 2). If two 
stituencies change hands (as in 1987), the ratio becomes 34-36. 
ow acceptable will this sort of scenario be to many Fijians, and 
deed to the CBC? Could there not be an effort to further strengthen 
e Fijian position? But if this is done by designing another 
stituency in their favour, the Lower House ratio will likely 
ome43-27. 
Let us say, however, that multi-ethnic parties are formed. What 
ould the ethnic breakdown likely be then? Well first, if the populace 
"ects the multi-ethnic concept and split their votes to vote 
· cally, the result will be the same as above. If on the other hand 
ey accept it and vote according to the party slate, the situation will 
vertheless be very similar. The constituencies being three-member 
es, the constituency slates for such multi-ethnic parties will almost 
be of the form: one Fijian, one Indo-Fijian, and one extra-the 
tra most likely being a Fijian or Indo-Fijian depending on which 
ic group is preponderant in the electorate.18 The CBC's balancing 
will thus be quite similar to that described above. Instead of 
orking in threes, however, it will need to compute the proper ratio 
r each ethnic group as derived from a mixture of ones and twos. 
A particular difficulty will arise if the main electoral division is 
tween a multi-ethnic party and an ethnically based party, 
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especially if it turns out that the multi-ethnic party is supported 
much more seriously by one ethnic group rather than the other. The 
result will be that the 'more tolerant' ethnic group will have 
considerably less representation than its numbers warrant. If the 
multi-ethnic party lost the election, this would be a death-knell for 
that party, and politics would revert to being ethnically based. If it 
won the election, the disproportions could nevertheless have a 
negative effect. The 'more tolerant' ethnic group could well have a 
majority in the governing multi-ethnic party, but a minority in the 
Lower House. Resentment could rise as this ethnic group is 
numerically dominated not just in the Lower House itself, but in 
Sector Standing Commmittees and so on. This problem could arise, 
of course, under any voting system, but its effects could be much 
more sharply felt under MAV, since, unlike a PR system, it can 
notably distort ethnic proportions. 
No matter what the scenario, it seems the CBC is expected to 
gerrymander the constituencies to better facilitate a multi-ethnic 
result. The Commissioners themselves say 
The design of constituencies deliberately to improve the chances of 
success of a particular party, or to exclude the effective representation 
of a particular community is widely condemned as 'gerrymandering'. 
But it is wrong to suppose that constituency design cannot also be a 
legitimate element of a voting system specially in an ethnically 
diverse society. Everything depends on the purpose for which 
constituencies are designed in a particular way (Fiji CRC 1996:313). 
The argument here seems designed to justify gerrymandering. But 
it is wrong to gerrymander 19 and that is explicitly what the 
Commissioners have advocated by-to requote the above words-
' deliberately improving the chances of success' of multi-ethnic 
parties (to the detriment of ethnic ones) and 'excluding the effective 
representation of a particular community' (indeed more· than one) 
(See Fiji CRC 1996: 317, para 10.62), 322, paras 10.81 and 10.82, 323, 
para 10.86, and 324, para 10.88). 
The whole question of heterogeneous constituencies is 
overplayed. The CRC is prepared to tolerate an ethnic imbalance of 
up to 90 per cent to 10 per cent (Fiji CRC 1996:315, para 10.51). How 
heterogeneous is that? Even constituencies with a ratio as low as 60 
per cent to 40 per cent are hardly likely to generate, of themselves, 
much cross-ethnic appeal. On the other hand, constituencies that are 
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"vided about 50 per cent to 50 per cent, while looking the fairest, 
under the AV system be the most dangerous of all. If all 
nstituencies were divided such that Fijians had the national 
erage of about 52 per cent, 20 they could not only win the election, 
t take all 45 seats! If, however, due to inclement weather or acute 
litical apathy a good number of Fijians failed to vote, they could 
wise lose, not just a few seats, but all 45. 
Of course, the constituencies will not be so evenly divided, but 
fact is the division will depend on the CBC, and anywhere 
een the extremes is a possibility. Furthermore, with even just a 
50 per cent to 50 per cent constituencies in existence, the 
tential is there for a huge switching of power (ethnically and/ or 
litically) on the basis of just a small swing of votes. If on the other 
d the CBC designs most of the constituencies so as to be 
·cally lopsided (say 60 per cent to 40 per cent or more), many 
ters are likely to lose interest in elections, in the valid belief that 
eir vote is not going to matter much. There is the problem too of 
· g to design constituencies for multi-ethnic parties in such a way 
t if the parties go mono-ethnic instead, the national ethnic ratio 
· not be too distorted.21 
In effect the CBC is a team of three people which will decide the 
mposition of the Government. In a PR system on the other hand, 
e degree of support for the various parties is tied strictly to what 
e voters have expressed. It does not depend on electoral 
undaries. PR provides virtual certainty that in an election where 
· c considerations will be very high, the ethnic proportions in 
liament will be fair. If it were used for the suggested 45 seats with 
e parties ethnically based, one could confidently predict there 
ould be a 25-20 divide (give or take one or two seats) between the 
o major communities regardless of their party affiliation. If the 
·es were multi-ethnically based, the divide might be a little less 
ct-perhaps out of balance by another seat or two, but nowhere 
ar as unpredictable as with AV. 
Even if the CBC gets the ethnic part right and provides an 
·cally balanced parliament, the AV system can still give 
traordinary political results. By gerrymandering constituencies, the 
might be able to get the ethnic mix it wants, but it will not be 
le at the same time to guarantee a fair party mix. Even if the AV 
stem yields a multi-ethnic government, Fiji could end up with a 
iji's proposed new voting system: a critique with counter-proposals 
122 
I State, society and governance in Melanesia 
politically lopsided Lower House. One multi-ethnic party could win 
all the seats, perhaps with a slim majority of the votes, while other 
parties could win none at all, even though holding 49 per cent of the 
vote! The range of percentages and the way they work-discussed 
above mainly for ethnicity-apply in the same way to parties 
representing other social or ideological interests. 
Effective government and effective opposition. It is not 
necessary to have an official Opposition.22 Fiji could operate on a 
'Government of National Unity', for example. The idea that 
government by a party holding a majority is more effective than one, 
say, formed by a post-election coalition is also unproven. 
Government and Opposition will be effective if the people elect good 
people to the posts, and provided the structures of government are 
well organised. The former, one must leave to the decision of the 
people. The latter is something for which the CRC can make, and has 
made, very useful suggestions, but it is outside the electoral system. 
Proven workability. This criterion is interpreted very narrowly to 
mean that the system has in fact been used somewhere. The CRC 
mentions the use of 'multimember constituencies in Nauru' (Fiji CRC 
1996:326) but does not follow it up. The CRC also mentions that MAY 
was used in the Australian Senate from 1919 to 1946. It was a dismal 
failure. It has not been used elsewhere for national elections and has 
no proven suitability for promoting multi-ethnic governments. 
Legitimacy. This criterion serves as a good heading under which 
to summarise my very strong objections to the CRC's proposed 
system. It is not a legitimate system because 
• its basis is objectively and ethically unsound. An electoral 
system is meant primarily to ascertain the will of the 
people, not produce willy-nilly a multi-ethnic government. 
To distort the people's will so as to achieve a particular end 
is unethical. 
• the system itself is clearly unfair. Up to 49 per cent of the 
people may remain totally unrepresented. This unfairness 
also leads to instability, since just a small swing in votes can 
achieve a large transfer of power. 
• the system is totally untested in multi-ethnic situations, has 
been used very little generally, and even then with poor 
results. It is quite inappropriate to propose a system of such 
dubious record for Fiji's problematic situation. 
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• the system has not been well argued. In discussing AV and 
other systems, the CRC has made errors of fact and 
judgement. An AV election could have a totally different 
outcome from what the CRC hopes for a multi-ethnic 
government. Even should those hopes be realised, the 
system could be disastrous in effect, leaving a large group 
grossly unrepresented. 
unterproposals-the STV system 
view of my very negative assessment of the CRC's electoral 
posals, it would be desirable for this chapter to make some 
itive suggestions. The CRC has said that its entire Report needs to 
read as a whole if it is to be understood properly. This is because 
y of its parts are dependent on one another, and because what is 
· d in one place helps to explain what is said in another. It does not 
ean, however, that the Report must be accepted as a whole. 
Choosing a suitable voting system is a vital part of the whole 
onstitution Review. Nevertheless, replacing the CRC's system, 
hether partially or totally, does not mean that its entire Report is 
t in doubt. On the contrary, so much of it is excellent. Furthermore, 
ere is a lot of material in the Report which actually provides the 
is for choosing a different electoral system from the one the CRC 
proposed. Changing the CRC's system can be seen as a modifica-
on or development of the Report, not so much a contradiction of it. I 
ropose that a system of PR, and specifically the STV system, be used 
r government elections in Fiji.23 The main advantages of this system 
be summarised under the following headings. 
e will of the people and neutrality 
e STV system is a neutral system that strives to reflect as 
partially and as accurately as possible the will of the people. Being 
preferential system, it allows people to express and nuance their 
ill fully. It provides voters with a variety of options (including 
ethnic ones) while in no way pushing them one way or the other. 
This last point has particular relevance for multi-ethnicity. AV 
allows one to express preferences in an identical way to STY, but 
since the quota for election is so high (51 per cent), a much greater 
percentage of voters are pushed away from their first, second or even 
third preferences before any candidate reaches the required total. By 
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having a lower quota for election (26 per cent for a three-member 
constituency) the STV makes it easier for voters to get somebody 
they really want elected. This, of course, is of great benefit to 
minorities who can thus get separate representation if they so wish. 
Genuine majorities do not suffer, as two or three of their candidates 
may reach the 26 per cent quota and thus get elected. Where the 
party is multi-ethnic, the votes of some voters may well contribute to 
electing a candidate of different ethnicity from their own. Where the 
party is not multi-ethnic, the voter may nevertheless have been 
prepared to give some later preference to a candidate of different 
ethnicity. Having got a candidate elected of the voter's own ethnicity 
(or having had him or her eliminated if he or she could not make the 
26 per cent), the voter may in fact help someone of a different 
ethnicity by this later preference. 
Obviously, one wants to use the higher preferences of voters as 
much as possible, not the lower, if one is serious about seeking the 
will of the people. There is little point in having a great range of 
choice if in fact the voter's preferred choices are bypassed. This is 
what tends to happen in AV. Note, for instance, that in order to 
reasonably guarantee a clear election result, the CRC requires voters 
to fill in 75 per cent of the preferences on their AV ballot papers (Fiji 
CRC 1996:319). This is because the AV system brings it about that a 
substantial number of voters have their votes utilised for candidates 
who are very low preferences for them. The STV system, on the other 
hand, leaves people free to enter as many or as few preferences as 
they like, since in STV the lower preferences come into play only for 
a few ballot papers. Clearly, STV enables people's votes to be used 
more faithfully according to their wishes. 
Fairness and proportionality 
To truly respect all people equally, every body of opinion must be 
allowed to play its part. It follows that every body of opinion should 
be given due representation according to the number of people who 
support it-that is, there should be Proportional Representation (PR). 
This seems so obviously fair that some find it hard to understand 
how people can really be opposed to PR. The reason for their 
opposition usually lies in their own political agenda. They are not in 
accord, perhaps, with the presumed politic.al consequences of a PR 
system. They concede it may be fair to have all viewpoints 
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resented, but having all these differing viewpoints clamouring for 
say, will, they reckon, lead to indecisive and unstable government. 
has, however, been around for a long time and in many countries. 
ere is no general tendency in these countries towards stalemate or 
tability. Even if there were, such a negative feature would still 
eed to be measured against the negative features of an unjust and 
presentative system. 
The problem lies not in the electoral system, but in the style of 
vernance. A system of government that presumes on a majority 
· g all power and doing as it likes with it, will naturally be wary 
fa PR system. Basic fairness requires that even smaller parties be 
otted their due proportion of seats. One sometimes hears people 
roclaiming the virtues of PR, but then trying to cut back on the 
roportional principle for smaller parties by setting a minimum 
shold in order to exclude them. The argument is that smaller 
arties are bad for politics: the political system gets too fragmented 
ading to instability and ineffective government. 
The case against small parties is grossly exaggerated. The classic 
ample given is that of a hung government which can swing this 
ay or that on the the discretion of an Independent MP. This one 
arliamentarian is regarded as wielding too much power. But his or 
r vote has no more power than anyone else's. What has happened 
that the other MPs have abdicated their duty of making a 
ponsible choice and are simply towing a party or ideological line. 
y one of them could have as much power as the Independent MP 
ut they have abdicated their freedom to do so-quite often under 
arty duress. 
The inordinate fear of Independents and of smaller parties stems 
from subservience to majoritarianism.24 The target is seen to be a 51 
per cent vote in Parliament. Independents and small parties are seen 
as making this target more difficult to achieve. But concern for the 
hole community would surely demand that a sincere effort be 
made to appeal to more than just 51 per cent. 
Accountability and responsibility 
If the will of the people is so important, there needs to be a means 
whereby the elected representatives can be held accountable to their 
electorates. The constituency is the place where this accountability 
resides. The CRC asserts the importance of the constituency, but is 
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critical of the fact that regional interests can interfere with national 
ones. Representatives, however, should have the freedom to 
represent local interests. Contrary to what the CRC implies in 
paragraph 9.170 (Fiji CRC 1996:296), it is not desirable to blur 
traditional boundaries to provide nondescript constituencies that 
have no natural cohesive principle. Feeling that a representative is 
one's own, and accountability to the electorate, are much more easily 
accomplished when the electoral constituencies stick to natural or 
traditional boundaries. This is what STV (as a PR system) does, and 
where it is so superior to a system like AV. Variations in constituency 
size are taken care of by having a different number of representatives 
elected according to the size of the constituency. Under PR this works 
out fairly. Under other systems it does not. 
It may be felt that larger constituencies will make things too 
impersonal. It requires only straightforward decisions by the CBC to 
decide which geographical divisions need be constituted as three-
member constituencies (because of their far-flung nature), and which 
should be seven-member (because of their high concentration of 
population). Modem transport should enable candidates to visit all 
parts of their constituencies as desired. Having more than one 
representative is a distinct advantage to electors as they can go to the 
one they feel will be most responsive to their needs, whether because 
of personal charisma or a party affiliation. 
Effective votes and effective choice 
A very important facet of a voting system is to ensure that people's 
votes do, as far as possible, contribute equally and meaningfully to 
the election. The STV system has very little vote wastage. What is 
more, all votes in the system have equal weight. It is the most 
effective system in terms of respecting the voters' expressed choices, 
and provides a wide range of choices in the first place. By having the 
vote transferable, voters can indicate their will in a very complete 
way. If a party is what is important to them, they can give all their 
top preferences to the members of that party. By putting them in 
order, they show which of them they prefer. If ethnic background is 
what is important, they can vote for people of one ethnic 
background. If religion, they can vote for co-religionists. If a 
particular issue (for example women's rights, a nuclear-free Pacific), 
they can vote for supporters of this position. When all these concerns 
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mixed up together, STV is better than any other system in the 
ss-section of representation it provides. 
Of course, voters vote for their choices in several electoral 
stems. Where the vote is non-transferable, if that person misses 
ut, the vote is 'wasted'. Even if it is transferable as in AV, the vote 
ay well be wasted as the candidates are unnecessarily required to 
t 51 per cent instead of a lower figure, and thus many voters will 
ve their votes end up electing nobody. Furthermore, even if a 
oter's choice is elected, such a vote may be wasted as the candidate 
ay have many more votes than really needed. The STV system gets 
ver both these drawbacks by having the vote transferable and by 
ving a low quota (not an absolute majority). If one's first choice is 
ut, the vote moves on to the next choice (as in AV). If one's first 
oice is already elected and does not need the vote, the vote 
· ewise moves on (which does not happen in AV) and is not 'wasted' 
that candidate (which it is in AV). As a result, a very large 
rcentage of the electorate has their votes contribute to the electing 
f someone they are happy about. For the majority party each vote is 
ital because it may lead to a clean sweep for the party. For the 
· ority party it is no less vital, for, the system not being winner-
es-all, the minority party may get one of the seats if it has 
ufficient support. 
Nevertheless, the STV system does not force the voter to vote in 
arty terms. A person's vote is not counted towards a party total as 
List-systems of PR. For very many people party considerations are 
ppermost, but those with a different approach should be free to 
xpress it. The STV is undoubtedly superior in the freedom it gives in 
· respect. The voters have a single vote, but they can direct it to 
have maximum effect according to their will. Parties having nothing 
to lose from this. The fact that some voters are not committed to a 
articular party means that the party will lose those voters' support 
even as early as the second preference, but the party will also pick up 
as much support in the same way. 
Integration and consociation. A final important attribute of a 
good voting system, especially in a multi-ethnic country like Fiji, is 
that it generates consciousness among the people that they are voting 
together as citizens of one country. It should facilitate the various 
political, cultural, religious, and other groupings in their deciding 
together on national leadership. There are two approaches to this 
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problem: the integrative approach and the consociational approach 
(Sisk 1996:34-45). The integrative approach tends to bring groups 
together by blending them, by mixing individuals together from 
different groups, or by forming new joint groups. The consociational 
approach tends to retain the separate identity of groups, but 
encourages them to respect each other and to work together. Both of 
these approaches can be positive, but care must be taken also against 
their excesses. The bad side of integration can be a tendency towards 
uniformity, the smothering of valuable distinctions, and 
preoccupation with the whole. The bad side of consociation can be a 
tendency towards divisiveness, a failure to appreciate what is held in 
common, and preoccupation with the communal unit. The electoral 
system needs to be one that is fully open to the positive dimensions 
of both approaches. It must help generate unity in diversity, giving 
the people the facility to decide in what areas they will integrate, in 
what areas they will consociate, and to what degree. 
Any system where the voters make only one entry is not likely to 
do this. It is all too easy for the voters to simply vote for the known-
for their own group, or traditional candidate. A system, however, 
where the voters make a number of meaningful entries as in STV 
(though AV likewise does this), stimulates voters to think outside 
predetermined categories and to consider the merits of candidates 
that may be quite distantly removed from their spontaneous choice. 
This can only contribute to greater bonding and understanding 
between Fiji's different groups as well as to more informed voting 
habits. 
Basis for STV in the CRC's report 
There is material in the CRC's Report which provides a good basis 
for choosing the STV system. In considering its objectives, the CRC 
pointed out that 'there are two schools of thought about the best way 
of encouraging moderation and cooperation across ethnic lines'. It 
continued: 'One view is that, in order to come together in stable 
multi-ethnic coalitions or perhaps a multi-ethnic party with broadly-
based support, political parties must have strong electoral incentives 
to take real account of the interests of other communities' (Fiji CRC 
1996:311). This is one form of the integrative approach. But as I have 
shown at length, the particular way the CRC applies this approach is 
unsound. · 
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The STV system is, I believe, an ideal voting system for Fiji as it 
corporates both the integrative and consociational approaches, and 
ill allow the future development of these approaches in the way 
d at the pace the people and their politicians want. Much of what 
e CRC says about making cross-ethnic appeals and trading 
references (Fiji CRC 1996:311) applies perfectly well to STY. At the 
e time, STV makes good and fair provision for those groups that 
ant separate representation. 
The CRC is also of the view that 'it is desirable to maintain a 
iform electoral system for all government elections' (Fiji CRC 
996:633).25 If the STV system of PR is chosen for Fiji, this condition is 
· fulfilled. Firstly, STV and AV are both 'preferential' systems. 
deed, STV and MAV are both daughters of SAV. This can be put the 
er way round. STV and MAV are both typically thought of as 
stems for multimember constituencies. When their respective rules 
applied in single-member constituencies, however, they have 
entical effect. In other words, the STV for a single-member 
nstituency and the SAV system are one and the same. It would be 
oroughly advantageous, then, for STV to be used for all 
overnment elections in Fiji. Whether one-member, two-member, 
e-member or multimember constituencies are involved, the ballot 
apers are the same, as are the rules for counting. Government 
ections in Fiji would thus be uniform. 
There are other features of the CRC's proposals that STV 
romotes. For example, the CRC recommended multimember 
nstituencies. Though I have shown that these work disastrously 
der MAV, they are a very positive dimension of STY. 
awbacks to STV 
fore concluding, it would be well to consider some of the possible 
awbacks to STY, both real and imagined. It can occasionally 
ppen under the STV system that a party or grouping (of any size) 
ts less than its due proportion. This is because there is a slight 
astage of votes in each constituency. For instance, if there are five 
presentatives being elected, five-sixths of the vote in that 
onstituency will have elected them. The other sixth may be quite 
ppy with those representatives. On the other hand, they may not. 
any election of course, some voters will be disappointed. But if the 
ople in each constituency who miss out on their choice (under a 
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sixth, on average) all belong to the same party or grouping, then 
some disproportion can creep into the representation. 
The problem here is akin to the problem in FPP, SAV, or MAV 
constituencies. It was pointed out that in these systems up to 49 per 
cent of the electorate (more in the case of FPP) may have no represen-
tation at all due to the fact that the same party can be winning in all 
constituencies. That can happen too for STY, but in this case the 
maximum amount of distortion is only 16 per cent, 26 not 49 per cent. 
It is also much rarer in STV that that maximum would be realised, 
because usually a good number of the 'wasted' votes-those not 
resting with an elected candidate-have been moved on from a 
higher preference candidate who has been elected. Such voters, then, 
will not be unrepresented. 
It is a defect which occurs comparatively rarely. It occurs more 
frequently and in a much worse form in the AV (and FPP) systems. 
Some List-systems of PR overcome the problem altogether but 
unfortunately have defects of their own. 
Other 'defects' of the STV system are hardly real defects at all. We 
have already discussed the matter of candidates of the same party 
competing with one another. We also briefly considered the 
complexity of counting. As the CRC said for the AV system: 'Voters 
do not need to concern themselves with the mechanics of counting 
and distributing the preferences ... We foresee no great difficulty in 
training the requisite number of electoral officers' (Fiji CRC 1996:20-
22). The principles of STV are clear and recommend themselves to 
the voter as being fair. This, plus an easy-to-fill-in ballot paper, are all 
that is required. There is the problem of non-transferable votes (votes 
that are in some way incomplete), but methods have been found to 
handle these fairly. The accusation that STV brings about too many 
coalition governments is also unfounded. 
One alleged defect is that STV provides only a single vote. It does 
not allow voters to vote for more than one person at once, thereby 
restricting them to one choice out of many, and not allowing them to 
vote for two or more candidates whom they actually support. What 
is more, a system that allows a multiple vote will better allow people 
with multi-ethnic interests to show that on the ballot paper. However, 
by being preferential systems, both STV and AV do allow multi-
ethnic interests to be indicated. The idea of voting is to have one's 
will taken due note of. While MV and MAV give a voter more than 
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e vote, the end result of these extra votes is that some voters are 
otably over-represented and others notably under-represented. By 
tricting everybody to just one vote, but making it preferential, STV 
ures that as many people as possible get represented and also that 
ey get represented by the person they want. Some List-systems of 
R that provide a multiple vote do not misrepresent the electorate 
· e MV or MAV, but they fail in this latter point. Voters' ability to 
lect a particular candidate from the list, and to register their opinion 
bout issues across party lines, is most uncertain. 
One further genuine defect of STY, however, is the fact that at 
arious stages of the election the lowest candidate is eliminated. This 
ay seem fair enough, but it could happen, for instance, that a 
rson who got practically nobody's first preferences was 
verybody's second preference, yet would be eliminated before this 
act would emerge. In practice, however, this problem is of rare 
currence and is generally felt to be a very tolerable one. AV, 
bviously, has the same problem. While other systems do not, this is 
ot to their advantage. The only reason they do not is that they do 
ot go as far as the STV and AV systems in trying to find out the 
voter's will. 
The electoral system recommended by the CRC is seriously defective. 
The STV system is demonstrably far superior to it. What defects the 
STV system has are very minor, especially when compared with the 
defects of the 1970, 1990, or the CRC's systems. STV builds on much 
of what the CRC itself has proposed. Furthermore, it was also 
advocated for open seats by the Street Commission, using excellent 
argumentation. STV is a transparently fair system which would 
operate very well in a multi-ethnic country like Fiji. It is a system that 
demonstrably seeks out and respects the people's will. Fiji's people 
deserve that much. 
It is not done for the Indian or General Voter seats-a further 
unfair differentiation that has been little commented on. 
Third preferences, because those 4 votes have already had both 
their first and second preferences considered but excluded. 
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3. A contender for serious consideration along with AV is the 
Condorcet system, (Newland 1982:15-8). 
4. Strictly speaking, all that is required is more than 50 per cent, not 
51 per cent. The figure 51 per cent (and other approximate 
percentages) will be used throughout the paper for ease of 
reference. 
5. Fuller details of counting, including a sample count, can be found 
in Newland (1982:31). See also Ben Reilly's chapter in this 
volume. 
6. This is in fact admitted by the CRC in 9.180 (Fiji CRC 1996:299). 
7. This figure is gained by summing the totals for Fijians and Other 
Pacific Islanders in Table B of the Report (Fiji CRC 1996:791). The 
CRC proposes that these groups be joined together for purposes 
of voting. 
8. Strictly speaking, the Fijians are more entitled to an extra seat 
than the Rotumans are entitled to even one! It does seem fitting, 
though, that if there is insistence that the Rotumans be given a 
separate seat, the 'cost' would be borne mainly by the Fijians. 
Both are indigenous peoples and have tended to support each 
other strongly politically; furthermore the Fijians do not have 
sufficient numbers to warrant a thirteenth seat as of absolute 
right. 
9. This may seem a harsh criticism for the misallotment of just one 
seat, but in politics-as the CRC well knows-every seat is 
important. 
10. Note, however, that it is not a mere 'opportunity' that's involved 
here, but a right: 'Everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives' (Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act 21/ 
1). Nor does AV promote 'freely chosen representatives' when it 
pressures voters to vote for some larger party that may (or may 
not) take care of their interests rather than enable them to elect 
the representatives they really want. 
11. The following are just some of the countries that use List systems. 
Those in bold print are multi-ethnic-Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Israel, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. 
12. Such versions of STV are not as accurate as those employing 
fractions, but are still fairer than most other voting systems. 
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13. These 'incentives' are in fact but a linear progression of just one 
incentive: parties must strive to be in the majority group 
(ultimately the government) and voters likewise must vote for 
such conglomerates; otherwise parties and voters risk being 
grossly unrepresented! 
14. Two examples are the agreement between Major-General Rabuka 
and the Labour Party already mentioned above, and the fact that 
Ratu Mosese Tuisawau and Sakeasi Butadroka ran on the same 
Rewa ticket in 1992. 
15. The presentation is clear and user-friendly, but there is no 
comparable explanation of the AV system itself, especially the 
MAV version. Many readers of the Report will not fathom how 
the system works. 
16. Traditionally, the 'all others' group has tended to side with the 
Fijians politically, but it would be unfair to claim that all have. It 
could be claimed that the fairest distribution would be: 24 for 
Fijians and others, 21 for Indo-Fijians and others. This would 
make it easier for the CBC to plan an electoral outcome where 
parties remained ethnically based, as the constituencies are three-
member ones and it would be difficult to set up a 25-20 situation, 
such numbers not being divisible by three. 
17. This total is gained by adding together the communal (SAV) and 
open (MAV) seats. There is always the possibility, of course, that 
a General Voter or Rotuman might win one of the open seats as 
well. 
18. In one or even two constituencies, a General Voter or Rotuman 
might take the third spot. 
19. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines 'gerrymander' as 
'manipulate boundaries of (constituency etc.) so as to give undue 
influence to some party or class'. 
20. This percentage would included Rotumans and Pacific islanders. 
21. This will be a most daunting task, since the CBC will have to 
draw up the constituencies before party alignments and voting 
patterns develop. 
22. Indeed the MAV system could result in no Opposition being 
elected, just as the MV system has done in Mauritius. 
23. In an earlier version of this paper, I also proposed a List-system 
as a possible (though less preferred) alternative, providing much 
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detail as to how it could be fairly applied in Fiji even using small 
multimember constituencies (3 to 7 people). This material has 
been omitted from this version of the paper both for reasons of 
space and because a List-system is, at this juncture at least, much 
less likely to be seriously considered than STY. 
24. Having said that, it must not be thought that PR invariably 
proliferates Independents and small parties. There are various 
kinds of PR. The STV system recommended here (and also some 
List systems) show no tendency to excess in this dimension. 
Indeed the STV system can be criticised as having quite a high 
threshold (see below). 
25. In 10.24 (Fiji CRC 1996: 309) it goes further and claims that 'the 
system has to be suitable for all these purposes'. This statement is 
wrong. There is absolutely no need for different government 
elections to be run according to one and the same system, 
although, other things being equal, a uniform system would 
obviously have some advantages. 
26. That is, a sixth, if the average constituency has 5 members. The 
percentage will increase or decrease inversely to the increase or 
decrease of average constituency size. This is why larger-sized 
constituencies were recommended above. 
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Party cooperation and the electoral 
system in Mauritius 
The tiny Republic of Mauritius, of an area of 1,865 sq km and a 
population of 1.1 million, is situated in the Indian Ocean, 850 km east 
of Madagascar. It was first successfully colonised by the French 
(1715-1810) then by the British (1810-1968). On 12 March 1968 
Mauritius became a sovereign democratic state but chose to keep the 
British Queen as the Head of State, represented in Mauritius by a 
Governor-General. Exactly 24 years after independence from Britain 
(on 12 March 1992), Mauritius became a republic, thus breaking one 
of the last umbilical links with Britain. 
The Republic of Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy based on 
the Westminster model. It is one of the rare former British colonies 
which has retained the political system inherited from colonial times, 
27 years after her independence and five years after becoming a 
republic. Of course, the Westminster model (winner-takes-all), had to 
be adapted to ensure power-sharing, a sine qua non for the survival 
and growth of multi-ethnic societies. 
Before power-sharing amongst the various ethnic groups could 
become a realitY in Mauritius, the country underwent some 
traumatic experiences in the 1950s and 1960s, the pre-independence 
period. Hence, we see the pertinence of the Mauritian experience to 
the Fijian problem. Successive constitutional conferences1 held in 
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London before independence were preoccupied with devising an 
electoral system for Mauritius which would ensure the following 
conflicting goals 
• a safe and adequate representation of the various ethnic 
groups comprising the Mauritian people 
• majority rule but at the same time respect for the rights of 
the minorities. 
These goals were to be reconciled by 
• encouragement of voting which would cut across ethnic lines 
• inter-party, and therefore, inter-ethnic collaboration at the 
level of government 
• the imperative of power-sharing amongst the various 
parties, thus killing any notion of politics as a zero-sum 
game 
• the growth of 'national parties', that is, parties which 
would represent the interests of all the various ethnic 
groups and would, therefore, necessarily seek genuine 
cross-ethnic support. 
The Mauritian social structure is not dissimilar to Fiji's. Mauritius 
is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious and, therefore, 
multicultural society. However, there is one major difference-while 
the Mauritian population is totally an immigrant one, Fiji has an 
indigenous population. Mauritius was first peopled in the 18th and 
early 19th centuries by African slaves to labour in the sugar 
plantations and to work in the households of the French and British 
colonisers. Following the abolition of slavery in 1835, French sugar 
magnates turned to the Indian subcontinent for labourers to work in 
the sugarcane fields. By 1881 the Indian immigrants and their 
dependants already constituted two-thirds of the inhabitants of 
Mauritius. 2 
The different communities 
According to the Constitution of Mauritius 
The population of Mauritius shall be regarded as including a Hindu 
community, a Muslim community, and a Sino-Mauritian community, 
and every person who does not appear, from his way of life, to 
belong to one or other of those three communities shall be regarded 
as belonging to the General Population, which shall itself be 
regarded as a fourth community.3 
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Thus, there are only four main communities. The weight of each 
community, as a percentage of the total population is as follows4 
Hindu 
Muslim 
General Population 
Chinese 
50.3 per cent 
16.1 per cent 
30.7 per cent 
2.9 per cent 
It is significant to note that if the Hindu population is added to that 
of the Muslim, the weight of the population of Indian descent is 66.4 
per cent. 
There are divisions inside each of the four communities. The 
Hindus are divided along caste, religious and linguistic lines. There 
are several linguistic groups within the Hindu community: Telegu, 
Marathi, Tamil, Hindu and also many castes, such as Brahmin, 
Babouji, Vaish, and Rajput. There have always been attempts by 
extremist politicians to foster divisions by encouraging each one of 
the subgroups to demand parliamentary representation 
commensurate with its numerical strength. The extremists claim that 
Marathis, Telegus and Tamils should not be categorised as Hindus, 
that their cultural rites are different and that they have different 
religious traditions. Like the Hindu community, the Muslim 
community is also divided along caste, linguistic, economic lines but 
probably in a less pronounced form. The General Population for its 
part consists of Franco-Mauritians (less than one percent of the 
population), persons of mixed blood (Europeans and Africans, 
Europeans and Indians, Africans and Indians), and persons of 
African and Malagasy descent. The General Population is further 
divided along colour, social status and class lines. The Chinese 
community is also divided along religious (Xian or Buddhists), 
economic (big business or small shopkeepers), and political 
(Communist or Nationalist) lines. 
Parties and ethnicity in the 1950s and 1960s 
In the 1950s and 1960s the Mauritius Labour Party, which controlled 
a majority in the legislature and which had cross-communal support, 
rightfully claimed to be a national party, representing the.intere~~ of 
the various ethnic groups. The Opposition party, the Parti Maunc1en 
Social Democrat (PMSD) which overtly claimed to represent the 
Party cooperation and the electoral system in Mauritius 
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interests of the minorities-that is the Muslims, the Chinese, and, 
lastly but most importantly, the General Population-pressed for a 
system of Proportional Representation to ensure that the 'minorities' 
would have seats in the legislature, proportionate to their numerical 
strengths in the country. The opponents of the Mauritius Labour 
Party taxed the party for being communal, defending only the 
interest of the Hindu community. The Mauritius Labour Party, 
founded in 1936, preached class warfare in the late 1930s and 1940s 
against the sugar oligarchy. The party successfully aroused the class 
consciousness of the workers and was able to rally under its umbrella 
workers of all denominations and ethnic groups to press for a better 
deal with the sugar barons-mainly white Franco-Mauritians-in 
order to improve their desperately low living and working 
conditions. It became a major political force in the late 1930s and 
pressed for an extension of the vote to the working classes. 
Fearing that political power would slip from their hands if the 
workers remained united, the sugar oligarchy instilled the poison of 
communalism to divide and arrest the working class movement. This 
is how politics became communal and ethnically based in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Since the PMSD claimed to represent the minorities, the 
Mauritius Labour Party (already perceived by the population as 
being pro-Hindu)5 had no alternative but to tum to the latter to 
consolidate its votes. In the 1960s while the Labour Party and other 
progressive forces pressed for the Independence of Mauritius, the 
PMSD-representative of the minorities-demanded an Integration 
or Association with Britain, ostensibly because of their fear of Hindu 
hegemony after independence. The propaganda of the PMSD against 
Hindu domination scared the minorities, and led to an exodus of its 
population just before and after independence to Britain, France, and 
Australia. Fifty-four per cent of the population voted in favour of 
independence (that is, for the Labour Party and its allies) in the 
critical election of August 1967, while 44 per cent of the population 
(mostly people belonging to the General Population) voted for the 
PMSD, against independence (Mathur 1991:268). 
From independence onwards both major parties made a big effort 
to become 'national', that is, embracing all ethnic groups. The PMSD 
accepted the offer of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the Labour leader 
and Prime Minister, to join a government of national unity in 1969. 
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The electoral system 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the electoral system and the mode 
of election to the legislature was the main bone of contention 
between the two main parties. Successive constitutional conferences 
held in London were haunted by the need to ensure a 'safe and 
adequate representation' to all sections of the Mauritius community. 
It is undoubtedly an achievement that this 'safe and adequate 
representation' has been made possible without the imposition of a 
Proportional Representation system which would probably have 
polarised the divisions along communal, caste and linguistic lines, 
thus rendering the process of nation-building more difficult. 
For the purpose of elections to the National Assembly the country 
is divided into 21 constituencies, 20 for mainland Mauritius and 1 for 
Rodrigues (a smaller island). Each constituency in Mauritius elects 
three representatives whereas Rodrigues elects two representativesJo 
the legislature.6 The present electoral boundaries of the various 
constituencies of Mauritius were drawn by British electoral experts 
in pre-independence days, to ensure 'adequate representation' to the 
two most important sections of the Mauritian population, namely the 
Hindus and the General Population. Ten constituencies are in the 
rural areas where Hindus predominate with the remaining ten in the 
urban areas.7 Thus the Hindus who constitute 50 per cent of the 
population would get adequate representation if, as has always been 
the practice, the national parties would field Hindu candidates in the 
rural areas. The General Population which constitutes 30 per cent of 
the population is the most important 'ethnic group'8 in the majority 
of the urban constituencies. With the support of the other minority 
groups, it can muster a majority in urban constituencies, ensuring 
that it would always get a fair number of seats. Like the Hindu 
community, it would get 'adequate' representation in the National 
Assembly. 
There is, however, a problem regarding the representation of the 
remaining two communities, the Muslim (16 per cent) and the 
Chinese (three per cent). National political parties do sponsor 
Muslim candidates in areas where that community constitutes a 
sizeable section of the population and one or two Chinese 
candidate(s) in a Port Louis constituency where the Chinese 
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represent an important ethnic group.9 Parties, however, go much 
further in their choice of candidates for particular constituencies. 
They do not merely look at the ethnic configuration of a constituency 
but also consider the sub-groups-caste, cultural and linguistic 
appurtenance-of the voters, ensuring in the process that the several 
caste, cultural and linguistic groups of the Hindu community would 
be represented in the Legislature. 
The electoral system is based on the Westminster First-Past-the-
Post system (FPP) with the important difference that whereas Britain 
has some 659 single-member constituencies, Mauritius has 20 three-
member constituencies. It is a simple majority system. Candidates do 
not require an absolute majority (50 per cent of the votes + 1) to be 
elected. The first three candidates, regardless of the percentage of 
votes obtained, are declared elected. 
Distortions caused by FPP 
Under the one-round elections prevalent in Mauritius, a party with 
only 35 per cent of the vote evenly distributed may get, in a three-
party contest, a majority of seats in Parliament. In theory that party 
may even get 100 per cent of the seats, if the strength of the other two 
parties are 33 and 32 per cent in every one of the 20 constituencies. At 
the 1982 elections the Mouvement Militant Mauricien/Parti 
Socialiste Mauricien alliance obtained 100 per cent of the seats with 
64 per cent of the vote (see Mathur 1991:282). The 33 per cent of the 
electorate who voted for the Opposition had no representative at all 
in the Legislature. The Opposition was completely wiped out, thus 
jeopardising the workings of the British-based parliamentary 
system.10 However the legitimacy of the Government was not 
challenged as it had the support of 64 per cent of the population. One 
may wonder what would have happened had total victory for one 
party or party alliance come with less than 50 per cent of the vote! 
General elections were again held in 1983 and this time the 
winning alliance obtained 52 per cent of the vote and 41 of the seats 
(out of 60) that is, 68 per cent of the seats, leaving the Opposition 
with 19 seats (32 per cent) for 46 per cent of the vote. In 1987 the 
winning alliance with slightly less than 50 per cent of the vote 
obtained 65 per cent of the seats. In 1991 again the distortion was 
more pronounced, the winning alliance obtaining 95 per cent of seats 
for 56 per cent of the vote, leaving the Opposition with only 5 per 
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cent of seats for 40 per cent of the vote. However the distortions were 
to become alarming when at the 1995 election, the winning alliance, 
repeating the performance of 1982, won all the seats for 65 per cent of 
the vote, leaving the Opposition, smaller parties and Independents 
with no seats at all for 35 per cent of the vote! 
Table 5.1: Votes and seats in General Elections, 1982-1995 
General Elections Alliance %Vote % Seat 
1982 MMM/PSM 64 100 
LAB/PMSD 33 
1983 MSM/LAB/PMSD 52 68 
MMM 46 32 
1987 MSM/LAB/PMSD 50 65 
UNION 48 35 
1991 MSM/MMM 56 95 
LAB/PMSD 40 5 
1995 LAB/MMM 65 100 
MSM/Others 35 
Notes 
1. The two seats of Rogrigues are normally contested by Rodriguan parties 
and are, therefore, not included. 
2. MMM: Mouvement Militant Mauricien, founded in 1969 and led since its 
foundation by Paul Berenger. 
3. PSM: The Parti Socialiste Mauricien a party founded by H. Boodhoo in 
1979. The party is now defunct. 
4. LAB: the Mauritius Labour Party founded in 1936 and at present led by 
Navin Ramgoolam, Prime Minister (Dec 1995-to date). 
5. PMSD: the Parti Mauricien Social Democrates led by Sir Gaetan Duval 
from 1966 until his death in 1996. At present the party is led by Sir Gaetan's 
brother Herve Duval. 
6. MSM: the Mouvement Socialiste Militant was founded in 1983. It was the 
ruling party from March 1983 to December 1995. It is led by Sir Anerood 
Jugnauth, Prime Minister from 1982to1995 (1982 as the MMM party leader, 
then from 1983 as leader of the MSM). 
7. UNION: the official name of the alliance of MMM along with two small 
political formations namely, the Mouvement Travailleurs Democrates, led by 
A. Baichoo and the FTS, the Front Travailleurs Socialiste, led by S. Michel. 
8. Others: include the very small political formations and the Independents. 
At the 1987 elections, the MSM/LAB/PMSD alliance won 65 per cent of the 
seats with only 49.6 per cent of the vote. The figure has been rounded up to 
SO per cent. 
Under FPP, a small swing from one party to another may lead to a 
disproportionate percentage of seats changing hands. If this is true 
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for countries with single-member constituencies, the distortion 
between the percentage swing in votes and seats may be three times 
as much in a country like Mauritius where the three-member 
constituencies prevail (see Rae 1971). In 1983 the results were so 
clear-cut with the winning alliance obtaining an average of 64 per 
cent in practically all constituencies, that it would have required an 
enormous swing from the winning party to the losing alliance for 
seats to change hands. In 1987 a four per cent swing in favour of the 
losing alliance and against the winner would have meant that the 
losing alliance would have obtained 37 seats with 50 per cent of the 
vote and, therefore, form the Government! In 1987 the losing side 
would have gained office with only two per cent swing in its favour 
against the winner. It would have obtained 32 out of the 60 seats!11 
Political parties, with the exception of the ruling Labour Party, are 
seriously considering a mixed system which would incorporate FPP 
and a form of Proportional Representation. 
Best losers 
Over and above the direct election of 62 members to the National 
Assembly, the Constitution of Mauritius also provides for the 
allocation of eight additional seats to ensure a 'fair and adequate 
representation' of each community.12 These additional seats are 
known as 'Best Loser' seats. Thus, the Mauritian Parliament is made 
up of seventy members-62 directly-elected (60 in Mauritius and 2 in 
Rodrigues) and eight Best Losers. The first four Best-Loser seats are 
allocated to under-represented communities (resulting from the 
results of the direct elections) regardless of the candidates' political 
affiliations. However the candidates must obtain the highest score 
amongst other defeated candidates belonging to the same 
community. The under-represented community is determined by 
dividing the number of persons belonging to that community by the 
number of seats that the community has obtained plus one. The 
community with the highest quotient is the appropriate community 
and MPs belonging to that community represent a greater number of 
persons than MPs belonging to other communities. A separate 
exercise is done for each seat to determine the under-represented 
community. 
The second set of four Best Losers is awarded on a party and 
community basis. The emphasis is first on party because the balance 
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of political power which existed soon after the general election must 
not be offset. In a close election, if such a rider were not laid down, 
the Opposition might become the majority party by winning a 
greater number of Best Loser seats. The candidates chosen must 
belong to the under-represented community. However the score 
obtained by candidates must be the highest in relation to other 
candidates of their party belonging to their community. 
Following the 1982 and 1995 elections there has been a massive 
popular movement in favour of the abolition of the Best Loser 
system, and therefore doing away with the vestiges of communalism 
in Mauritian politics. It is argued that the electorate in the successive 
elections held from 1976 to 1995 did not vote along communal lines. 
Instead the electorate's choice was more motivated by the program of 
the parties, the competence of the team presented by the various 
parties, the choice of a Prime Minister, political principles and 
ideology rather than by race, caste or religion. The movement 
contends that it is high time for the Mauritian Parliament to pass a 
Bill abolishing the constitutional provisions for Best Loser seats. This 
would in effect mean the abolition of formal ethnic representation 
and, hopefully, put an end to ethnically based politics. 
Party cooperation and sharing of political power 
The Mauritian electoral system encourages bipolarisation of the 
political system. The FPP favours the formation of two major political 
alliances confronting each other. A third party, or still less smaller 
political formations, has no chance at all to have their candidates 
elected unless the support is concentrated in one or two 
constituencies. There is either a pre-electoral alliance of two parties 
perceived by the population as representative of the two major ethnic 
groups (Hindus and General Population) or a post-electoral coalition 
formed by parties perceived as representatives of the two major 
ethnic groups after the election results are known. There is, therefore, 
a real sharing of political power by all the different constituents of 
the Mauritian nation. This sharing of political power ensures that the 
several ethnic groups and sub-groups have their share of the national 
cake, in particular the appointment to top positions in the civil 
service, parastatal bodies, municipalities, and in the private sector. 
Since independence, Mauritius has been governed by a coalition 
formed after the results of the elections are known or by an alliance 
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concluded before the elections. It is conceded that no party on its 
own can expect to win a parliamentary majority. Pre-election 
alliances and coalition governments are the rule. Politics in Mauritius 
has never been conceived as a zer0--5um game. 
Democracy in multi-ethnic societies does not merely mean 
majority rule, governing with 50 per cent plus 1 seats. Rather it 
means a readiness to share political power with other parties which 
are perceived to be representatives of other communal or ethnic 
interests. All the important communal, linguistic and economic 
groups must be represented in Parliament and in the Cabinet. Since 
the introduction of the Ministerial system in 1958, the British colonial 
power had assured that the governments formed were governments 
of national unity, encompassing all the various ethnic groups and 
political parties.13 Successive governments formed after 
independence have always consisted of ministers from all the major 
ethnic groups. 
In their bid to win political power, the two major parties strove 
very hard to be perceived by the electorate as 'national' parties. They 
would field candidates from all the major communities. These 
candidates are not 'puppets' but rather important personalities 
capable of seeking and obtaining cross-communal support. The main 
political parties in Mauritius have learnt a very important lesson-
namely that to win political power a party cannot be perceived as 
being solely ethnically based, defending the interests of only one 
community. Rather it must obtain cross-communal support. This 
stark reality has sunk so much in the minds and hearts of the political 
elite that today there is no major party which is ethnically based. All 
the major parties can claim to be truly national parties. 
Notes 
1. These constitutional conferences were convened by the colonial 
power to pave the way for self-government and eventual 
independence. 
2. In 1881 there were 249,064 Indians out a total population of 
360,847 (Mauritius 1891:1:7). 
3. Schedule 1, para 3(4) of the Constitution. 
4. The population figures, from which the percentages have been 
worked out, are based on the 1972 population census-the last 
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census when the population was required to indicate their 
communal appurtenance. There has not been ai:tY sign.if~cant 
change in the ethnic distribution of the population (Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development 1974). 
5. Up to the end of the 1950s, the Mauritius Labour par~ was .. 
supported by workers of all denominations. The Parh Maunc1en 
Social Democrat's propaganda that the Labour Party was a pro-
Hindu party was successful in convincing the non-Hindu 
'minorities' only in the 1960s. 
6. Schedule 1, para 1 (1) of the Constitution of Mauritius. 
7. See Trustram-Eve Report in Sessional Paper 1 of 1958, Report of 
the Mauritius Electoral Boundary Commission and also the 
Banwell Report in Sessional Paper 5of1966, Government of 
Mauritius, Port Louis, Mauritius. 
8. However, the Community General Population has an absolute 
majority in only one constituency. 
9. This practice which encourages inter-ethnic collabora!io~ was 
initially recommended by the British Electoral Commissioner 
Trustram-Eve in 1958. It has since then been followed 
scrupulously. 
10. The allocation of 4 seats to the Opposition through the Best Loser 
system provided a skeletal parliamentary opposition. 
11. For the effect of swings, see Mathur 1991. 
12. Schedule 1, para 5 to the Constitution of the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
13. During the colonial era, it was the.British Go_v~rnor who formed 
the Council of Ministers. He appointed as ministers persons 
whom he considered to be representatives of the various 
communities. These appointments would be carried out 
regardless of whether the. app.ointees w~re elected members or 
nominees of the then Legislative Council. 
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The recommendations on the electoral 
system: the contribution of the Fiji 
Constitution Review 
YashGhai 
In order to assess the electoral proposals of the Fiji Constitutional 
Review Commission (CRC), it is necessary to place them in the 
overall scheme of constitutional reform recommended by the 
Commission. The Commission states that its report is like a 'seamless 
document', whose component parts are inextricably linked and that 
'its full import will be grasped only if it is read in its totality' (Fiji 
CRC 1996:3). This approach to the recommendations of the CRC is 
particularly important in view of the 'social engineering' orientation 
of its report, whereby constitutional rules are deliberately designed 
to achieve particular results (as opposed to, for example, a 'liberal' 
constitution which theoretically seeks merely to establish a 'political 
market place' where different ideas and options may be freely and 
equally pursued). Indeed a social engineering approach was required 
by the terms of its commission. It was the task of the CRC to 
recommend a constitution that would 'promote racial harmony and 
national unity and the economic and social advancement of all 
communities', paying attention to 'Fiji's needs as a multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural society' (Fiji CRC 1996: 754-5). 
The CRC decided that these goals would be best achieved 
through the emergence of multi-ethnic governments. The 
Commission also set out the broad framework within which a multi-
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ethnic government would be established. It supported the concept of 
the paramountcy of Fijian interests, so long as the concept was 
understood in its 'protective function' and did not 'involve the 
relegation of the interests of other communities'. It recommended 
that the Westminster parliamentary system should continue. At the 
same time the 'important role of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga', or Great 
Council of Chiefs, should be constitutionally recognised. The system 
of representation should move away from communal seats. There 
should be an increased role for backbench members of all parties. 
The Constitution should protect individual human rights and the 
rights of groups, including rights to land. It also recommended 
programs for social justice and affirmative action for the Fijian and 
Rotuman communities 'as well as for other disadvantaged 
communities and groups'. (These points are set out in chapter 2 of 
the report). 
The rest of the lengthy and detailed report of the Commission 
sticks clearly and consistently to these objectives, and establishes a 
close connection between the various parts of its constitutional 
proposals. The report is admirably clear and well argued. It is by far 
the most sophisticated review of a constitution that has been 
undertaken in the South Pacific. However, there is not necessarily an 
internal coherence to its proposals. The role of the Bose Levu 
Vakaturaga and the constant emphasis on 'Fijian and Rotuman 
interests' (bracketed often with the 'interests of other communities'), 
the singling out of Christianity from other religions in Fiji in the 
proposed Preamble, and frequent genuflections to the paramountcy 
of Fijian interests are out of tune with its otherwise even-handed and 
humanistic approach. It would, however, be unfair to blame the 
Commission for these aberrations, for it was weighed down with the 
burden of history, and had to try to produce not only a fair set of 
proposals but also those which had some prospects of acceptance by 
the ruling elites in Fiji. Nevertheless, when assessing the proposals, 
these features cannot be ignored, since the report is a 'seamless web'. 
Proposals of the SVT and the NFP-FLP 
In order to understand and evaluate the recommendations of the 
CRC, it is useful to provide a summary of the submissions of the 
major political parties. This will help to establish the ideas that were 
circulating in the country, the difficulties facing the Commission in 
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establishing common ground, and insights into its own thinking in so 
far as it deviated from the submissions made to it. 
The position of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) was 
that arrangements for power-sharing should be voluntary but made 
within a constitutional framework which recognised the political 
supremacy (and majority in parliamentary representation) of 
indigenous Fijians (SVT 1995:45). Otherwise it had little to say on 
coalitions or power-sharing, being concerned largely with castigating 
Indo-Fijians and accusing them of all manner of nefarious intentions 
and activities. Its general approach was scarcely that of a community 
looking for inter-racial cooperation and amity. Under its proposals, 
the decision whether to form a multi-ethnic party would effectively 
depend on the dominant indigenous Fijians' party, although that 
decision would be influenced by its strength in the legislature and 
consequently whether it had sufficient members to establish a 
government by itself. Nor did the SVT say much about the electoral 
system, but in so far as it wished to retain the 1990 Constitution, it 
supported a disproportionately large representation of indigenous 
Fijians and opposed any form of non-racial seats or parties. However, 
it was not clear how far this position represented the views of the 
leadership of the government, as it was rumoured that only a small 
group had drafted the submission and that it did not enjoy the 
support of some senior politicians. Certainly both its tone and 
content were at variance with the position adopted by ministers in 
their discussions with the opposition leading up to the establishment 
of the CRC and the drafting of its terms of reference. 
By contrast, the position of the National Federation Party (NFP) 
and the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) clearly favoured a constitutionally 
mandated sharing of power. They had given much thought to the 
desirability and feasibility of power-sharing and constitutional 
provisions that would facilitate both a coalition type of government 
and its accountability to the legislature-which is reflected in their 
submission to the CRC (NFP-FLP 1995). The two parties claimed that 
the 'justification for some form of power-sharing at this stage of our 
history is overwhelming' (NFP-FLP 1995:54). They referred to the 
effect of the 1970 and 1990 constitutions of excluding a major ethnic 
group from any share in state power, or influence in its exercise, and 
argued that this had served to worsen race relations. They saw 
several advantages in power-sharing. 
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Under it the cabinet would provide a framework for inter-ethnic 
negotiations and would facilitate the resolution of many outstanding 
problems of the country which requires accommodation of 
competing ethnic claims. It would ensure that no vital interests of 
any community would be disregarded. It would help to develop a 
national outlook on major issues facing us. It would lead to increased 
responsiveness to public needs. It. would ensure greater stability in 
government and strengthen the party system. A particular advantage 
in Fiji would be that an agreement on power-sharing would facilitate 
an agreement on the electoral system-which is the most 
controversial decision your Commission would have to make-since 
every major community and party would be confident of 
participating in government and precise numbers of parliamentary 
seats would be of less moment than at present (NFP-FLP 1995:54). 
Their submission also discussed possible shortcomings or 
negative consequences of power-sharing but considered that the 
'advantages of power-sharing outweigh them-at least for now' 
(NFP-FLP 1995:55). However, in their proposals on power-sharing, 
they were concerned 'to maximise the advantages and minimise the 
drawbacks'. They realised that their proposals were not consistent in 
all respects with the Westminster system (although they were 
concerned to ensure that government remained accountable and that 
backbenchers would have an active role in policymaking and the 
supervision of administration). Their basic position was that the 
Westminster system as it had been constitutionally established and 
practised in Fiji had not served well the interests of the country. 
The principal part of their proposal was that power-sharing 
should be constitutionally mandated, not voluntary. It would be 
inter-party rather than inter-ethnic. Any party which obtained more 
than 20 per cent of seats in the lower house would be entitled to a 
similar proportion of seats in the cabinet. The expectation clearly was 
that this proposal would result in leaders of all ethnic groups joining 
in government but also that it would not inhibit the development of 
inter-ethnic parties which might result from a formula which based 
power-sharing on ethnicity. Nevertheless, there would be an obliga-
tion on the part of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister 
(drawn respectively from the largest and the second largest parties) 
to ensure a racially balanced cabinet (the minimum portfolios recom-
mended were 40 per cent each for indigenous Fijians and Inda-Fijians 
and 5 per cent for others). 
Yash Ghai 
Electoral s stems in divided societies: the Fiji Constitution Review 
The proposals of these parties on the electoral system were 
likewise determined by the objective of racial harmony and national 
unity-in contrast to previous systems which had 'pitted one 
community against another' (NFP-FLP 1995:57). The ultimate goal 
was non-communal voting of all members. However, as an interim 
measure, a certain number of communal seats would be retained. 
The recommendation was for 40 non-communal ('national') seats and 
31 communal (14 each for indigenous Fijians and Inda-Fijians, and 3 
for others). Communal seats would be elected from single-member 
constituencies on the alternative vote system to ensure a real 
majority, while the other seats would be contested on a system of 
Proportional Representation based on party lists, with the whole 
country as one constituency (with voters free to change the order of 
preference in relation to candidates of the party for which they vote). 
It recommended a threshold of seven per cent of the national vote in 
these elections before a party would become eligible for any seats. 
The NFP and the FLP expected that the system of national seats 
would act as incentives towards the formation of non-racial or inter-
racial political parties. There would be several incentives for the 
formation of such parties: national seats constitute the majority of 
seats; a party has to achieve seven per cent threshold to be eligible 
for a seat; a party qualifies for a seat in the cabinet only if it has at 
least 12 members in the legislature; and the largest party supplies the 
prime minister. It also recommended that no party would be allowed 
to contest elections unless its membership was open to all races. 
The Commission's approach to multi-ethnic government 
The Commission's assumptions about, and framework for, multi-
ethnic government are quite specific. The first assumption is the 
retention of the Westminster system, which it regards as having 
served the South Pacific well (Fiji CRC 1996:22). Its scheme for multi-
ethnic government had therefore to be fitted within the broad parameters 
of that system, which has not traditionally been hospitable to coalitions. 
The second assumption of the Commission is that multi-ethnic 
government has to come about through the choice and decisions of 
political parties, rather than be constitutionally required or 
mandated. However, it realised that a multi-ethnic government was 
unlikely to come about purely through voluntary means. 
Consequently, it was willing to skew the electoral system in favour of 
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multi-ethnic government by creating incentives for parties to seek 
cooperation with other parties, especially across racial boundaries. 
Its preference for voluntary over constitutionally mandated multi-
ethnic government was motivated by its assessment that, in so far as 
a multi-ethnic government would arise out of a coalition, it needed a 
stronger foundation than a post-election pact-as such coalitions 
tend to be unstable. Of course in so far as a coalition is mandated by 
the constitution, it has greater prospects of survival than a purely 
voluntary arrangement, but the Commission may have been 
concerned about the deadlocks that may ensue from such a 'forced 
marriage', and the consequent delays in decision-making and 
administrative inefficiencies (Fiji CRC 1996:20, 279). The Commission 
had great faith in the capacity of political parties to respond to 
electoral incentives and to negotiate and fashion deals. It stated that 
'the party system is deeply embedded in the [Fiji] political culture. 
Power-sharing should be achieved through the voluntary 
cooperation of political parties, or increased support for a genuinely 
multi-ethnic party' (Fiji CRC 1996:19). The Commission was therefore 
concerned to devise an electoral scheme in which the prospects for 
the formation and stability of multi-ethnic coalitions or the 
development of multi-ethnic parties would be high. 
The key to that scheme was the electoral system. The Commission 
believed that it would be impossible to establish multi-ethnic 
government unless there was a change in the electoral system. The 
electoral system had to create incentives for cooperation among 
ethnic parties or lead to the formation of ethnic parties (Fiji CRC 
1996:279). Essential to that purpose was the abolition of communal 
representation which had led to ethnic parties and prevented 
cooperation among them (Fiji CRC 1996:19-20, 279). However, the 
Commission recognised that it was unrealistic to expect at this stage 
to do away altogether with communal representation. The 
Commission's recommendations on the allocation of seats were a 
compromise between its preferred policy of no communal seats and 
the reality in which most parties supported or were willing to accept 
some communal representation, and that of the ruling SVT party 
which opposed any form of non-communal seats. 
There are two elements to the Commission's proposals for the 
electoral system. The first relates to the allocation of seats in the 
House of Representatives. It recommended that in a House of 70 
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seats, there should be 25 communal seats and 45 non-communal 
('open seats'). The communal seats would be distributed as follows: 
Fijians (including Pacific islanders) 12; Indo-Fijians 10; General 
Voters 2 and Rotumans l. The crucial part of the recommendations 
was the system of constituencies and of voting for the open seats. The 
Commission recommended single-member constituencies for 
communal seats, and three-member constituencies for the open seats. 
The reason for choosing three-member constituencies will become 
apparent after the system of voting is explained. 
For both types of seats, the system recommended for votingwas 
the Alternative Vote (AV). This system of voting has been described 
elsewhere in this volume. The essence of this system is that a 
candidate has to obtain an absolute majority (rather than plurality) of 
votes to win the elections. Voters cast their votes among the 
candidates in an order of preference. In order to determine the 
winner, the first preferences of all the candidates are counted to begin 
with. If a candidate obtains an absolute majority, he or she is declared 
elected, but if no one has enough votes, the candidate at the bottom 
is eliminated, and the second preferences of the voters of those voted 
for such a candidate are distributed accordingly among the 
remaining candidates. The process of elimination and redistribution 
is carried on until a candidate obtains the majority. 
This system is used in single-member constituencies in preference 
to plurality voting in order to ensure that the winning candidate 
enjoys the support of the majority of voters. The system has the effect 
of encouraging parties and candidates to broaden their appeal to 
their electorates. If an electorate consists of two or more ethnic 
communities (none of which is in a majority), the chances are that the 
candidate who appeals to and beyond his or her community would 
win. This may also lead to cooperation among parties (especially in 
agreeing to urge their members to cast their second preferences for 
the candidates of their 'partner' parties). It may even lead to multi-
ethnic parties. In communal seats the system would of course not 
work like this. Therefore the importance of AV for the purposes of the 
Commission lay in open electorates. However, if constituencies for 
open seats tended to have a clear majority of one community, AV 
would not work in the way desired by the Commission. Fearful that 
single-member constituencies would indeed be of this kind, the 
Commission recommended that open seats be contested in three-
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member constituencies to increase the likelihood of their being 
significantly ethnically heterogeneous, so that no one party could 
expect to win the elections on the strength of the votes of one com-
munity only. However, the Commission failed to explain clearly what 
the system of voting within the constituencies would be. The impres-
sion being that there would be one composite constituency, returning 
three candidates, as the Commission specified that the first, second 
and third preferences given to each candidate would be added 
together before the elimination of the candidate with the lowest votes 
(Fiji CRC 1996:329). 
There was considerable confusion among the readers of the 
recommendations as to how precisely the elections for open 
electorates would be conducted. This was one of the major reasons 
that almost all political parties (and other commentators) were 
critical of the proposals. The system of AV is associated with single-
member constituencies-the consequences of its adoption in three-
member seats were uncertain, and could indeed act to operate 
against minorities. 
A critique of the Commission's recommendations 
The impact of the recommendations was undoubtedly dented by the 
confusion about the method of voting proposed for open seats. It was 
impossible for political parties to establish how votes would be cast 
or its consequences, or how they might affect their strategies for 
political organisation or cooperation with other groups. Not surpris-
ingly, they tended to disregard the recommendations. It is not my 
purpose to comment on the recommendations from the point of view 
of the mechanics of the recommendations or the feasibility of their 
implementation. I wish to examine some of the assumptions of the 
recommendations instead. 
The Commission was at one with most parties and individuals 
who made representations to it on the necessity of multi-ethnic 
government. It departed from them in two important respects. First, 
its commitment to the Westminster system meant that it was not 
always prepared to accept the logic of some proposals for power-
sharing made to it, which implied a significant modification of that 
system. It would have been difficult for the Commission to take on 
the Westminster model in the absence of any large-scale opposition to 
it, but it is unfortunate that it did not examine (but assumed) that the 
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model had worked well in the South Pacific. In fact it has not worked 
well and many problems such as the lack of political stability, 
incoherent policymaking, and a large measure of corruption in public 
life, can be attributed to it (Chan 1988; Ghai 1988, 1997). In any event, 
the Commission could have made more of an attempt to recommend 
modifications of the Westminster system in order to accommodate 
the general support of multi-ethnic governments expressed in most 
of the submissions to it. It was also mistaken in its observation that 
those supporting power-sharing had not tried to fit it within the 
Westminster model. In fact the NFP-FLP had gone to considerable 
lengths to examine and deal with some of the issues that might arise 
from its accommodation within Westminster. 
The more important departure, partly (but only secondarily) 
aimed at preserving the 'purity' of Westminster, was in the method 
advocated to achieve multi-ethnic government. Most proposals 
assumed that political parties represented in the legislature would 
qualify for the membership of the cabinet in some proportion to their 
parliamentary seats. Most of them also specified the ethnic 
proportions that must be represented in the government. The 
Commission opposed this method, arguing that there was no realistic 
prospect of multi-ethnic government unless there are strong 
incentives within the electoral system for cooperation within what, 
for the time being, would continue to be mainly ethnic parties (Fiji 
CRC 1996:20). It was also influenced by the view that such coalitions, 
formed after elections, tend to be unstable. It supported a system 
which would lead to cooperation or partnership between political or 
ethnic groups before the elections-in fact, would constitute an 
essential element in their election strategy. For this reason it focused 
instead on the electoral system and came up with the specificities 
that I discussed above. It wanted the electoral system itself to 
provide incentives for cooperation between ethnically-based parties 
or preferably the formation of inter-ethnic parties. The success of this 
strategy depended on various assumptions that the Commission 
made. I argue that several of these assumptions were unjustified. 
It was central to the recommendations of the Commission that 
parties are well established in Fiji and that they are able to take 
advantage of incentives offered by electoral rules. It is true that for a 
long period politics in Fiji were dominated by parties, with two large 
and relatively well-organised parties. However, the situation 
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changed with the formation of the Fiji Labour Party. Its major impact 
was on Indo-Fijian politics and party organisation. The coups of 1987 
and the promulgation of the 1990 Constitution had an equally 
significant impact on political organisation among the Fijian 
community, with the SVT replacing the Alliance as the dominant 
party. Its claim as the party of the chiefs and its close links with the 
Council of Chiefs affected the configuration of party organisation 
among indigenous Fijians. It was neither as well organised or 
representative as the Alliance. Since these developments, parties 
have been less firmly anchored among their supporters and there is 
considerable fluidity in their membership and leadership. 
Another precondition for the success of the scheme recommended 
by the Commission is that there should be two or more parties in 
each community. This would facilitate cooperation or alliances 
between parties with different ethnic bases for the purpose of trading 
or polling votes. One could say that the existence of multi-parties in 
each of the major communities is an essential condition for the 
achievement of the goals of the Commission. It may be questioned 
whether the communities would remain politically divided. There 
was some incentive under the 1970 Constitution for the existence of 
more than one party in each community due to the existence of 
national seats. The community which dominated in a constituency 
could effectively determine the results of the election to the national 
seats, and each party had an incentive to field candidates for all 
national seats. So there was a role for a minority party within each 
community and, indeed, for multi-ethnic parties. However, the sense 
of communal competition for power so dominated the political 
system that, effectively, each community had one party only. 
The situation changed under the 1990 Constitution for two 
reasons. The first was the abolition of national seats. The second, 
more important, was the provision of a built-in Fijian majority 
representation and domination. Not only did each community 
become inward-looking (under a system where there were only 
communal seats), but the huge Fijian majority representation 
eliminated a sense of competition for power from other communities. 
Consequently there emerged different claimants to power in the 
Fijian community, while the pre-coup divisions within the Indo-
Fijians consolidated with the disappearance of the coalition that had 
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formed government under Bavadra. It is likely that with the 
introduction of open seats, which would be the key determinants of 
access to power under the recommendations of the Commission, the 
sense of communal rivalry would re-emerge. It is hard to predict its 
effect on the pattern of party organisation. I want merely to suggest 
that the solidity within each community, especially the indigenous 
Fijians, is at least as likely as bifurcation or the emergence of multi.-
ethnic parties. It is conceivable that the Council of Chiefs or 
provincial councils would attempt to close Fijian ranks Gust as there 
may be 'fundamentalists' among the Indo-Fijians). Ironically, it was 
the existence of a system in which seats were contested purely on a 
communal basis that produced divisions within each community, 
and created the situation which the Commission perceives is 
essential to the success of its proposals rejecting the dominance of 
communal seats. 
A further assumption is that parties have effective control over 
their supporters and can direct them on how to cast their preferences. 
It remains to be seen whether voters would overcome a natural 
tendency to favour candidates of their own ethnic affiliation. The 
more complex the system of seats and voting, the less likely is it that 
voters would understand the implications of multi-ethnic 
cooperation. In this respect the continued existence of communal 
seats might work against the logic of open seats. It is possible that 
given a majority of communal seats, the tendency towards internal 
communal divisions may persist. There is therefore considerable 
irony that the effective working of the recommendations of the 
Commission in favour of open seats would depend on the logic of 
communal seats! 
Yet a further assumption is the feasibility of the ethnic 
heterogeneity of constituencies. The Commission realised that a 
deliberate act of 'gerrymandering' would be necessary to establish 
heterogenous constituencies-and that such heterogeneity would be 
difficult in single-member constituencies. There are very 
considerable dangers in a deliberate design of constituencies. It 
would tend to politicise the process of their delimitation, which 
fortunately has been avoided hitherto. It would be most undesirable 
if the neutrality of the Constituency Boundaries Commission were 
undermined. 
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Conclusions 
I do not want to suggest that the scheme proposed by the 
Commission would not work in the way the Commission expects it 
to. I want to suggest that it may not work like that. There are too 
many assumptions and uncertainties about the system. If so, we have 
to assess whether it is desirable to put all one's eggs of multi-ethnic 
government in the electoral basket. The Commission's agenda is bold 
and eminently sensible and desirable-if it works. The negative side 
is that if it does not, the prospects for multi-ethnic government may 
become even more remote. The impression one gets on reading the 
CRC report is that it has made what one might call doctrinal 
objection to post-election coalition. In the search for its alternative 
proposals, it paid insufficient attention to the proposals for a 
constitutionally mandated power-sharing (even on a temporary 
basis). There is no doubt that the political integration through the 
electoral process that the Commission envisages is better than the 
alternatives it rejected-if it works. However, a close analysis of the 
NFP-FLP proposals (which the Commission does not undertake in its 
report, although it may have in its internal deliberations) would have 
demonstrated that the primary concern is integration through the 
political process. 
In the end the choice may lie between a constitutionally mandated 
power-sharing, hopefully on terms that would encourage multi-
ethnic parties, and a system which relies only on the electoral system 
to achieve that goal. In the realities of Fiji, the Commission may have 
underestimated the difficulties of persuading political parties and 
communities, particularly but not only Fijians, to move. away from 
the essentials of the old system of representation. By placing so much 
weight on an untried electoral system (and it must be remembered 
that it is untried anywhere else, not only in Fiji), it has provoked 
acute anxieties about the electoral system. The Commission thereby 
gave up an immediately more feasible alternative-that of a 
constitutional mandate. Ironically, the provision of constitutionally 
mandated power-sharing would have facilitated agreement on the 
electoral system that the Commission has recommended. Perhaps in 
the end the Commission was too much influenced by textbook 
arguments against coalitions, and an unspoken prejudice against 
consociationalism-notwithstanding that its other recommendations 
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are replete with the consociationalism of Fiji's past. However, even if 
they are not accepted, the Commission's bold and innovative 
approach and recommendations have opened up a lively debate-
and concentrated the minds of decision-makers in their search for 
multi-ethnic government. 
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ASSISTANCE 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) was established in February 1995. 
Based in Stockholm, International IDEA is an international organization 
working for the promotion and advancement of sustainable democracy 
worldwide and, within this context, the improvement and consolidation of 
electoral processes. The Institute's principle objective is to assist creatively 
and practically in sustaining and developing a democratic process in a large 
number of countries. The Institute also provides a meeting place for 
practitioners--from governments and electoral commissions to non-
governmental organizations and the media-to interact, share information, 
and draw upon each other's experiences. Its approach is hands-on and 
practically oriented. International IDEA hopes to fill an important void as an 
international institution, independent of specific national interests, 
providing a forum for interaction and the exchange of experiences among a 
variety of global actors involved in the democratic process. 
For further information on IDEA's publications and work programme, 
please contact: 
International IDEA 
S-103 34 
Stockholm 
Sweden 
Phone: 
Fax: 
E-mail: 
Website: 
46 8 698 3700 
46 8 202422 
info@int-idea.se 
http:/ /www.int-idea.se 
Publications on Electoral Matters from International IDEA 
International IDEA has a range of publications relating to the electoral 
process which aim to provide clear but comprehensive advice to policy 
makers and officials. These include: 
The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design 
While there are many academic works dealing with electoral systems, there 
are no reference guides which clearly, and in simple language, describe the 
choices and consequences inherent in the field of electoral systems for policy 
makers. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design is 
intended to fill this gap. The Handbook offers a comprehensive introduction 
to the world of electoral systems, which describes and analyses the range of 
electoral systems in use today and the experiences of countries who have 
used specific systems. It is particularly focused on the needs of developing 
countries and those holding transitional elections. It also deals with the 
practical consequences of different electoral system choices, and includes 
advice for electoral system designers. 
Codes of Conduct for Electoral Obseroation and Election Management 
The IDEA Code of Conduct for Election Observation provides a framework for 
regulating the cond~ct of election observers. The code is drawn from the 
experience of a large number of countries who have attempted to guide and 
regulate the conduct of election observation, as well as from the distilled 
practical experience of individuals and observer groups. It lays down 
guidelines for both the ethical principles which form the ha.sis of election 
observation, and for practical issues concerning sovereignfY, neutrality, 
transparency and accuracy that must form the backbone of any successful 
observation mission. The code also sets out some suggested professional 
principles for those directly engaged in observation activities. The IDEA 
Code of Conduct for Election Management provides a similar framework for 
regulating the ethical and professional conduct of electoral officials, setting 
out some basic principles and guidelines for the conduct of election 
administration. The Code focuses on the need for a consistent set of 
minimum standards in terms of independence, transparency, accuracy and 
service orientation in the administration of elections. Both these codes have 
already been adopted by International IDEA's member countries and used 
for elections in Bosnia, Nicaragua and elsewhere. 
Forthcoming publications include 
• Voter Turnout: A World-wide Comparison 
• The ID EA Code of Conduct for Political Parties 
• The IDEA Handbook of Electoral Dispute Resolution Systems 
• Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict 
Elections can increase tension in ethnically divided 
societies, like Fiji. The way constituencies are drawn and 
votes counted can also affect the result. First-past-the 
post can deliver lopsided results, while proportional 
representation may give excessive influence to small, 
fringe parties. 
Fiji's Constitution Review Commission believed a 
system of alternative voting in ethnically mixed 
constituencies would encourage politicians, and parties, 
to take into account the interests of other ethnic groups. 
This book assesses their recommendations, looks at 
alternatives, and considers how they might work in Fiji. 
Contributors include Donald Horowitz, author of 
A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering i11 a 
Divided Society,Yash Ghai, who has written and 
consulted widely on comparative constitutional issues, 
and Brij V Lal, who was a member of the Review 
Commission. It will be of interest to students of electoral 
systems, ethnicity, constitutional change, and comparative 
politics. 
The book is the first in a series produced by the 
Australian National University's project on 'State Society 
and Governance in Melanesia', and is published with the 
assistance of International IDEA, an international 
organisation established in 1995 to promote sustainable 
democracy worldwide. 
